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[gentle music]
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- Norman Gilliland: Welcome
to University Place Presents.
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I'm Norman Gilliland.
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The demise
of the Edmund Fitzgerald
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has been well documented
in records from that fatal day
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in 1975, and of course,
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in Gordon Lightfoot's popular
song from the following year.
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While some mysteries remain
as to exactly what happened
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to the ship
on that fatal November day,
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seeing the wreck in the
wider context of its times
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will give us some idea
as to what happened to it.
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With me is Thomas M. Nelson,
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the author of
Wrecked: The Edmund Fitzgerald
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and the Sinking
of the American Economy,
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co-authored with Jerald Podair
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and published by the Michigan
State University Press in 2025.
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Welcome to
University Place Presents.
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- Thomas Nelson:
Great to be with you.
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- I have to ask, originally,
with so many other people
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interested in the wreck
of the Edmund Fitzgerald,
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what sparked your interest?
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- Well, I think it comes back--
it goes back to two things.
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First of all,
there was a personal experience
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at a very young age,
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and being a child in the Midwest
in the 1970s and the 1980s,
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I took a trip to the
Upper Peninsula with my dad.
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It was a motorcycle trip.
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It's in the preface.
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And it goes and talks about
that trip there.
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But going up there, I went
to the Valley Camp Museum.
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In the Valley Camp Museum,
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there are a number of artifacts
from the wreckage,
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and one of them
was the lifeboat.
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And it, you know, I mean,
it's a pretty impressive relic.
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And for a seven-year-old
walking up to it,
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I mean, the stern
is just pulled apart
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as if a can opener
had just ripped it open.
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And it was almost like,
you know, walking up to it,
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you know, four feet, five feet.
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It it felt like this monster
was just, you know,
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you know,
just, like, grabbing me.
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And so, it was this image
that was seared in my mind
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and stayed there
for a long time.
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Then about 15 years ago,
I was running for office
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for lieutenant governor,
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and I was doing a fundraiser
in Milwaukee.
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And there was a gentleman there
that explained to me
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the economic ecosystem
of how the Fitzgerald
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carrying ore was at the center
of this economy.
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And since manufacturing was
a big part of the economy
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in the 1960s and the 1970s,
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the Fitzgerald was
absolutely definitional.
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And over the last
couple of years,
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I kind of played
with those two concepts.
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And the result of that
is this book.
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- Now, there have been
other wrecks, of course.
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I'm thinking in particular,
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there have been a lot of wrecks
over the years,
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but not too long before,
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in 1958,
there was the Carl D. Bradley,
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which had a similar experience
on the lakes.
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Breaking up, heavy weather
and all that
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and a loss of 33 lives
with two survivors miraculously.
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Why the Fitzgerald?
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Why has it captured
the imagination so much?
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And of course,
other than Gordon Lightfoot.
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- Talking to a lot of people,
I think they'll say that
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if there wasn't
the Gordon Lightfoot song,
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we wouldn't be talking
about this,
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and I probably would not
have written this book.
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But I think that there is
a lot more to this story
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than just a song.
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And if you think about
what makes a really good movie,
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you're going to have, you know,
compelling characters,
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compelling drama,
and a really good soundtrack.
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And those three elements
came together
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to make this incident as popular
as it has been.
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I also think, too,
different from the Carl Bradley,
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it's important
to look at a historical context.
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So, in this case,
it's the 1970s.
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1975 was probably
not this country's finest hour.
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And earlier that year,
you had the fall of Saigon.
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The year before that,
you had Watergate.
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You also had double-digit
inflation, on and on.
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And I think the American
people were looking for heroes.
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And if you recall,
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what happened with
the Fitzgerald is right away,
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it wasn't about a wreckage.
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It was about a mystery
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because people just
didn't know what happened.
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It was on the lake at one moment
and the next, it was gone.
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And so, it wasn't for another
24 to 48 hours
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that people realized
that it had sunk.
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And so, I think you combine
those things,
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which is those elements
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where later on, you
have a very popular song,
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you have this mystery
from the very beginning,
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which is a little bit
more different
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than your typical wreckage.
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And those three elements
coming together
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made this such
a fascinating story
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that has piqued
seemingly everyone's interest.
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When I went around
doing book talks,
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I mean, people were coming in--
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You know, people were coming out
from the woodwork.
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I mean, they had stories,
they knew somebody.
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They had heard the song,
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they loved the song,
read a book and so forth.
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- Let's start looking
at the vessel then.
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Who, first of all,
was Edmund Fitzgerald?
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- Thomas: Edmund Fitzgerald was
the CEO of Northwestern Mutual,
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and Northwestern Mutual
was the company
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that paid for the construction
of the ship.
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So, Northwestern Mutual
owned the ship.
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Oglebay Norton was the company
that operated the ship,
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and that was kind of unusual.
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Usually, there was
more vertical integration
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with the steel companies,
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so they went all the way down,
owning the equipment,
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the vessels, and so forth.
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But you had this dynamic
with the Fitzgerald
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where it was owned
by one entity,
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in this case
Northwestern Mutual,
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and was operated
by another entity,
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in this case Oglebay Norton.
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Northwestern Mutual entered
into what's called
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a triple net lease
with Oglebay Norton,
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which basically absolved them
of any liability
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if anything were to happen.
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And if there's one company
that knows
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how to write insurance policy,
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make sure that
that's gonna happen,
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it's going to be
an insurance company.
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And so, that was the case there.
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So, Oglebay Norton,
they had the responsibility
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to make sure that this ship
was in good condition.
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But they didn't--
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They didn't really treat it
like their own ship
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because it wasn't
their own ship.
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And so, the dynamic here
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was Oglebay Norton
treating it like a rental.
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They didn't have the same
incentive structure
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that, for example,
the Arthur Anderson had,
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which was owned
and operated by U.S. Steel and--
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- Norman:
We'll get into that ship later.
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- Yes, yes, exactly.
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And so, that's how--
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That's how Edmund Fitzgerald
fit into this.
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Northwestern Mutual had nothing
to do with the steel industry.
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But as an insurance company,
they had very healthy reserves.
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And so, they chose
to put it into a ship.
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- And another part
of the historical connection,
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I would think,
would be that this was when
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the Soo Locks were put through,
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and they made this ship as big
as possible with what,
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just a foot of leeway...
- Yeah, right.
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- ...to get through the locks.
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And so, whenever we hear,
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"Oh,
the biggest ship ever built,"
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you know, we kind of have
vibes right away
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that a little hubris
might be involved.
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[both laugh]
- Yeah.
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And so, it had a number
of nicknames,
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including Queen of the Lakes,
The Mighty Fitz,
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the Toledo Express
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because it went from Minnesota
to Toledo, Ohio.
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That was its traditional route.
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And it was the biggest ship
for exactly one year.
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Because a year later,
there was someone else
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that came out and built a ship
that was one foot longer.
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- What were the dimensions
of it then?
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- It was about 700 feet long
and it had 21 hatches.
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And so, within the hatches,
there were three holds.
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And so, the three holds
had the ore
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that was divided equally.
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And that was important.
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We can get into it later.
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And all told, it was certified
for about 26,000 long tons.
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That number
is also significant
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because there were a number
of times,
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particularly in the late 1960s,
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where the ship was carrying a
lot more than 26,000 long tons.
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And that goes to the night
in November of 1975,
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where you had this vessel
that was not in great shape,
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because the company that ran it
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did not have the incentive to
keep it in good working order.
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You had oversight entities that
were certifying it as seaworthy,
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and you had a company
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that was trying to push
the ship as hard as possible,
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as deep into the season
as possible.
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And so, late '60s
and the early '70s,
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if you're doing
30,000 long tons,
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that's 20% or 25% above
what should be capacity.
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- Not to digress back too much,
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but the Bradley
was the same thing.
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Tended to be overloaded
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and overworked.
- Right, exactly, exactly.
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- And was there no concern
at this point
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that pushing all
of these parameters,
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including into the gales
of November,
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would be dangerous for a crew?
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- Very dangerous.
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And there were a number
of crew members
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that knew the ship
was not in great shape,
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that going deep into the season
was not a good idea.
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And part of my book,
a big part of my book,
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talks about what I like
to call the 30th crew member,
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a guy by the name
of Red Burgner.
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He was the cook on the ship
for the 1975 season
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up until about September
or October.
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He had a doctor's note.
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He had a medical condition.
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And so, he took the rest
of the season off.
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And so, he was someone
who knew the ship very well.
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He had been on the ship
for ten seasons.
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He had wintered on it.
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So, he knew this better
than anyone.
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And he knew it was in bad shape.
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He had inspected the hull
and the ballast tanks,
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and at one point,
he actually took an executive
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from Oglebay Norton
down into the hold
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to show him what
kind of condition it was in.
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So, it was very well established
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that the Fitzgerald
was not in good shape.
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And going back to how
there was hubris about the ship
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because it was so large,
there was kind of this myth
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that the ship was
in very good condition,
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that it was the Mighty Fitz,
that it was indestructible,
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which sounds a lot
like another shipwreck story.
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Which of course is the Titanic.
- Right.
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- But I think
they have it reversed.
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And I think one of the reasons
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why there has been this false
narrative about the Fitzgerald
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is that it seems that
the narrative of the Titanic
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has been grafted onto the
narrative of the Fitzgerald.
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So, as we know,
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the Titanic had a ship
that was in great working order.
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It ran into an iceberg because
that's what the captain did.
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- Brand-new ship.
- Brand-new ship.
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But what happened
with the Fitzgerald
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is you had
a very experienced,
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well-seasoned captain
who had been in the lakes
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for about 30 years,
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and he was doing
everything right.
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He was doing his job well,
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but they didn't have a ship
that was in good shape.
247
00:11:05,599 --> 00:11:10,871
So, it was the opposite of
what happened with the Titanic.
248
00:11:10,938 --> 00:11:15,509
- Did it have compartments
that could be broached
249
00:11:16,677 --> 00:11:18,145
and still keep afloat?
250
00:11:18,212 --> 00:11:21,215
- Now, that's a good question
because the union
251
00:11:21,281 --> 00:11:23,350
that represented
the crew members,
252
00:11:23,417 --> 00:11:25,385
the United Steelworkers,
253
00:11:25,452 --> 00:11:28,021
had made
a really big issue
254
00:11:28,088 --> 00:11:32,359
about how the bulkheads
were not impermeable
255
00:11:32,426 --> 00:11:34,862
and that
if you hit high seas
256
00:11:34,928 --> 00:11:37,831
and the ship
was banging around,
257
00:11:37,898 --> 00:11:41,235
it was possible
for the taconite ore
258
00:11:41,301 --> 00:11:43,704
to slide into another hold.
259
00:11:43,770 --> 00:11:46,240
So, there were 21 hatches,
260
00:11:46,773 --> 00:11:50,944
and the 21 hatches were
divided 7, 7, and 7.
261
00:11:51,011 --> 00:11:52,746
So, there were three holds.
262
00:11:52,813 --> 00:11:54,181
And it was very important
263
00:11:54,248 --> 00:11:57,784
that you had close
to the same weight
264
00:11:57,851 --> 00:11:59,052
in each of the three areas
265
00:11:59,119 --> 00:12:01,054
so that it would be stable.
- Norman: For balance.
266
00:12:01,121 --> 00:12:02,689
- Thomas: Right,
but if you're, you know,
267
00:12:02,756 --> 00:12:06,226
banging around
on the waves in the Great Lakes,
268
00:12:06,293 --> 00:12:08,262
and that's a lot different
than you're at sea
269
00:12:08,328 --> 00:12:11,732
where there's kind of like these
nice rolling waves.
270
00:12:11,798 --> 00:12:13,667
Here, you know,
in the Great Lakes
271
00:12:13,734 --> 00:12:15,102
when you hit a really bad storm,
272
00:12:15,169 --> 00:12:17,204
which happens all the time
in November and December,
273
00:12:17,271 --> 00:12:18,739
if you go that far into it,
274
00:12:18,805 --> 00:12:21,208
that it was just beating up
on the ship.
275
00:12:21,275 --> 00:12:23,310
And so, it was very possible,
276
00:12:23,377 --> 00:12:27,848
likely that the holds
were running into each other,
277
00:12:27,915 --> 00:12:30,217
and so the taconite ore
was sloshing
278
00:12:30,284 --> 00:12:32,152
into the front compartment,
279
00:12:32,219 --> 00:12:35,689
you know, perhaps back
to the stern and so forth.
280
00:12:35,756 --> 00:12:37,891
And the union had said,
281
00:12:37,958 --> 00:12:41,595
"Look, you know, we need to have
stronger material
282
00:12:41,662 --> 00:12:43,664
"so that it doesn't--
283
00:12:44,765 --> 00:12:47,935
"the weight doesn't shift toward
the bow or toward the stern
284
00:12:48,001 --> 00:12:50,571
"because that's just
going to compound problems,
285
00:12:50,637 --> 00:12:52,506
especially
if you're in a storm."
286
00:12:52,573 --> 00:12:55,108
- Make it impossible to control.
- Exactly, exactly.
287
00:12:55,175 --> 00:12:57,578
So, that had been established.
288
00:12:57,644 --> 00:13:00,781
The industry refused
to push for,
289
00:13:01,915 --> 00:13:04,051
to accept regulations
290
00:13:04,484 --> 00:13:08,555
that would have
a more impermeable block,
291
00:13:08,622 --> 00:13:10,958
a bulkhead between the
three compartments.
292
00:13:11,024 --> 00:13:12,860
- Refused to accept them.
- Mm-hmm.
293
00:13:12,926 --> 00:13:15,162
Well, not refused
to accept them, though.
294
00:13:15,229 --> 00:13:18,966
But there was a lot
of pushback from the industry.
295
00:13:19,032 --> 00:13:20,734
They just did not want
to do this
296
00:13:20,801 --> 00:13:23,971
because it was going to be
more expensive.
297
00:13:24,037 --> 00:13:26,206
It would take time to rebuild.
298
00:13:26,273 --> 00:13:28,542
And then, you're losing time.
299
00:13:28,609 --> 00:13:32,479
And so, the goal was to get
as many trips in as possible,
300
00:13:32,546 --> 00:13:35,549
to carry as much weight
as possible.
301
00:13:35,616 --> 00:13:39,653
And that was particularly
the case with the Fitzgerald.
302
00:13:39,720 --> 00:13:41,922
- And to make as many trips
as possible.
303
00:13:41,989 --> 00:13:43,724
- And to make
as many trips as possible.
304
00:13:43,790 --> 00:13:45,192
So, it starts sometime in April,
305
00:13:45,259 --> 00:13:49,563
go into November, and sometimes
all the way into December.
306
00:13:49,630 --> 00:13:52,099
- And during these trips,
307
00:13:52,165 --> 00:13:55,202
we do tend to,
all of us, I guess,
308
00:13:55,269 --> 00:13:58,071
underestimate just over the
course of how many years
309
00:13:58,138 --> 00:14:00,374
this ship was in service,
310
00:14:00,440 --> 00:14:02,743
the beating it took
from trip to trip
311
00:14:02,809 --> 00:14:05,245
rather than any dramatic event.
312
00:14:05,312 --> 00:14:07,347
Just constantly getting
beaten.
313
00:14:07,414 --> 00:14:08,582
And you mentioned
the waves.
314
00:14:08,649 --> 00:14:11,618
And we can look at the shapes
of the Great Lakes,
315
00:14:11,685 --> 00:14:13,854
which are designed
to kill ships.
316
00:14:13,921 --> 00:14:15,856
- Thomas: Yes, that's a good way
to put it.
317
00:14:15,923 --> 00:14:19,893
- Norman: Because the waves all
pile up in these narrow ends
318
00:14:19,960 --> 00:14:23,130
of the lake, and the waves come
much closer together
319
00:14:23,197 --> 00:14:25,132
than they do in the ocean?
- Yes, yes, yes.
320
00:14:25,199 --> 00:14:27,134
- So, you could actually
be riding on the crest
321
00:14:27,201 --> 00:14:28,735
of two waves at once?
- Exactly, yeah.
322
00:14:28,802 --> 00:14:30,003
And so, you know,
323
00:14:30,070 --> 00:14:31,805
if you're looking at a vessel
like the Fitzgerald,
324
00:14:31,872 --> 00:14:34,975
which is 700 feet long,
it's very narrow,
325
00:14:35,042 --> 00:14:38,712
and you have 26,000
to 30,000 long tons,
326
00:14:39,746 --> 00:14:42,316
and because of the waves,
because of the weather,
327
00:14:42,382 --> 00:14:44,451
they're not evenly distributed
anymore.
328
00:14:44,518 --> 00:14:47,821
And it just makes
the situation even worse.
329
00:14:47,888 --> 00:14:49,857
And so, it's not really
accounting
330
00:14:49,923 --> 00:14:52,993
for the kind of weather
and the conditions
331
00:14:53,060 --> 00:14:55,629
that you're gonna have
on the lake,
332
00:14:55,696 --> 00:14:58,265
which makes it more imperative
333
00:14:58,332 --> 00:15:00,534
that you have
tighter regulations
334
00:15:00,601 --> 00:15:03,170
that are gonna make sure
that the structure itself
335
00:15:03,237 --> 00:15:04,471
is more sound,
336
00:15:04,538 --> 00:15:07,007
that the bulkheads
are gonna be stronger,
337
00:15:07,074 --> 00:15:10,444
and that the inspections
will be a little bit more...
338
00:15:10,511 --> 00:15:11,645
- Rigorous.
- ...professional
339
00:15:11,712 --> 00:15:14,314
and more rigorous,
and enforced too.
340
00:15:14,381 --> 00:15:16,617
- What about the steel?
341
00:15:16,683 --> 00:15:19,119
- The steel, the quality,
supposedly,
342
00:15:19,186 --> 00:15:20,921
according to some of the people
I interviewed,
343
00:15:20,988 --> 00:15:23,557
was not the best, which is kind
of ironic because
344
00:15:23,624 --> 00:15:25,359
the carrying it--
- In terms of carrying it.
345
00:15:25,425 --> 00:15:27,361
- Yeah, exactly,
and taconite ore--
346
00:15:27,427 --> 00:15:28,662
Pure iron ore
347
00:15:28,729 --> 00:15:31,031
had been
almost completely mined
348
00:15:31,098 --> 00:15:33,300
and exhausted
after World War II
349
00:15:33,367 --> 00:15:37,704
because of the demand for ships,
for tanks, and so forth.
350
00:15:37,771 --> 00:15:40,908
And so, they were limited
with this taconite ore,
351
00:15:40,974 --> 00:15:44,077
which was probably
about 60% pure iron ore,
352
00:15:44,144 --> 00:15:46,079
and it wasn't
the highest quality.
353
00:15:46,146 --> 00:15:50,484
And going back to the problem
with the taconite
354
00:15:51,285 --> 00:15:54,488
that is sloshing
among the three holds,
355
00:15:54,555 --> 00:15:59,626
because it's taconite ore,
about 40% of it is sand silica.
356
00:15:59,693 --> 00:16:01,628
And so, that absorbs water.
357
00:16:01,695 --> 00:16:04,898
So, now you have
the weight is increasing
358
00:16:04,965 --> 00:16:07,201
by, like, 40% or so forth.
359
00:16:07,267 --> 00:16:10,337
So, you didn't have
the same quality of ore.
360
00:16:10,404 --> 00:16:14,908
And what you were carrying
was even more susceptible
361
00:16:14,975 --> 00:16:17,578
to bring on
and hold more weight.
362
00:16:17,644 --> 00:16:20,714
- Sailors are perhaps
understandably known
363
00:16:20,781 --> 00:16:22,749
for being superstitious.
364
00:16:22,816 --> 00:16:26,053
Tell us about the launch of the
Fitzgerald. [Thomas laughs]
365
00:16:26,119 --> 00:16:29,323
- Okay,
well, two things happened.
366
00:16:29,389 --> 00:16:32,960
Mrs. Fitzgerald, who had
the honor of christening it,
367
00:16:33,026 --> 00:16:37,097
took about three or four hits
before the wine bottle smashed.
368
00:16:37,164 --> 00:16:38,899
- Norman: Broke on the bow.
- Yeah, exactly.
369
00:16:38,966 --> 00:16:40,067
So, that wasn't good.
370
00:16:40,133 --> 00:16:42,636
And then supposedly,
that when it was launched,
371
00:16:42,703 --> 00:16:46,607
it made such a massive wave
that one person
372
00:16:46,673 --> 00:16:49,476
who was in the audience
died from a heart attack.
373
00:16:49,543 --> 00:16:51,111
It was that intense.
374
00:16:51,178 --> 00:16:54,248
And the cover of my book
shows that launch.
375
00:16:54,314 --> 00:16:55,949
And it really is something.
376
00:16:56,016 --> 00:16:57,951
- Norman: And it almost took out
a pier, too?
377
00:16:58,018 --> 00:16:59,119
- Thomas: Yes, yes.
378
00:16:59,186 --> 00:17:01,121
And so, you can see
by looking at the cover,
379
00:17:01,188 --> 00:17:03,590
you know, there really wasn't
a lot of oversight.
380
00:17:03,657 --> 00:17:06,560
I mean, this is a massive ship
unlike anything else
381
00:17:06,627 --> 00:17:08,962
that's been in the lakes before,
and that's not a big pier.
382
00:17:09,029 --> 00:17:10,597
And there's a lot of people
around that.
383
00:17:10,664 --> 00:17:12,900
So, it didn't seem safe at all,
and it wasn't.
384
00:17:12,966 --> 00:17:14,501
- Norman: Took it
on a shakedown cruise,
385
00:17:14,568 --> 00:17:16,203
which would be, I guess,
pretty typical.
386
00:17:16,270 --> 00:17:18,472
But would this have been when,
in June?
387
00:17:18,539 --> 00:17:21,441
- So, it was built
in 1957, 1958,
388
00:17:22,676 --> 00:17:26,413
but it was launched in the
spring of 1958 for that season.
389
00:17:26,480 --> 00:17:27,881
- Norman:
So, obviously not the conditions
390
00:17:27,948 --> 00:17:29,516
it would encounter in November.
391
00:17:29,583 --> 00:17:31,251
- Thomas: No, no.
392
00:17:32,152 --> 00:17:36,023
- So, what is its working route
for the Fitzgerald?
393
00:17:36,089 --> 00:17:39,426
- It goes from Silver Bay,
Minnesota
394
00:17:40,127 --> 00:17:41,862
to Toledo, Ohio,
395
00:17:41,929 --> 00:17:44,531
hence the nickname
Toledo Express.
396
00:17:44,598 --> 00:17:47,534
And it was operated
by Oglebay Norton.
397
00:17:47,601 --> 00:17:49,369
And so that was
the route it took.
398
00:17:49,436 --> 00:17:53,340
Now, on November 9
and November 10 of 1975,
399
00:17:54,608 --> 00:17:57,144
it didn't leave Silver Bay
for Toledo.
400
00:17:57,211 --> 00:18:00,013
It left Superior for Detroit.
401
00:18:00,480 --> 00:18:05,252
Now, that wasn't because
Oglebay Norton was taking a load
402
00:18:05,319 --> 00:18:08,822
from Superior
and taking it someplace else.
403
00:18:08,889 --> 00:18:10,490
November 9 and November 10,
404
00:18:10,557 --> 00:18:12,359
and people don't
really talk about this,
405
00:18:12,426 --> 00:18:16,230
the Fitzgerald was actually
carrying not for Oglebay Norton,
406
00:18:16,296 --> 00:18:18,332
but for National Steel.
407
00:18:18,398 --> 00:18:20,501
There was this
mutual aid agreement
408
00:18:20,567 --> 00:18:22,269
that the steel companies had,
409
00:18:22,336 --> 00:18:26,240
that if they had a load of ore
in the upper lake
410
00:18:26,306 --> 00:18:28,041
and they needed
to get to a steel mill,
411
00:18:28,108 --> 00:18:30,777
but they didn't have the boat,
the vessel, to take it,
412
00:18:30,844 --> 00:18:34,414
they would tap the resources
from another company.
413
00:18:34,481 --> 00:18:37,050
So, in this case,
it was National Steel
414
00:18:37,117 --> 00:18:40,087
making an arrangement
with Oglebay Norton,
415
00:18:40,153 --> 00:18:42,489
and that is very relevant
416
00:18:44,057 --> 00:18:48,629
because the captain
was not taking the same route
417
00:18:49,396 --> 00:18:51,231
that he would normally do.
418
00:18:51,298 --> 00:18:53,100
But there was actually
two things.
419
00:18:53,166 --> 00:18:56,103
And as shown on this graphic,
two things happen.
420
00:18:56,170 --> 00:19:00,841
One, he was not taking it
on the traditional route.
421
00:19:01,608 --> 00:19:03,177
And then second of all,
422
00:19:03,243 --> 00:19:07,648
he modified the route
because of the storm system
423
00:19:07,714 --> 00:19:09,950
about halfway
through Lake Superior.
424
00:19:10,017 --> 00:19:13,287
Instead of taking
a straight shot down to the Soo,
425
00:19:13,353 --> 00:19:16,456
the ship hugged the North Shore,
just in case.
426
00:19:16,523 --> 00:19:19,126
If the weather got really
out of control, which it did,
427
00:19:19,193 --> 00:19:22,629
they would be closer to shore
to bring it into safe harbor,
428
00:19:22,696 --> 00:19:24,164
which did not happen.
429
00:19:24,231 --> 00:19:27,401
So, he was on a completely
different route
430
00:19:27,467 --> 00:19:28,969
than what he was used to,
431
00:19:29,036 --> 00:19:32,472
and that route itself
was being changed up.
432
00:19:32,539 --> 00:19:34,208
And at the time,
433
00:19:34,508 --> 00:19:37,711
the maps, the charts
that they had in the pilothouse
434
00:19:37,778 --> 00:19:41,849
were about 50 years old,
and the bottom of the lake
435
00:19:41,915 --> 00:19:43,951
is going to be changing...
- Norman: Changing.
436
00:19:44,017 --> 00:19:45,152
- ...over 50 years,
437
00:19:45,219 --> 00:19:47,487
which has a lot
to do with this incident,
438
00:19:47,554 --> 00:19:50,224
because one
of the prevailing theories
439
00:19:50,290 --> 00:19:55,462
is that the ship ran aground
at the Six Fathom Shoal.
440
00:19:55,529 --> 00:19:56,864
And so, that could have been
441
00:19:56,930 --> 00:19:59,433
because the charts
were not dated,
442
00:19:59,499 --> 00:20:00,601
I mean,
they were outdated,
443
00:20:00,667 --> 00:20:03,537
or it could have been
that the captain
444
00:20:03,604 --> 00:20:05,639
was not consulting the charts.
445
00:20:05,706 --> 00:20:09,910
And the culture, the mentality
in the pilothouse
446
00:20:09,977 --> 00:20:15,249
is that there was complete
deference to the captain,
447
00:20:15,315 --> 00:20:17,818
and the captain
was not gonna be told
448
00:20:17,885 --> 00:20:20,053
how to sail the ship
from anyone.
449
00:20:20,120 --> 00:20:22,222
That included
whether it was the Anderson...
450
00:20:22,289 --> 00:20:23,490
- Including another captain.
451
00:20:23,557 --> 00:20:25,492
- ...whether it was
the first mate or second mate,
452
00:20:25,559 --> 00:20:26,660
the wheelsmen.
453
00:20:26,727 --> 00:20:27,895
And they knew the lake,
454
00:20:27,961 --> 00:20:31,131
and so they usually
didn't consult charts either,
455
00:20:31,198 --> 00:20:33,100
let alone weather equipment
and so forth.
456
00:20:33,166 --> 00:20:37,171
And so, you go to this question
about what was working,
457
00:20:37,237 --> 00:20:38,972
what was not working.
458
00:20:39,039 --> 00:20:42,576
But there's also this element
of the culture
459
00:20:42,643 --> 00:20:47,447
for which a lot of these
captains were sailing a ship
460
00:20:49,516 --> 00:20:52,619
a lot like a dad
would drive the minivan
461
00:20:52,686 --> 00:20:54,655
or the station wagon.
462
00:20:54,721 --> 00:20:57,424
Of course, he would
never stop for directions
463
00:20:57,491 --> 00:20:58,692
or consult the map.
464
00:20:58,759 --> 00:21:00,761
And it was
the same kind of mentality.
465
00:21:00,827 --> 00:21:02,362
- What was the draft
of the Fitzgerald?
466
00:21:02,429 --> 00:21:04,498
How much water
did it take to float it?
467
00:21:04,565 --> 00:21:05,666
- Let's see.
468
00:21:05,732 --> 00:21:09,770
Sometimes, the clearance
would actually go down.
469
00:21:09,837 --> 00:21:12,339
The draft would be
about ten feet.
470
00:21:12,406 --> 00:21:15,542
And so, usually I think it's
between, like, 15 or 20 feet.
471
00:21:15,609 --> 00:21:17,277
But because it was allowed to,
472
00:21:17,344 --> 00:21:19,479
it was certified to take on more
and more weight,
473
00:21:19,546 --> 00:21:23,250
which it should not have been,
it was getting lower and lower.
474
00:21:23,317 --> 00:21:26,086
And so, there was really
only ten feet distance.
475
00:21:26,153 --> 00:21:27,254
So, think about that.
476
00:21:27,321 --> 00:21:29,923
If you're playing basketball
in the front yard,
477
00:21:29,990 --> 00:21:33,760
from Lake Superior to the top
of the Fitzgerald deck
478
00:21:33,827 --> 00:21:36,563
is only the height
of a basketball hoop.
479
00:21:36,630 --> 00:21:39,399
Now, if you are smooth sailing,
480
00:21:39,466 --> 00:21:41,101
that's not that much
of a concern.
481
00:21:41,168 --> 00:21:43,203
But if you have rogue waves
482
00:21:43,270 --> 00:21:46,507
that could be potentially
coming through at 40 or 50 feet,
483
00:21:46,573 --> 00:21:48,108
you have very choppy waters,
484
00:21:48,175 --> 00:21:50,244
not just November 9
and November 10,
485
00:21:50,310 --> 00:21:53,647
but throughout the fall
and into November and December,
486
00:21:53,714 --> 00:21:55,315
like, that is just not safe.
487
00:21:55,382 --> 00:21:56,950
Like, you are not
gonna have that ship
488
00:21:57,017 --> 00:21:58,552
around for that longer.
489
00:21:58,619 --> 00:22:00,721
- Tell us about the captain.
490
00:22:00,787 --> 00:22:06,226
- Captain McSorley was known
as a rough weather captain.
491
00:22:06,293 --> 00:22:08,495
So, he had the reputation.
492
00:22:08,562 --> 00:22:09,796
He was a company man,
493
00:22:09,863 --> 00:22:12,332
and so he knew
that any moment,
494
00:22:12,399 --> 00:22:15,536
any day that the ship
was not on the lake
495
00:22:15,602 --> 00:22:17,271
was one more day
496
00:22:17,604 --> 00:22:19,740
that the company was
not making money.
497
00:22:19,806 --> 00:22:24,945
And so, he made it a priority
to get the ship on the lake
498
00:22:25,012 --> 00:22:28,749
and get it from the upper lake
to the lower lake
499
00:22:28,815 --> 00:22:30,050
as quick as possible.
500
00:22:30,117 --> 00:22:32,219
And so, he took chances.
501
00:22:32,286 --> 00:22:35,589
There were a number
of sailors that were with him
502
00:22:35,656 --> 00:22:36,790
on the Fitzgerald,
503
00:22:36,857 --> 00:22:39,026
as well as sailors
that were with him
504
00:22:39,092 --> 00:22:41,128
on different crews
in different ships,
505
00:22:41,195 --> 00:22:44,131
that he had that reputation.
506
00:22:44,198 --> 00:22:45,332
But he wasn't reckless.
507
00:22:45,399 --> 00:22:47,467
So, there's this
kind of fine line
508
00:22:47,534 --> 00:22:50,604
between kind of a cowboy
of a captain
509
00:22:50,671 --> 00:22:53,340
and someone that is just being
completely reckless.
510
00:22:53,407 --> 00:22:55,175
He knew
what he was doing.
511
00:22:55,242 --> 00:22:59,279
He knew that the ship
was in bad shape too.
512
00:22:59,346 --> 00:23:01,415
Going back to Red Burgner,
513
00:23:01,481 --> 00:23:03,884
the gentleman
who was the 30th crew member
514
00:23:03,951 --> 00:23:05,586
who wasn't on the ship,
of course,
515
00:23:05,652 --> 00:23:09,556
in November of 1975,
he was deposed in 1977
516
00:23:12,826 --> 00:23:16,730
in front of attorneys
for two of the families,
517
00:23:16,797 --> 00:23:18,398
as well as representation
518
00:23:18,465 --> 00:23:21,902
from both Northwestern Mutual
and Oglebay Norton.
519
00:23:21,969 --> 00:23:24,037
And he spilled the beans.
520
00:23:24,104 --> 00:23:25,772
And one of his--
521
00:23:26,206 --> 00:23:27,875
Part of his testimony
was talking about
522
00:23:27,941 --> 00:23:30,978
how Captain McSorley
was a rough weather captain
523
00:23:31,044 --> 00:23:33,981
and how he had made
this off-color comment that
524
00:23:34,047 --> 00:23:37,251
he didn't care what happened
to the Fitzgerald after 1975
525
00:23:37,317 --> 00:23:40,020
because he was going
to retire after 1975.
526
00:23:40,087 --> 00:23:42,556
He just needed to get one more--
527
00:23:42,623 --> 00:23:46,693
He just needed to get one more
load down to the lower lakes.
528
00:23:46,760 --> 00:23:51,298
- What was the relationship
between the owner, the company,
529
00:23:51,365 --> 00:23:56,370
and also those people
certifying the ship being safe?
530
00:23:58,272 --> 00:23:59,940
- Well, this is...
531
00:24:01,675 --> 00:24:05,179
If you think back
to the Great Recession
532
00:24:05,245 --> 00:24:06,914
in 2008 and 2009,
533
00:24:08,248 --> 00:24:11,618
part of the reason
why we had a financial meltdown
534
00:24:11,685 --> 00:24:14,721
is that there was a
very cozy relationship
535
00:24:14,788 --> 00:24:16,723
between the regulatory agencies,
536
00:24:16,790 --> 00:24:21,228
Moody's Investor Services,
for example, and Goldman Sachs.
537
00:24:21,295 --> 00:24:23,931
And so, the company
that was certifying
538
00:24:23,997 --> 00:24:27,334
whether or not an investment,
a financial instrument,
539
00:24:27,401 --> 00:24:29,102
was in fact sound,
540
00:24:29,169 --> 00:24:33,640
was the same company that
was being paid by the company
541
00:24:33,707 --> 00:24:35,943
that it was overseeing.
542
00:24:36,343 --> 00:24:39,513
The same thing happened
with the Fitzgerald
543
00:24:39,580 --> 00:24:41,315
and the shipping industry
in general.
544
00:24:41,381 --> 00:24:44,151
There was the American Bureau
of Shipbuilding or Shipping
545
00:24:44,218 --> 00:24:49,223
that inspected and certified
those ships to be seaworthy.
546
00:24:49,289 --> 00:24:52,926
And if they're getting paid
by a company
547
00:24:52,993 --> 00:24:56,096
who is getting paid
by steel companies
548
00:24:56,163 --> 00:25:00,033
to haul as much taconite ore
as possible,
549
00:25:00,100 --> 00:25:04,004
as long as possible, as deep
into the season as possible,
550
00:25:04,071 --> 00:25:07,674
okay, that doesn't really
make for a good arrangement.
551
00:25:07,741 --> 00:25:09,877
- Conflict of interest?
- Conflict of interest.
552
00:25:09,943 --> 00:25:11,812
So, what happened
to the Fitzgerald
553
00:25:11,879 --> 00:25:17,184
in 1975 is a lot like what
happened to the financial houses
554
00:25:17,251 --> 00:25:21,154
in 2008 and 2009
with the Great Recession.
555
00:25:21,722 --> 00:25:25,526
- And as far
as the financial incentives.
556
00:25:27,427 --> 00:25:30,397
Was there a financial incentive
for the captain?
557
00:25:30,464 --> 00:25:31,565
- Oh, absolutely.
558
00:25:31,632 --> 00:25:33,166
So, the captain--
- But not the crew?
559
00:25:33,233 --> 00:25:36,170
- No, the crew reported
to the captain,
560
00:25:36,236 --> 00:25:38,972
but it was the captain
that reported to the company
561
00:25:39,039 --> 00:25:41,742
and had the incentive structure
562
00:25:41,808 --> 00:25:44,878
to run the ship as hard
as it can,
563
00:25:44,945 --> 00:25:47,381
as deep into the season
as possible.
564
00:25:47,447 --> 00:25:50,584
So, Captain McSorley
and other captains
565
00:25:50,651 --> 00:25:53,453
had the incentive
from the company.
566
00:25:53,520 --> 00:25:54,888
So, that
was the relationship
567
00:25:54,955 --> 00:25:56,390
between the captain
and the company.
568
00:25:56,456 --> 00:25:59,259
But that was not the case
with the crew.
569
00:25:59,326 --> 00:26:01,261
The crew,
I shouldn't say at the mercy of,
570
00:26:01,328 --> 00:26:03,664
but it was the crew
that reported to the captain
571
00:26:03,730 --> 00:26:05,799
and not
to the company directly.
572
00:26:05,866 --> 00:26:10,237
- How did McSorley feel
about going out on November 9?
573
00:26:10,304 --> 00:26:12,139
- That's a good question.
574
00:26:12,206 --> 00:26:15,375
I think, you know,
based on the Bergner testimony,
575
00:26:15,442 --> 00:26:18,612
based on people
that knew McSorley,
576
00:26:18,679 --> 00:26:22,382
I don't think it was ideal
being out in November.
577
00:26:22,449 --> 00:26:26,587
He was very close to retirement,
but he took pride in his work,
578
00:26:26,653 --> 00:26:30,457
and he wasn't gonna be told
that he couldn't sail,
579
00:26:30,524 --> 00:26:33,293
and he was gonna show his crew
and certainly his boss
580
00:26:33,360 --> 00:26:35,629
that a little bit of bad weather
on Lake Superior
581
00:26:35,696 --> 00:26:37,297
in November
wasn't going to stop him.
582
00:26:37,364 --> 00:26:39,600
He was that close to retirement.
583
00:26:39,666 --> 00:26:41,902
He had been on trips before
584
00:26:41,969 --> 00:26:44,638
for which the weather
was not cooperating.
585
00:26:44,705 --> 00:26:48,375
He may not have had crew members
that were top notch either.
586
00:26:48,442 --> 00:26:50,177
And so, he was ready for this,
587
00:26:50,244 --> 00:26:51,778
or he thought
he was ready for this.
588
00:26:51,845 --> 00:26:55,215
And keep in mind, he had been
on the lakes for about 30 years.
589
00:26:55,282 --> 00:26:57,317
- What was his trajectory then?
590
00:26:57,384 --> 00:26:59,786
Let's look at the map and see.
591
00:26:59,853 --> 00:27:01,522
But this is different
from the way--
592
00:27:01,588 --> 00:27:03,323
the route he usually took?
- Thomas: Yes, right.
593
00:27:03,390 --> 00:27:05,359
So, the route
that he would normally take
594
00:27:05,425 --> 00:27:08,595
would be from Silver Bay,
which Silver Bay, Minnesota,
595
00:27:08,662 --> 00:27:10,664
which is closer
to Two Harbors,
596
00:27:10,731 --> 00:27:13,166
which is where
the Arthur Anderson left.
597
00:27:13,233 --> 00:27:16,136
But you can see
with the red line
598
00:27:17,104 --> 00:27:19,006
that the Fitzgerald went,
you know,
599
00:27:19,072 --> 00:27:22,442
straight to Ontario, Canada,
and then went down to the Soo.
600
00:27:22,509 --> 00:27:26,113
And that was deliberate
because of the weather.
601
00:27:26,180 --> 00:27:30,317
So, normally if they were
carrying for National Steel,
602
00:27:30,384 --> 00:27:33,720
it would not have taken
that exact, that same route,
603
00:27:33,787 --> 00:27:35,822
nor would it have taken
that route
604
00:27:35,889 --> 00:27:38,559
if they were sailing
for Oglebay Norton.
605
00:27:38,625 --> 00:27:41,061
So, that is instructive.
606
00:27:41,128 --> 00:27:44,298
There isn't a third line
that shows its normal course,
607
00:27:44,364 --> 00:27:47,668
but trust me, it would have been
a lot different than that.
608
00:27:47,734 --> 00:27:50,270
You know, coming down here
from the Fox Valley,
609
00:27:50,337 --> 00:27:54,074
you know, I took,
you know, 41 to 26 to 151.
610
00:27:54,141 --> 00:27:55,676
Now, I could have skipped 26,
611
00:27:55,742 --> 00:27:57,978
kept on going to 151
in Fond du Lac.
612
00:27:58,045 --> 00:28:00,113
- Right, yeah.
- I would be okay, all right.
613
00:28:00,180 --> 00:28:01,515
So, he took a different route,
614
00:28:01,582 --> 00:28:02,916
which was much different
than coming
615
00:28:02,983 --> 00:28:04,651
from the Fox Valley
down to Madison.
616
00:28:04,718 --> 00:28:06,753
And on Lake Michigan,
617
00:28:06,820 --> 00:28:09,656
even the slightest changes
and the course corrections
618
00:28:09,723 --> 00:28:11,558
they have to make
is a pretty big deal.
619
00:28:11,625 --> 00:28:15,195
And this was a radical departure
from the route
620
00:28:15,262 --> 00:28:16,630
he normally would have taken.
621
00:28:16,697 --> 00:28:19,099
- Which he was not
as familiar with.
622
00:28:19,166 --> 00:28:21,168
- Exactly,
now, was he going to admit
623
00:28:21,235 --> 00:28:22,636
that he wasn't familiar with it
624
00:28:22,703 --> 00:28:24,638
and that he had to stop
and asked for directions?
625
00:28:24,705 --> 00:28:26,807
Of course not,
and so that made things worse.
626
00:28:26,874 --> 00:28:29,042
- What was the forecast
for November 9?
627
00:28:29,109 --> 00:28:32,379
- The forecast,
it was going to be...
628
00:28:32,446 --> 00:28:34,081
It wasn't gonna be
easy weather.
629
00:28:34,147 --> 00:28:35,649
They knew
that there was a system
630
00:28:35,716 --> 00:28:37,818
that was coming up
from the southwest.
631
00:28:37,885 --> 00:28:41,288
It was a panhandle,
coming from the panhandle.
632
00:28:41,355 --> 00:28:43,724
So, you had a warm front
that was going to collide
633
00:28:43,790 --> 00:28:46,093
with a cold front coming down
from Canada.
634
00:28:46,159 --> 00:28:48,295
And so, that was going to be
a bad thing.
635
00:28:48,362 --> 00:28:50,497
And they had been
through bad weather before,
636
00:28:50,564 --> 00:28:55,636
but it wasn't going to be as bad
as it turned out to be.
637
00:28:55,702 --> 00:28:57,204
The weather was really bad,
638
00:28:57,271 --> 00:29:01,208
but it wasn't to the point
where it was completely unusual.
639
00:29:01,275 --> 00:29:02,910
And keep in mind, too,
640
00:29:02,976 --> 00:29:06,146
the Fitzgerald
was not the only ship
641
00:29:06,213 --> 00:29:08,215
that was on the lake that night.
642
00:29:08,282 --> 00:29:11,084
You had the Arthur Anderson,
643
00:29:11,151 --> 00:29:13,420
which had been
behind the Fitzgerald
644
00:29:13,487 --> 00:29:14,821
by about ten miles.
645
00:29:14,888 --> 00:29:16,557
And that was important
646
00:29:16,623 --> 00:29:20,427
because the weather was
coming from the west-southwest.
647
00:29:20,494 --> 00:29:23,697
And so, the weather
would hit the Anderson
648
00:29:23,764 --> 00:29:25,799
before it reached
the Fitzgerald.
649
00:29:25,866 --> 00:29:28,001
And so, Bernie Cooper,
650
00:29:28,468 --> 00:29:30,604
who was the captain
of the Anderson,
651
00:29:30,671 --> 00:29:33,106
served as the
weather forecaster,
652
00:29:33,173 --> 00:29:35,042
the weatherman for McSorley
653
00:29:35,108 --> 00:29:40,480
because of his position
relative to the Fitzgerald.
654
00:29:40,547 --> 00:29:43,483
So, you put those things
together
655
00:29:43,550 --> 00:29:47,988
and you can kind of see how
they were close to each other.
656
00:29:48,055 --> 00:29:50,224
And if you look
at Lake Superior,
657
00:29:50,290 --> 00:29:51,491
if you're on a normal lake,
658
00:29:51,558 --> 00:29:54,294
I mean, another lake,
and they are ten miles apart,
659
00:29:54,361 --> 00:29:56,897
well, you are on completely
sides of a lake.
660
00:29:56,964 --> 00:29:59,967
But this is the second-largest
lake in the world,
661
00:30:00,033 --> 00:30:02,970
so relatively speaking,
if you wanna scale it down,
662
00:30:03,036 --> 00:30:05,038
they're basically on top
of each other.
663
00:30:05,105 --> 00:30:06,373
And in addition to that,
664
00:30:06,440 --> 00:30:09,776
you had the Sykes
as well as the Ford.
665
00:30:10,210 --> 00:30:15,449
So, you have four ore ships
that are on Lake Superior,
666
00:30:15,516 --> 00:30:20,988
and three of them come out
unscathed and another one sinks.
667
00:30:21,655 --> 00:30:25,058
So, why is it
that you have four ships
668
00:30:25,125 --> 00:30:27,027
that are kind of close
to each other,
669
00:30:27,094 --> 00:30:30,063
three of them survive,
one of them sinks?
670
00:30:30,130 --> 00:30:31,632
And of the three,
671
00:30:31,698 --> 00:30:34,735
the Anderson was still
on the lakes
672
00:30:34,801 --> 00:30:37,671
as recent as two seasons ago.
673
00:30:37,738 --> 00:30:40,340
And I believe,
based on the research,
674
00:30:40,407 --> 00:30:41,909
that a big reason why
675
00:30:41,975 --> 00:30:44,878
is that the Fitzgerald
was not seaworthy.
676
00:30:44,945 --> 00:30:49,049
That's why the Fitzgerald sank
in the same storm
677
00:30:49,116 --> 00:30:53,020
that the Sykes, the Anderson,
and the Ford were in.
678
00:30:53,086 --> 00:30:56,223
Those three ships have something
in common,
679
00:30:56,290 --> 00:30:57,524
something very important.
680
00:30:57,591 --> 00:30:59,826
And this hasn't been
talked about either.
681
00:30:59,893 --> 00:31:03,263
They were owned and operated
by the same company.
682
00:31:03,330 --> 00:31:05,832
So, Anderson would have been
U.S. Steel.
683
00:31:05,899 --> 00:31:07,968
Sykes would have been
Inland Steel.
684
00:31:08,035 --> 00:31:10,370
And Ford would be
the Ford company.
685
00:31:10,437 --> 00:31:13,373
And so, those
were ships for which
686
00:31:13,440 --> 00:31:16,043
the owner and the operator
were the same.
687
00:31:16,109 --> 00:31:19,246
And so, they had
a very clear incentive structure
688
00:31:19,313 --> 00:31:22,249
to make sure
that the ship kept up.
689
00:31:22,316 --> 00:31:27,120
And that was not the same
structure for the Fitzgerald.
690
00:31:27,187 --> 00:31:29,523
- It would be interesting
to see how they would have fared
691
00:31:29,590 --> 00:31:30,991
if they had taken--
692
00:31:31,058 --> 00:31:33,827
Were they all taking the same
route that the Fitzgerald took?
693
00:31:33,894 --> 00:31:36,930
- The Ford had sought shelter,
694
00:31:36,997 --> 00:31:40,567
had gone closer to shore,
and so, and--
695
00:31:41,902 --> 00:31:45,439
But the Ford
was coming from the lower lake.
696
00:31:45,506 --> 00:31:48,842
And so, the only thing
that the Ford had was ballast.
697
00:31:48,909 --> 00:31:53,680
So, the Ford had ballast,
and it was a much smaller ship.
698
00:31:53,747 --> 00:31:58,418
And yet, that was the ship
that almost volunteered
699
00:31:59,019 --> 00:32:01,588
to go back out in the storm
to find the Fitzgerald.
700
00:32:01,655 --> 00:32:04,157
If you look at the
radio transmission
701
00:32:04,224 --> 00:32:07,160
between the Anderson
and the Coast Guard
702
00:32:07,227 --> 00:32:10,497
after the Fitzgerald
disappeared, so to speak,
703
00:32:10,564 --> 00:32:14,835
there is reluctance
on the part of Bernie Cooper.
704
00:32:14,902 --> 00:32:18,238
He does not want to go
back out into the storm
705
00:32:18,305 --> 00:32:19,640
to find the Fitzgerald.
706
00:32:19,706 --> 00:32:22,075
He does not want to risk
his ship.
707
00:32:22,142 --> 00:32:25,179
He doesn't want to risk
the lives of his crew members.
708
00:32:25,245 --> 00:32:28,348
And he certainly doesn't want
to lose an entire ship
709
00:32:28,415 --> 00:32:31,185
for the company
that he works for.
710
00:32:31,251 --> 00:32:34,821
You add those together
and you can see,
711
00:32:35,322 --> 00:32:38,792
how it just
doesn't make a lot of sense
712
00:32:38,859 --> 00:32:42,963
why the Fitzgerald sank
and the other ships didn't sink.
713
00:32:43,030 --> 00:32:44,865
They were close to each other
714
00:32:44,932 --> 00:32:49,236
and the Ford came in and tried
to find the Fitzgerald.
715
00:32:49,303 --> 00:32:53,073
Bernie Cooper was reluctant
to go back into the storm.
716
00:32:53,140 --> 00:32:55,676
And so, these ships were
pretty close to each other.
717
00:32:55,742 --> 00:32:57,311
If they weren't close
to each other
718
00:32:57,377 --> 00:32:58,912
when the Fitzgerald sank,
719
00:32:58,979 --> 00:33:01,281
they were in the
general vicinity.
720
00:33:01,348 --> 00:33:03,217
And given the kind of system
721
00:33:03,283 --> 00:33:05,586
that was coming up
from the panhandle,
722
00:33:05,652 --> 00:33:07,621
this was not a storm
723
00:33:07,688 --> 00:33:11,625
that was localized
in one small area on the lake.
724
00:33:11,692 --> 00:33:15,529
This had an effect all over that
included the other three ships.
725
00:33:15,596 --> 00:33:18,899
- Norman: Did the forecast
suggest early on at least
726
00:33:18,966 --> 00:33:25,172
that this big storm was going to
be going south of their course?
727
00:33:25,239 --> 00:33:26,340
- It wasn't, right, right.
728
00:33:26,406 --> 00:33:27,641
So, there were two things.
729
00:33:27,708 --> 00:33:31,945
It was projected not
to go as far north as it did.
730
00:33:32,012 --> 00:33:36,583
And the Fitzgerald,
McSorley wanted to make sure
731
00:33:37,317 --> 00:33:41,255
that he was doing
what he could for the situation,
732
00:33:41,321 --> 00:33:44,324
which was to try
to hug the North Shore.
733
00:33:44,391 --> 00:33:47,227
So, they were expecting
the storm to be bad.
734
00:33:47,294 --> 00:33:49,096
If they weren't expecting
the storm to be bad,
735
00:33:49,162 --> 00:33:50,497
he would have had a route
736
00:33:50,564 --> 00:33:53,867
that wasn't going
as far north as he did.
737
00:33:53,934 --> 00:33:55,869
- Norman: They were all headed
for the Soo Locks?
738
00:33:55,936 --> 00:33:57,104
- Thomas: Yes.
739
00:33:57,171 --> 00:33:58,906
- Norman: And with that wind
from the southwest,
740
00:33:58,972 --> 00:34:00,574
once they start turning
toward the locks,
741
00:34:00,641 --> 00:34:02,843
they must have been rolling
ferociously.
742
00:34:02,910 --> 00:34:04,044
- Oh, yeah,
yes, yes, yes.
743
00:34:04,111 --> 00:34:06,580
And so, the way
that I look at why it sank
744
00:34:06,647 --> 00:34:08,448
differently
than most authors
745
00:34:08,515 --> 00:34:13,153
is I kind of look at it
as a 15-round boxing match
746
00:34:13,220 --> 00:34:17,457
where it seems like everyone is
focused on the very last round.
747
00:34:17,524 --> 00:34:20,827
What happened around
between 7:00 and 7:30?
748
00:34:20,894 --> 00:34:23,630
Was it the system coming up
from the panhandle?
749
00:34:23,697 --> 00:34:26,733
Was it because the ship ran
aground at Six Fathom Shoal?
750
00:34:26,800 --> 00:34:30,003
Was it because
the hatches weren't secure?
751
00:34:30,070 --> 00:34:34,107
All of those factors played
into why the Fitzgerald sank.
752
00:34:34,174 --> 00:34:35,876
But they were proximate causes.
753
00:34:35,943 --> 00:34:37,477
They weren't
the underlying cause.
754
00:34:37,544 --> 00:34:40,881
My book looks at
the first 14 rounds.
755
00:34:41,515 --> 00:34:43,217
How there was mismanagement.
756
00:34:43,283 --> 00:34:45,619
There wasn't the type
of business model
757
00:34:45,686 --> 00:34:47,154
that incented maintenance.
758
00:34:47,221 --> 00:34:49,890
There, of course, was not
adequate maintenance done.
759
00:34:49,957 --> 00:34:52,426
The design was not as good
as it could have been.
760
00:34:52,492 --> 00:34:55,162
The material used according
to some people
761
00:34:55,229 --> 00:34:57,698
was not high quality material.
762
00:34:57,764 --> 00:34:59,199
The oversight was lacking.
763
00:34:59,266 --> 00:35:00,868
It was a cozy relationship,
764
00:35:00,934 --> 00:35:03,537
perhaps
a conflict of of interest.
765
00:35:03,604 --> 00:35:06,707
And so, what's happening
is the Fitzgerald
766
00:35:06,773 --> 00:35:11,178
is getting beat up really bad
in the first 14 rounds.
767
00:35:11,245 --> 00:35:15,182
It goes in the 15th round,
November 10, 1975.
768
00:35:15,249 --> 00:35:16,717
It's on the ropes.
769
00:35:16,783 --> 00:35:20,754
And you have the storm system
at that point of the night.
770
00:35:20,821 --> 00:35:24,424
Plus you have perhaps going
aground at Six Fathom Shoal.
771
00:35:24,491 --> 00:35:27,094
The hatches may
or may not have been secure,
772
00:35:27,160 --> 00:35:28,896
but that was not the fault
of the workers.
773
00:35:28,962 --> 00:35:30,497
Absolutely not the fault
of the crew members.
774
00:35:30,564 --> 00:35:32,666
We can talk about that as well.
775
00:35:32,733 --> 00:35:35,402
But what happened
between 7:00 and 7:30
776
00:35:35,469 --> 00:35:38,305
on the night
of November 10, 1975,
777
00:35:38,372 --> 00:35:40,607
that was the last punch,
778
00:35:40,908 --> 00:35:43,210
the knockout punch
that did in the Fitzgerald.
779
00:35:43,277 --> 00:35:46,113
So, I believe that
it was only a matter of time
780
00:35:46,180 --> 00:35:47,581
before the Fitzgerald sank.
781
00:35:47,648 --> 00:35:50,551
The reason why it sank
is it simply was not seaworthy.
782
00:35:50,617 --> 00:35:53,387
- Conversation
between captain of Fitzgerald
783
00:35:53,453 --> 00:35:56,190
and the captain
of the Anderson,
784
00:35:56,256 --> 00:35:57,724
how did that go?
785
00:35:57,791 --> 00:36:00,994
- It was cordial,
it was professional.
786
00:36:01,061 --> 00:36:05,599
There was really no way
of knowing, based on the--
787
00:36:05,666 --> 00:36:08,235
their voice,
the cadence, inflection,
788
00:36:08,302 --> 00:36:12,072
whether or not there
really was trouble.
789
00:36:12,139 --> 00:36:17,277
Bernie Cooper was very careful
not in offering advice,
790
00:36:18,512 --> 00:36:21,849
offering unsolicited advice
about how McSorley
791
00:36:21,915 --> 00:36:24,484
should be sailing
his ship.
792
00:36:25,152 --> 00:36:29,957
But Bernie Cooper was asking
very important questions.
793
00:36:30,023 --> 00:36:31,725
He was asking
the type of questions
794
00:36:31,792 --> 00:36:34,127
that I think
would make McSorley think,
795
00:36:34,194 --> 00:36:37,030
"Okay,
should I be chucking down?
796
00:36:37,097 --> 00:36:40,667
"Should the ship not be going
as fast as it should?
797
00:36:40,734 --> 00:36:43,036
Should I get closer
to the shore?"
798
00:36:43,103 --> 00:36:47,007
And so, Bernie Cooper,
I think, did a really good job.
799
00:36:47,074 --> 00:36:50,143
He was a veteran captain,
he knew about the culture.
800
00:36:50,210 --> 00:36:53,780
He knew he could not push
McSorley too hard,
801
00:36:53,847 --> 00:36:55,616
but he asked the questions.
802
00:36:55,682 --> 00:36:59,319
He provided the information
that was available to McSorley
803
00:36:59,386 --> 00:37:03,857
to make the best
possible decisions at the time.
804
00:37:05,659 --> 00:37:07,094
Reading the transmission
805
00:37:07,160 --> 00:37:08,562
and listening
to the transmission,
806
00:37:08,629 --> 00:37:10,531
it's very difficult
807
00:37:11,665 --> 00:37:14,801
to tease out
exactly how McSorley felt.
808
00:37:14,868 --> 00:37:16,203
You could listen to it
and say,
809
00:37:16,270 --> 00:37:18,138
"Well, here's a guy
that's under control."
810
00:37:18,205 --> 00:37:21,642
Now, he could be speaking
in that manner
811
00:37:21,708 --> 00:37:24,144
because he really did think
things were okay,
812
00:37:24,211 --> 00:37:26,246
or he could have been speaking
in that manner
813
00:37:26,313 --> 00:37:30,350
because he wanted to keep
the pilothouse as, you know,
814
00:37:30,417 --> 00:37:32,519
as settled down as possible.
815
00:37:32,586 --> 00:37:34,421
And I think it was the latter.
816
00:37:34,488 --> 00:37:37,157
I think that he knew
that he was in rough shape,
817
00:37:37,224 --> 00:37:39,927
that he had been taking in water
818
00:37:39,993 --> 00:37:43,330
ever since he got close
to the Six Fathom Shoal.
819
00:37:43,397 --> 00:37:46,400
I put a lot of weight
into that theory
820
00:37:46,466 --> 00:37:50,103
because Bernie Cooper,
to the day he died,
821
00:37:50,170 --> 00:37:53,807
he believed that it ran
aground on the Six Fathom Shoal
822
00:37:53,874 --> 00:37:55,809
and that it was taking on water.
823
00:37:55,876 --> 00:37:58,478
And that wasn't--
That wasn't an opinion
824
00:37:58,545 --> 00:38:00,414
that he formed after the fact.
825
00:38:00,480 --> 00:38:05,419
That was real time because
McSorley was talking about
826
00:38:05,485 --> 00:38:07,688
how it was taking on a list.
827
00:38:07,754 --> 00:38:11,258
And so, that suggests that some
of the cable lines were down,
828
00:38:11,325 --> 00:38:14,728
the transoms were down,
and it was taking on water,
829
00:38:14,795 --> 00:38:17,264
which would mean
that it's absorbing water
830
00:38:17,331 --> 00:38:20,501
because the taconite
being part sand silica.
831
00:38:20,567 --> 00:38:23,871
And so, Bernie Cooper had
a pretty good understanding.
832
00:38:23,937 --> 00:38:27,741
He had a pretty good sense
that it was taking on water.
833
00:38:27,808 --> 00:38:30,777
And he tried communicating
that to Captain McSorley.
834
00:38:30,844 --> 00:38:34,515
Captain McSorley came
within 15, 17 miles of the Soo
835
00:38:34,581 --> 00:38:37,150
and thought he could just punch
in hard and get there to safety,
836
00:38:37,217 --> 00:38:39,319
but it didn't happen.
837
00:38:39,386 --> 00:38:40,988
- What do we know of as terms
838
00:38:41,054 --> 00:38:44,958
of while the Fitzgerald
was still afloat,
839
00:38:45,492 --> 00:38:47,294
what was breaking?
840
00:38:49,196 --> 00:38:52,132
- There were a few things
that happened.
841
00:38:52,199 --> 00:38:55,636
They thought
that they were taking on water.
842
00:38:55,702 --> 00:38:58,038
McSorley thought
he was taking on water.
843
00:38:58,105 --> 00:39:00,340
Cooper thought that the
Fitzgerald was taking on water
844
00:39:00,407 --> 00:39:02,342
just because it was listing.
845
00:39:02,409 --> 00:39:04,545
And it was taking on a lot
846
00:39:04,611 --> 00:39:07,781
because the cable lines
had snapped off.
847
00:39:07,848 --> 00:39:11,084
And if you think about how
the top of an ore ship looks,
848
00:39:11,151 --> 00:39:13,387
on both sides,
you have these,
849
00:39:13,453 --> 00:39:15,355
you know,
these steel cable lines
850
00:39:15,422 --> 00:39:17,758
that are about as thick
as a wrist,
851
00:39:17,824 --> 00:39:21,828
and sometimes, rarely,
one might snap off.
852
00:39:22,629 --> 00:39:24,498
Once in a blue moon,
two will snap off.
853
00:39:24,565 --> 00:39:27,835
But it's unheard of that three
were actually gonna snap off.
854
00:39:27,901 --> 00:39:31,939
And that's exactly what happened
with the Fitzgerald.
855
00:39:32,005 --> 00:39:35,442
So, McSorley,
who knew the ship very well,
856
00:39:35,509 --> 00:39:37,444
I would think
that he had a sense
857
00:39:37,511 --> 00:39:39,079
that this thing
was falling apart.
858
00:39:39,146 --> 00:39:41,248
He knew that
it was in bad shape.
859
00:39:41,315 --> 00:39:42,916
He was gonna retire soon.
860
00:39:42,983 --> 00:39:44,451
It was really bad weather,
861
00:39:44,518 --> 00:39:48,488
but he just thought that
he could get that last 17 miles.
862
00:39:48,555 --> 00:39:50,290
- Which ordinarily would take,
what, about an hour?
863
00:39:50,357 --> 00:39:51,592
- Yes, yes, yes, yes.
864
00:39:51,658 --> 00:39:53,894
And so, he was, you know,
865
00:39:54,428 --> 00:39:56,496
he was trying
to push this thing hard.
866
00:39:56,563 --> 00:39:59,433
He was making the
distance between the Anderson
867
00:39:59,499 --> 00:40:01,802
and the Fitzgerald
was growing and growing
868
00:40:01,869 --> 00:40:04,371
and he could see
the finish line.
869
00:40:04,438 --> 00:40:07,508
He was running out of gas,
the wheels were coming off,
870
00:40:07,574 --> 00:40:09,510
but he thought that
he could cross the finish line,
871
00:40:09,576 --> 00:40:10,878
but he didn't.
872
00:40:10,944 --> 00:40:13,780
- What about the role of the
Coast Guard in all of this?
873
00:40:13,847 --> 00:40:15,048
- Ah, the Coast Guard.
874
00:40:15,115 --> 00:40:18,252
So, the Coast Guard
was the entity
875
00:40:18,318 --> 00:40:21,054
that allowed the ship
to continue to sail,
876
00:40:21,121 --> 00:40:24,658
even though it was
in very bad working condition.
877
00:40:24,725 --> 00:40:27,427
I think that that's been
very well established.
878
00:40:27,494 --> 00:40:30,964
But the Coast Guard
was also the ones
879
00:40:31,031 --> 00:40:34,168
who were on point to do
the rescue.
880
00:40:35,135 --> 00:40:36,870
And it was almost--
881
00:40:36,937 --> 00:40:38,972
It was just a comedy of errors.
882
00:40:39,039 --> 00:40:42,609
I mean, they really act
like Keystone Cops that night.
883
00:40:42,676 --> 00:40:45,746
And they act that way
because on the lake,
884
00:40:45,812 --> 00:40:47,214
even though everyone knew
885
00:40:47,281 --> 00:40:49,550
that this was going to be
a big storm,
886
00:40:49,616 --> 00:40:51,185
that November was a season
887
00:40:51,251 --> 00:40:52,653
where there were a lot
of shipwrecks
888
00:40:52,719 --> 00:40:55,489
going back 100 years,
150 years,
889
00:40:55,556 --> 00:41:00,694
that the closest craft, boat,
that it had was in Duluth.
890
00:41:02,329 --> 00:41:07,601
And so, it would have taken
this cutter about 21 hours
891
00:41:07,668 --> 00:41:10,103
to get from Duluth to the scene
892
00:41:10,170 --> 00:41:12,806
where the Fitzgerald
disappeared.
893
00:41:12,873 --> 00:41:15,742
There was an aircraft
in Traverse City,
894
00:41:15,809 --> 00:41:19,413
which was about an hour, an hour
and a half as the crow flies.
895
00:41:19,479 --> 00:41:22,049
But just as it was about
to take off,
896
00:41:22,115 --> 00:41:25,185
they realized that the flares
were not there.
897
00:41:25,252 --> 00:41:27,988
And of course, if you're going
to search for a boat
898
00:41:28,055 --> 00:41:30,591
that's missing in a bad storm
at night,
899
00:41:30,657 --> 00:41:31,758
you're gonna need flares.
900
00:41:31,825 --> 00:41:33,861
Once it gets to about
where they think
901
00:41:33,927 --> 00:41:36,663
the Fitzgerald disappeared,
902
00:41:36,730 --> 00:41:38,932
half the flares
weren't working.
903
00:41:38,999 --> 00:41:41,034
And people will say,
904
00:41:41,101 --> 00:41:43,804
"Well, it doesn't really matter
because the ship was lost.
905
00:41:43,871 --> 00:41:45,138
There wasn't a rescue."
906
00:41:45,205 --> 00:41:46,807
That might be true.
907
00:41:46,874 --> 00:41:52,546
But because the Coast Guard did
not have the adequate equipment,
908
00:41:52,613 --> 00:41:56,016
you know,
in that part of the lake,
909
00:41:56,083 --> 00:41:58,752
that's the reason
why the Coast Guard
910
00:41:58,819 --> 00:42:03,190
pushed the Anderson very hard
to go back in.
911
00:42:03,257 --> 00:42:06,026
If the Coast Guard
would have been better equipped,
912
00:42:06,093 --> 00:42:10,397
if they would have had
a vessel closer to the Soo,
913
00:42:10,464 --> 00:42:14,501
they may never have asked
the Anderson to go back in.
914
00:42:14,568 --> 00:42:15,869
And by going back in,
915
00:42:15,936 --> 00:42:19,973
yes, there was not
just one ship that sank,
916
00:42:20,040 --> 00:42:22,543
but you could have had
another ship sink as well.
917
00:42:22,609 --> 00:42:26,113
And that was because the
Coast Guard was not prepared.
918
00:42:26,180 --> 00:42:29,183
- You would think that given
the nature of the Great Lakes
919
00:42:29,249 --> 00:42:31,518
and the size
of the Great Lakes,
920
00:42:31,585 --> 00:42:33,453
that the Coast Guard
would have positions...
921
00:42:33,520 --> 00:42:35,656
- Exactly, absolutely.
- ...around the lakes
922
00:42:35,722 --> 00:42:37,824
rather than way over in Duluth.
- Absolutely, especially in--
923
00:42:37,891 --> 00:42:40,494
Exactly, especially given
that this is the lake
924
00:42:40,561 --> 00:42:43,864
where you have, you know,
the worst weather,
925
00:42:43,931 --> 00:42:45,465
you know, the worst weather.
926
00:42:45,532 --> 00:42:49,970
And the implications are the
most severe on any Great Lake.
927
00:42:50,037 --> 00:42:51,371
And I mean,
just think about that.
928
00:42:51,438 --> 00:42:53,373
I mean, you're like 17 miles
away from the Soo,
929
00:42:53,440 --> 00:42:56,476
and the closest point
is 21 hours ago.
930
00:42:56,543 --> 00:43:00,047
So, the time it took the
Fitzgerald to get from Superior
931
00:43:00,113 --> 00:43:03,250
to that point
would be about as long
932
00:43:03,317 --> 00:43:05,953
as it would take
the rescue ship to get there.
933
00:43:06,019 --> 00:43:08,155
And so, it didn't get
there until the evening
934
00:43:08,222 --> 00:43:10,791
or late afternoon
of November 11.
935
00:43:10,858 --> 00:43:13,594
- You have to wonder what
an aircraft could do anyway,
936
00:43:13,660 --> 00:43:15,195
other than dropping flares...
- Right.
937
00:43:15,262 --> 00:43:16,563
- ...to know where it was
938
00:43:16,630 --> 00:43:18,232
before it sank.
- Correct.
939
00:43:18,298 --> 00:43:20,234
- I mean, they couldn't do
any kind of rescue.
940
00:43:20,300 --> 00:43:22,236
- Yes, that's right,
and so if--
941
00:43:22,302 --> 00:43:24,671
So, that was important
to have that equipment
942
00:43:24,738 --> 00:43:26,673
ready to go for the Anderson
943
00:43:26,740 --> 00:43:29,343
because the Anderson
did go back in.
944
00:43:29,409 --> 00:43:30,677
If you had some flares,
945
00:43:30,744 --> 00:43:32,479
you might be able
to see a little bit.
946
00:43:32,546 --> 00:43:36,583
So, having the equipment ready
to go was important.
947
00:43:36,650 --> 00:43:39,219
And because the Coast Guard
948
00:43:40,787 --> 00:43:43,924
was ill-prepared
for a rescue for a search
949
00:43:43,991 --> 00:43:45,526
in that part of the lakes,
950
00:43:45,592 --> 00:43:49,096
it jeopardized
the crew of the Anderson.
951
00:43:49,162 --> 00:43:51,999
And I think Bernie Cooper
and his crew
952
00:43:52,065 --> 00:43:54,968
were very fortunate
that it was called off
953
00:43:55,035 --> 00:43:59,373
and that it either missed
the worst of the storm,
954
00:43:59,439 --> 00:44:02,442
or, you know, people
kind of came to their senses
955
00:44:02,509 --> 00:44:04,244
thinking that we don't wanna--
We lost one ship.
956
00:44:04,311 --> 00:44:05,445
We don't wanna lose
another one.
957
00:44:05,512 --> 00:44:07,114
- Fitzgerald had radar, though.
958
00:44:07,181 --> 00:44:09,082
- The radar,
both the radar were down.
959
00:44:09,149 --> 00:44:10,717
So, they were
on two separate circuits.
960
00:44:10,784 --> 00:44:12,052
But because of the weather,
961
00:44:12,119 --> 00:44:14,655
as luck would have it,
or, you know, unlucky,
962
00:44:14,721 --> 00:44:16,657
both of the radar were down.
963
00:44:16,723 --> 00:44:20,527
And so, the only way
that they had any eyes
964
00:44:21,828 --> 00:44:24,498
on the lake
was through Bernie Cooper.
965
00:44:24,565 --> 00:44:28,068
And it was good that the
Fitzgerald wasn't to the west
966
00:44:28,135 --> 00:44:30,537
because the Fitzgerald would be
getting the weather
967
00:44:30,604 --> 00:44:31,939
before the Anderson.
968
00:44:32,005 --> 00:44:35,375
So, it was absolutely crucial
that the Anderson
969
00:44:35,442 --> 00:44:38,679
was as close
to the Fitzgerald as possible
970
00:44:38,745 --> 00:44:41,348
and was being able to get
a good read on the weather
971
00:44:41,415 --> 00:44:43,784
before it hit the Fitzgerald.
972
00:44:43,851 --> 00:44:47,721
One of the theories is called
the Three Sisters rogue waves.
973
00:44:47,788 --> 00:44:50,724
That supposedly that there were
rogue waves that would--
974
00:44:50,791 --> 00:44:54,061
There's been a record
of such waves on the lake,
975
00:44:54,127 --> 00:44:56,129
that were as high
as 40 or 50 feet
976
00:44:56,196 --> 00:45:00,100
that came through and gave the
knockout blow to the Fitzgerald.
977
00:45:00,167 --> 00:45:03,837
There was testimony
that the Anderson
978
00:45:03,904 --> 00:45:06,807
saw a formation
of rogue waves,
979
00:45:07,241 --> 00:45:09,743
and because it was
only ten miles apart,
980
00:45:09,810 --> 00:45:11,378
it's very possible
981
00:45:11,445 --> 00:45:15,949
that those rogue waves
could have hit the Fitzgerald.
982
00:45:16,016 --> 00:45:18,118
- So, the Fitzgerald
really doesn't even know
983
00:45:18,185 --> 00:45:20,187
exactly where it is anymore?
- Exactly.
984
00:45:20,254 --> 00:45:22,189
I mean, they had a sense
of where they were
985
00:45:22,256 --> 00:45:24,291
because they were,
you know, they had the chart.
986
00:45:24,358 --> 00:45:26,527
And so, someone was keeping
track of that that way, but--
987
00:45:26,593 --> 00:45:28,061
- Just paper charts.
- Right, right.
988
00:45:28,128 --> 00:45:31,398
But it's important
to emphasize that
989
00:45:31,465 --> 00:45:34,234
McSorley and Bernie Cooper
990
00:45:34,301 --> 00:45:38,005
were in close communication
contact throughout that evening.
991
00:45:38,071 --> 00:45:41,508
So, Bernie Cooper
was only the only way
992
00:45:41,575 --> 00:45:45,379
that McSorley knew
where he was on the lake,
993
00:45:45,445 --> 00:45:48,982
outside of, you know, maybe
a gut sense or a sixth sense
994
00:45:49,049 --> 00:45:50,984
since he had been in the lakes
for many years.
995
00:45:51,051 --> 00:45:54,621
But Bernie Cooper was his eyes
and ears that night.
996
00:45:54,688 --> 00:45:58,825
- Were the men on the Anderson
in particular,
997
00:45:59,860 --> 00:46:02,596
hoping that
they could somehow,
998
00:46:02,663 --> 00:46:04,264
when they went back out,
999
00:46:04,331 --> 00:46:06,934
get to the Fitzgerald
in time to do a rescue?
1000
00:46:07,000 --> 00:46:08,635
- It's possible.
- I mean, because recovery
1001
00:46:08,702 --> 00:46:11,772
wouldn't have been any point
in that at that juncture.
1002
00:46:11,839 --> 00:46:13,207
- Yeah, that's a good question.
1003
00:46:13,273 --> 00:46:16,276
It's really unclear who
in the Anderson
1004
00:46:16,343 --> 00:46:19,213
besides the people
in the pilothouse
1005
00:46:19,279 --> 00:46:21,715
really had an understanding
1006
00:46:21,782 --> 00:46:26,053
of the conditions of the weather
and of the lake,
1007
00:46:26,119 --> 00:46:30,357
and then, what the fate was
of the Fitzgerald.
1008
00:46:30,424 --> 00:46:32,359
But Bernie Cooper
and his first mate,
1009
00:46:32,426 --> 00:46:33,794
they were in close contact.
1010
00:46:33,861 --> 00:46:37,764
So, we do know that
it would stand to reason
1011
00:46:38,232 --> 00:46:40,767
that the crew members
in the pilothouse
1012
00:46:40,834 --> 00:46:45,205
were well aware of the situation
that the Fitzgerald was in
1013
00:46:45,272 --> 00:46:48,008
and that maybe
if they were going to,
1014
00:46:48,075 --> 00:46:49,910
you know,
catch up to the Fitzgerald,
1015
00:46:49,977 --> 00:46:51,612
which at that point was unlikely
1016
00:46:51,678 --> 00:46:53,514
because there was still
ten miles distance
1017
00:46:53,580 --> 00:46:56,049
and they were getting
very close to the Soo.
1018
00:46:56,116 --> 00:46:58,652
I would think
that the crew members
1019
00:46:58,719 --> 00:47:01,622
would want to do
everything possible
1020
00:47:01,688 --> 00:47:06,326
to make sure that the Fitzgerald
would get safely to the Soo,
1021
00:47:06,393 --> 00:47:11,231
or maybe to conduct a rescue
without jeopardizing the lives
1022
00:47:11,298 --> 00:47:15,235
of the rest of the crew members
of the Anderson.
1023
00:47:15,302 --> 00:47:17,905
- What was finally
then decided?
1024
00:47:17,971 --> 00:47:21,408
I mean, the Fitzgerald
just disappears in the night
1025
00:47:21,475 --> 00:47:25,879
in the storm without giving
any clear indication
1026
00:47:25,946 --> 00:47:29,082
of what
their final moments were.
1027
00:47:29,550 --> 00:47:31,985
So, there's an investigation?
1028
00:47:32,052 --> 00:47:36,757
- So, the investigation is not
conducted until the next spring.
1029
00:47:36,823 --> 00:47:38,325
So, the Coast Guard
1030
00:47:38,392 --> 00:47:40,360
and the National Transportation
Safety Board,
1031
00:47:40,427 --> 00:47:41,695
they had their own reports,
1032
00:47:41,762 --> 00:47:43,730
and there were
some differences between it.
1033
00:47:43,797 --> 00:47:46,533
And so, immediately when those
reports came out,
1034
00:47:46,600 --> 00:47:48,769
and the reason why the reports
didn't come out
1035
00:47:48,836 --> 00:47:50,838
until six or seven months later
1036
00:47:50,904 --> 00:47:54,675
is because eyes weren't put
on the wreckage
1037
00:47:54,741 --> 00:47:58,178
until, like, March
or April of 1976.
1038
00:47:58,245 --> 00:48:01,181
So, they had a vehicle
that went down there
1039
00:48:01,248 --> 00:48:06,053
that had pictures
and video of how it looked like.
1040
00:48:06,119 --> 00:48:10,390
And so, based on that,
but mainly based on testimony
1041
00:48:10,457 --> 00:48:13,694
from crew members
on the Anderson,
1042
00:48:15,062 --> 00:48:17,831
as well as people
who are tending
1043
00:48:17,898 --> 00:48:20,400
to the National Weather Service
stations,
1044
00:48:20,467 --> 00:48:24,738
as well as the Coast Guard,
industry experts,
1045
00:48:24,805 --> 00:48:30,010
they're the ones that
constituted most of the report
1046
00:48:30,077 --> 00:48:34,715
since there was limited
visual evidence of what happened
1047
00:48:34,781 --> 00:48:36,583
to the ship and how it did.
1048
00:48:36,650 --> 00:48:38,385
And, you know,
keep in mind that this ship
1049
00:48:38,452 --> 00:48:40,587
is about 700 feet long,
1050
00:48:41,288 --> 00:48:44,091
and there
is a significant distance
1051
00:48:44,157 --> 00:48:45,859
between the bow
and the stern,
1052
00:48:45,926 --> 00:48:48,362
that it would take a long time
1053
00:48:48,428 --> 00:48:51,431
for video to capture all
of that.
1054
00:48:51,932 --> 00:48:55,068
And if you look
at the technology in 1975, 1976,
1055
00:48:55,135 --> 00:48:57,638
it's a lot different
than what it was today.
1056
00:48:57,704 --> 00:48:59,540
So, you have these reports
that come out,
1057
00:48:59,606 --> 00:49:02,776
these dueling reports,
and immediately each one,
1058
00:49:02,843 --> 00:49:05,045
the National Transportation
Safety Board
1059
00:49:05,112 --> 00:49:07,581
and the Coast Guard report,
1060
00:49:07,648 --> 00:49:09,449
they are arguing
with one another, saying that
1061
00:49:09,516 --> 00:49:12,519
"Your report is not valid,
ours is."
1062
00:49:12,586 --> 00:49:13,921
And what's important about that,
1063
00:49:13,987 --> 00:49:18,225
even though the reports
were not giving a lot of answers
1064
00:49:18,292 --> 00:49:20,327
and that there were a lot
of questions,
1065
00:49:20,394 --> 00:49:22,229
the message
that came from that
1066
00:49:22,296 --> 00:49:24,731
is that this
is going to continue
1067
00:49:24,798 --> 00:49:26,300
to be a political controversy.
1068
00:49:26,366 --> 00:49:27,768
You have these
government agencies
1069
00:49:27,835 --> 00:49:29,403
that can't seem to agree
on this.
1070
00:49:29,469 --> 00:49:30,804
They're fighting back and forth.
1071
00:49:30,871 --> 00:49:32,506
Then you have
the Lake Carriers' Association.
1072
00:49:32,573 --> 00:49:33,974
They have their own opinion.
1073
00:49:34,041 --> 00:49:36,476
In the middle of all this,
you have the family members
1074
00:49:36,543 --> 00:49:39,513
who six, seven months later,
they don't have any answers.
1075
00:49:39,580 --> 00:49:42,382
And even though
there is video of the ship,
1076
00:49:42,449 --> 00:49:45,419
it's not enough evidence
to make a determination
1077
00:49:45,485 --> 00:49:47,988
conclusively
what had happened to it.
1078
00:49:48,055 --> 00:49:52,993
And that also plays into the
dynamics with the lawsuits
1079
00:49:53,060 --> 00:49:56,496
and the legal action
had that had been transpiring
1080
00:49:56,563 --> 00:49:58,398
in the meantime.
1081
00:49:58,465 --> 00:50:00,133
- There is a,
1082
00:50:00,601 --> 00:50:03,036
I'm going to call it
a simulation,
1083
00:50:03,103 --> 00:50:06,173
of what the Fitzgerald
looks like down on the bottom.
1084
00:50:06,240 --> 00:50:08,342
And what were the conclusions
for that?
1085
00:50:08,408 --> 00:50:10,978
- Well, I mean, again, that,
1086
00:50:11,678 --> 00:50:15,182
it kind of raises
more questions than answers.
1087
00:50:15,249 --> 00:50:19,586
And so, if you look at
how the ship is positioned
1088
00:50:20,354 --> 00:50:24,992
based on that information,
based on previous studies,
1089
00:50:25,058 --> 00:50:27,194
some will say
that it's conclusive
1090
00:50:27,261 --> 00:50:29,429
that it broke apart
on the surface,
1091
00:50:29,496 --> 00:50:33,233
just by the nature of how it
landed on the lake bottom
1092
00:50:33,300 --> 00:50:34,968
and the disbursement
1093
00:50:35,035 --> 00:50:38,405
of the millions and millions
of pellets.
1094
00:50:38,472 --> 00:50:41,742
Other people will say
that it went into a nosedive
1095
00:50:41,808 --> 00:50:43,644
because of the shift,
1096
00:50:43,710 --> 00:50:46,346
the massive shift
of the taconite ore
1097
00:50:46,413 --> 00:50:49,883
from the middle and from the
stern toward the bow.
1098
00:50:49,950 --> 00:50:53,420
So, that's really, I mean,
based on my research,
1099
00:50:53,487 --> 00:50:56,156
that wasn't as conclusive
1100
00:50:56,223 --> 00:50:58,926
as I think some people
made it out to be.
1101
00:50:58,992 --> 00:51:00,527
And when people ask me about,
you know,
1102
00:51:00,594 --> 00:51:02,563
why was it that it sank,
I'm pretty consistent.
1103
00:51:02,629 --> 00:51:03,964
Which is the reason
why it sank
1104
00:51:04,031 --> 00:51:05,465
is it simply was not seaworthy.
1105
00:51:05,532 --> 00:51:08,268
All of these I like
to look at proximate causes.
1106
00:51:08,335 --> 00:51:10,671
This is what happened
in the 15th round.
1107
00:51:10,737 --> 00:51:15,075
My work and research and my book
is based on the first 14 rounds.
1108
00:51:15,142 --> 00:51:17,444
Acknowledging that
there are a number of scenarios
1109
00:51:17,511 --> 00:51:20,013
that could have happened
in the 15th round.
1110
00:51:20,080 --> 00:51:22,649
Was it, you know,
a right hook, a left hook?
1111
00:51:22,716 --> 00:51:24,318
I don't know,
but what I do know
1112
00:51:24,384 --> 00:51:27,788
is that this ship
had been beaten,
1113
00:51:27,855 --> 00:51:30,424
battered, and bruised
for the first 14 rounds,
1114
00:51:30,490 --> 00:51:32,726
and it was only a matter of time
before it sank.
1115
00:51:32,793 --> 00:51:34,127
- Norman:
What was the legacy then?
1116
00:51:34,194 --> 00:51:35,295
What came out of it?
1117
00:51:35,362 --> 00:51:37,464
Mystery notwithstanding.
1118
00:51:37,531 --> 00:51:40,167
- Thomas: Well, fortunately,
there hasn't been--
1119
00:51:40,234 --> 00:51:41,869
there hadn't been
another sinking
1120
00:51:41,935 --> 00:51:43,370
up until, I think, last year.
1121
00:51:43,437 --> 00:51:45,172
There was
a ship that ran aground,
1122
00:51:45,239 --> 00:51:47,674
and so it had to be towed
into port.
1123
00:51:47,741 --> 00:51:49,309
And that's important
1124
00:51:49,376 --> 00:51:52,312
because there were
some changes that were made.
1125
00:51:52,379 --> 00:51:54,481
I don't think
there was enough made.
1126
00:51:54,548 --> 00:51:57,851
But the good thing is that
the weather equipment,
1127
00:51:57,918 --> 00:52:00,888
the weather equipment
did in fact improve over time.
1128
00:52:00,954 --> 00:52:02,356
Technology improved too.
1129
00:52:02,422 --> 00:52:05,392
And I think that that has a lot
to do with the fact
1130
00:52:05,459 --> 00:52:07,895
that there has not been
another sinking.
1131
00:52:07,961 --> 00:52:10,163
But what that
also tells me is that
1132
00:52:10,230 --> 00:52:15,068
the Fitzgerald certainly
was an exceptional case,
1133
00:52:15,135 --> 00:52:18,205
that it was not taken care
of properly,
1134
00:52:18,272 --> 00:52:22,676
that it was allowed to fall
apart and eventually sink.
1135
00:52:22,743 --> 00:52:25,846
Whether or not other companies
learned that lesson,
1136
00:52:25,913 --> 00:52:28,916
wisened up to that,
and made sure that their ships
1137
00:52:28,982 --> 00:52:33,120
were in better working order,
it's pretty clear that the ones
1138
00:52:33,187 --> 00:52:35,122
for which
there was vertical integration,
1139
00:52:35,189 --> 00:52:38,158
and you had companies that owned
and operated these vessels,
1140
00:52:38,225 --> 00:52:40,694
that was a given because
they wanted to get as much life
1141
00:52:40,761 --> 00:52:42,029
out of that as possible,
1142
00:52:42,095 --> 00:52:45,499
and they
were responsible for it.
1143
00:52:45,566 --> 00:52:49,136
Whether or not Oglebay Norton,
that's not clear.
1144
00:52:49,203 --> 00:52:52,439
I know that, going back,
that the Fitzgerald
1145
00:52:52,506 --> 00:52:57,411
was not the only ship in its
fleet that had problems.
1146
00:52:57,477 --> 00:53:00,647
So, there was another ship,
the Sylvania,
1147
00:53:00,714 --> 00:53:02,316
that two or three years before,
1148
00:53:02,382 --> 00:53:05,652
before the Fitzgerald sank,
the rudder fell off.
1149
00:53:05,719 --> 00:53:09,056
So, this was not exceptional
in that regard,
1150
00:53:09,122 --> 00:53:11,058
that this company,
that there was, in fact,
1151
00:53:11,124 --> 00:53:14,928
a track record that was not
taking care of its equipment.
1152
00:53:14,995 --> 00:53:18,532
- Was there some compensation
for the families ultimately?
1153
00:53:18,599 --> 00:53:20,501
- Okay, so this was--
1154
00:53:21,802 --> 00:53:25,839
This has been a part
of the Fitzgerald legacy
1155
00:53:25,906 --> 00:53:29,176
that hasn't been explored
that much.
1156
00:53:29,243 --> 00:53:32,112
It constitutes
a pretty big part of my book.
1157
00:53:32,179 --> 00:53:36,617
What happened is the company
wanted to settle
1158
00:53:36,683 --> 00:53:40,187
with the families
as quick as possible.
1159
00:53:40,254 --> 00:53:42,656
There was $1 million deductible,
1160
00:53:42,723 --> 00:53:45,425
and based on interviews
with some family members,
1161
00:53:45,492 --> 00:53:48,228
it seemed as though
Oglebay Norton
1162
00:53:48,295 --> 00:53:52,533
was going to spend $1 million
because they had to do that,
1163
00:53:52,599 --> 00:53:55,369
but they weren't gonna do
a penny more.
1164
00:53:55,435 --> 00:53:58,772
$1 million
divided by 29 is $35,000,
1165
00:53:59,206 --> 00:54:03,076
and that is the figure that
several family members have said
1166
00:54:03,143 --> 00:54:04,912
as how much they have received.
1167
00:54:04,978 --> 00:54:08,248
And what happened is a lot
of those families signed off.
1168
00:54:08,315 --> 00:54:10,417
They got their $35,000.
1169
00:54:10,484 --> 00:54:15,088
But then, there was talk about
some families getting attorneys
1170
00:54:15,155 --> 00:54:17,624
that were able to get
more money.
1171
00:54:17,691 --> 00:54:19,293
And it's
a really interesting story
1172
00:54:19,359 --> 00:54:22,496
because at the heart
of this story
1173
00:54:23,063 --> 00:54:26,433
are two individuals
from Wisconsin.
1174
00:54:26,500 --> 00:54:28,468
Dick Hunegs,
who was from Ashland,
1175
00:54:28,535 --> 00:54:29,870
as well as Toby Marcovich,
1176
00:54:29,937 --> 00:54:33,040
who was an attorney,
still practicing in Superior.
1177
00:54:33,106 --> 00:54:36,577
And they fulfilled
very important roles,
1178
00:54:36,643 --> 00:54:40,514
tracking down Red Burgner
for the deposition,
1179
00:54:40,581 --> 00:54:42,115
tracking down evidence
that showed
1180
00:54:42,182 --> 00:54:45,118
that it was not
in sound working order.
1181
00:54:45,185 --> 00:54:47,154
But what happened
is when word came out
1182
00:54:47,221 --> 00:54:50,891
that some families had signed up
for attorneys,
1183
00:54:50,958 --> 00:54:52,326
the others could not
1184
00:54:52,392 --> 00:54:55,829
because they had already signed
off with the insurance company
1185
00:54:55,896 --> 00:54:58,599
or with the--
or with Oglebay Norton.
1186
00:54:58,665 --> 00:55:01,101
And they wanted to,
but they couldn't.
1187
00:55:01,168 --> 00:55:02,636
Legally, they couldn't.
1188
00:55:02,703 --> 00:55:06,073
So, the average settlement
was about $35,000.
1189
00:55:06,139 --> 00:55:08,075
But there were some
family members
1190
00:55:08,141 --> 00:55:11,979
that received settlements
in excess of $100,000, $200,000.
1191
00:55:12,045 --> 00:55:15,916
- Sounds complicated.
- Sounds very complicated.
1192
00:55:15,983 --> 00:55:18,352
- And not necessarily...
1193
00:55:18,418 --> 00:55:20,587
all equal for everybody.
- It was not, it was.
1194
00:55:20,654 --> 00:55:22,389
And it was a source
of contention
1195
00:55:22,456 --> 00:55:24,157
among some of the families.
1196
00:55:24,224 --> 00:55:25,359
It took a long time too.
1197
00:55:25,425 --> 00:55:26,994
According to Toby Marcovich,
1198
00:55:27,060 --> 00:55:29,429
for the family
that he represented,
1199
00:55:29,496 --> 00:55:31,865
he didn't get the settlement
until about 1982.
1200
00:55:31,932 --> 00:55:34,268
- Norman: Wow.
- So, six or seven years.
1201
00:55:34,334 --> 00:55:36,637
- Well, Thomas M. Nelson,
1202
00:55:36,703 --> 00:55:38,639
thank you for sharing
your insights...
1203
00:55:38,705 --> 00:55:41,408
- Of course.
- ...into the very famous,
1204
00:55:41,475 --> 00:55:45,379
notorious
and heroic Edmund Fitzgerald.
1205
00:55:46,013 --> 00:55:47,114
- Thank you.
1206
00:55:47,181 --> 00:55:48,282
- I'm Norman Gilliland,
1207
00:55:48,348 --> 00:55:50,284
and I hope you can join me
next time around
1208
00:55:50,350 --> 00:55:52,252
for University Place Presents.
1209
00:55:52,319 --> 00:55:53,987
[gentle music]