cc  >> And again, welcome to  "Global Hot Spots" today.  Our guest speaker is  Professor Jeremi Suri  from the Department of History.  Professor Suri is also Director  of the European Union Center for  Excellence on campus.  He is the author of three books,  the most recent of which is  "Henry Kissinger in the American  Century."  Professor Suri also has been  an outstanding outreacher and  has worked with us on a number  of occasions offering two online  courses through the Alumni  Lifelong Learning Program,  speaking at I think an  uncountable number of Founders  Days and other events.  And it was for that reason he's  also the recipient of the 2008  Ken and Linda Ciriacks Faculty  Outreach Award last spring.  And today, Jeremi will be  speaking on the future of  US-Europe relations in the  shadow of the Iraq War.  Will you please join me in  welcoming Professor Jeremi Suri.  >> Thank you for that very kind  introduction Sarah.  It's always a lot of fun to do  events with the WAA.  I have a rule that if they ask  me to do something and I can, I  will because I just love meeting  new people through the WAA. 

 And I also love the chance to  talk about these issues with  people who have a variety of  interesting backgrounds and  interesting points of experience  to bring to these issues.  So I consider this a chance for  me to learn from you probably  more than it is a chance for you  to learn from me.  And I hope we'll have time for  discussion along those lines.  And I'll also call on my  students when I get into trouble  myself to answer your hard  questions.  That's why they're really here.  In addition to thanking Sarah  Schutt, I also want to thank  Anne Lemke from the  UW-Foundation who's here.  It's really wonderful to work  with her.  And a number of our friends --  we had actually a lunch  beforehand, and it's nice to be  able to get a free lunch, so I  enjoyed that part of this too.  So let me begin with one of my  favorite pictures.  I hope everyone can see. 

 Can everyone see?  I know everyone can hear me with  or without the microphone.  I'm not worried about that.  Everyone can see.  This is one of my favorite  images because I think it  captures in many ways the  American predicament from WWII  on.  Franklin Roosevelt loved maps.  He loved globes.  He created the map room in the  White House.  If you've visited the White  House, that is one of the rooms  he created.  And he spent a lot of time  during WWII as a former Navy man  thinking about the world and  about geopolitics.  And what this captures I think  is the paradox of the American  position in the Twentieth  Century. 

 Franklin Roosevelt is  knowledgeable and to some extent  he's able to grasp what's  happening around the globe,  perhaps better than any  subsequent president.  At the same time, he does not  master it.  He is not mastering that globe.  He's studying it but he is not  mastering it and in some ways  it's bigger than he is.  Right?  It's bigger than he is.  Just as he has it on his -- I  guess around his desk or  wherever he would put that.  This is to some extent the  predicament that the United  States finds itself in in the  Twentieth Century.  The United States has  responsibilities, obligations,  areas of interest growing at an  exponential rate in the mid  Twentieth Century on.  Now we might argue whether that  was necessary, whether that was  good, whether it could have been  different, but it happened.  That's fact. 

 And ladies and gentleman, it's  continuing to happen.  And it will continue to happen  with President Barack Obama.  There are too many places in the  world that are too important for  us, regardless of our politics  to ignore them.  This is not just about economics  as it wasn't just about  economics for Franklin  Roosevelt.  It's about crisis, about failed  states, about humanitarian  issues, about environmental  issues.  There is almost nowhere that is  unimportant to us.  Now maybe there is nowhere where  we should be sending forces in  the way we send them, but there  is nowhere that is unimportant  to us in the world today.  That's a different world from  the American constitutional  presumptions of the Eighteenth  Century.  That's a different world from  the foreign policy doctrines  formulated in the Nineteenth  Century.  That's a different world even  from the world of Theodore  Roosevelt. 

 It's a very different world and  a world we continue to operate  in.  One of the reasons this man, who  I spend far too much time  thinking about and writing about  and -- I know I had gone too far  when my kids started making  Henry Kissinger jokes.  At this point I've actually got  to stop now.  But isn't that one of the  reasons why after FDR really if  we put together the three or  four most prominent people in  our daily discussion of foreign  policy, why this man's name  comes up as well.  Because like FDR he's one of the  few figures in the second half  of the Twentieth Century who  seemed to at least have some  grasp on this.  We might hate him or love him,  but Henry Kissinger, like  Franklin Roosevelt had some  grasp of the interdependence of  these issues and had a way of  working forward.  He had a way of being effective,  if not always moral, a way of  actually having effects on the  ground if they weren't always  what he intended.  He had a way of changing things  if it wasn't always the change  we wanted.  But nonetheless, he was  effective in that operation.  And I would just ask you to  think about all the presidents,  all the policymakers who have  gone to Washington and have been  so clearly subsumed by the  international affairs that they  sought to master. 

 It's rare to have a Kissinger or  a Roosevelt who seems to be able  to grasp the complexity of the  world and deal with it for  better or for worse.  Think how poorly someone as  smart as Bill Clinton faired  under any of these issues,  right?  You couldn't be smarter than  Bill Clinton on most gradients,  right?  Rhodes scholar, a man who by any  account, right, could grasp  information as fast as anyone  else but yet he was never able  to formulate an overarching  doctrine, never able to master  the circumstances around him.  If he had been able to do that,  right.  It's not just George W. Bush.  If Clinton had been able to do  that, we in part wouldn't be in  the mess we're in today.  Many of the issues that Bush  mishandled were issues also that  Clinton mishandled as well.  This is a bipartisan problem.  This is not only a republican or  democratic problem.  I'll be very happy to criticize  George W. Bush,  but we shouldn't just  focus in on him it seems to be  that's a bit on an easy answer  sometimes.  There are images of American  foreign policy that we grip  onto I think because they show  us or they try to give us some  sense of how we have at times  been able to deal with the  problems of Roosevelt and the  problems of Kissinger, how we at  times have been able to at least  appear to be in control in some  way. 

 And they all involve Europe.  They all involve Europe.  This is one of the most  significant ones.  I love this picture.  This is John F. Kennedy  at the Berlin Wall on  the 26th of June, 1963.  This is the famous "Ich bin ein  Berliner" speech.  My students have heard me talk  about this before, right?  "I'm a jelly donut" Right?  Ich bin Berliner,  I'm a Berliner.  The other is you're the donut  they call the Berliner.  But that moment stands out, not  just for the rhetoric and the  aesthetics of that moment  because Kennedy actually seemed  at that moment to be able to  articulate what the Cold War was  about and to actually be in  control and have some way  forward.  And if you don't think that's  true, look at the crowd. 

 Look at that crowd.  The largest crowd in Berlin  since the last Nazi rally, when  the American President comes to  Berlin.  Right?  And I don't have the image with  me, you'll have to look in my  book to see it, I have an image  of when Kennedy came to the  Field House here in 1960 when he  was running for office.  And the amazing thing about that  image is that it's not too  different from this.  The students are packed in, all  wearing suits and ties by the  way.  It was really interesting.  But they're mesmerized by him.  They're mesmerized.  He seems to be in control,  right.  That's what charisma is. 

 Even if he isn't in control, he  seems to be able to master the  moment.  Kennedy went to Berlin in 1963  and he said that Berlin is not  only a symbol of the Cold War,  Berlin is the way forward.  We will stand strong here.  We will show the rest of the  world what we can do.  This will be a model that will  influence others, and as a free  man, I'm a Berliner.  And all Berliners are free men  and that makes us a free  society.  That was an effective  intellectual way to bring these  things together.  Whether you agree with his  policies or not.  It also got us into Vietnam by  the way.  But nonetheless, for that  moment, it appeared to be an  effective way of controlling and  speaking to a complicated world. 

 Ronald Reagan went to the Berlin  Wall in June of 1987.  All go to the Berlin wall.  Went to the Berlin wall in June  of '87.  I love the image of Helmut Cole  by the way, sitting there.  And this was when Reagan also  had his moment, right?  Many of you must remember what  Reagan said.  "Mr. Gorbachev, tear down  that wall.  Mr. Gorbachev, tear down  that wall."  In 1987 when Reagan went  there, there were still -- and  you know this, you remember  this, there were still deep  debates over whether the United  States should work more closely  with Gorbachev or not.  Whether the United States could  trust Gorbachev or not.  What would come next and how we  would deal with the Soviet  Union.  But Reagan again seemed to be in  control, right. 

 Said very clearly, right, "this  wall is more than just a symbol.  This wall is the core of our  problem.  You've closed your society, we  are a society seeking open  borders.  We are a society for openness  and transparency.  If you want to end the Cold War,  you make a statement for  openness and transparency by  tearing down this wall."  Simplistic, yet captured what  many were thinking.  Gave a way forward.  And we know in fact Gorbachev  listened.  He didn't tear down the wall  because Reagan said so, but in  '89 Gorbachev had the chance to  actually send military force in  and didn't because he believed  that the way to move forward was  in fact to let this wall come  down.  I think you all predicted where  I'm going with this.  Right?  It's not a coincidence that  Barack Obama went to Berlin  during the campaign. 

 It's actually the first time,  maybe someone will come up with  an example, but I can't think of  a presidential candidate going  and giving a speech in Berlin  during the candidacy in the way  he did.  It's interesting Angela Merkel  wouldn't let him actually  stand in front of  the Brandenburg Gates,  she didn't want -- because  he's not president.  She didn't want that.  So he's actually in front of the  Prussian Victory Column from  1870 over the French.  Every time I read about how much  the French love Obama, I just  think they don't understand  their history here.  They just don't understand  what's going on at this moment.  But look at the crowd.  Look at that crowd.  German newspapers almost  uniformly said that next morning  that if Obama wasn't elected  president, he could run for  chancellor.  Either party, it didn't matter. 

 Right?  Look at that crowd there.  Obama also seemed to some to  actually be capturing a way  forward.  What did he talk about when he  went to Berlin?  He talked about a new era of  cooperation.  He talked about a new  partnership between the US and  Europe.  He talked explicitly about US-EU  relations being the core for a  new foreign policy for the  United States and a new foreign  policy for Europe.  He said three things among many  others, three things among many  others that echo Kennedy and  echo Reagan and echo Roosevelt  and even echo Kissinger, right?  He said that the United States  is an inherent partner of  Europe, that there is no  American foreign policy without  Europe, and there is no Europe  without the United States.  He didn't say this, but he  really was talking about Western  Civilization, that there is  something there -- it's not  exclusive, it doesn't mean it's  better than elsewhere, but there  is something special, a special  relationship between these  societies and there's no foreign  policy without that.  Second, he talked about the  importance of pooling resources  and cooperating and not going it  alone.  Now the United States and the  European Union and the various  states within the EU had  resources which together would  be greater than the sum of their  parts, and that separate would  be less than the individual  appearance of strength that they  seem to put forth.  So it's not just about the    inherent connection but also  about what we might call the  economies of scale, the  efficiencies, the greater effect  of working together. 

 And then third and I think most  pointedly, most poignantly, I  think he talked about how the  history of these societies  working together gave us a root  forward.  The history of these societies  working together gave us a root  forward.  Berlin for Obama became a symbol  not just of a division of Europe  in the past but also of a new  cosmopolitan, Trans-Atlantic  community.  A new cosmopolitan,  Trans-Atlantic community that's  more than just the United States  and Great Britain, but includes  the European Continent.  Where else would you go to speak  of the entire European continent  but in the center.  Where else would you go?  To the most dynamic element of  Europe itself.  Where else would you go quite  frankly.  To the country that's driving  the EU more than anywhere else,  in many respects.  I think that was chosen  intentionally by Obama, and I  think that's the message that  got across to citizens there.  When I was in Europe this  summer, I asked many citizens  you know what's going to be so  different about Obama, because  everyone loved Obama in Europe. 

 What's going to be so different?  It wasn't the policies, it was  the attitude.  It was the sensibility.  Just as it was for Kennedy and  for Reagan.  Right?  The attitude and the  sensibility that these men  would bring to bear.  In fact, the German Ambassador  to the United States was here a  few weeks ago.  He talked with a bunch of us  from the European Union Center  and he said during the  primaries, he couldn't convince  Angela Merkel that  Obama had a chance.  She just assumed that Hillary...  After the primaries, he couldn't  convince Angela Merkel that  there was a chance  Obama would lose.  Right?  It just flipped over, right?  And I think it was as much on  Merkel's part and others this  hope -- and this is not  an anti-McCain statement really,  but this hope for a new era  of cooperation in these terms.  What I want to argue today is  that the United States, in its  relationships with Europe over  the past century have had a  number of different kinds of  relations, but they've involved  a variety of commonalities and a  variety of issues. 

 And of these commonalities,  these experiences are the future  of our foreign policy with  Europe.  Not only because they should be,  not only because I say they are,  though that should be good  enough, right?  But actually more because they  make sense.  The past is the future, the past  is the future.  I was reading a very good book  by one of the journalists I  respect most, Fred Kaplan who  writes for a variety of  newspapers in Washington and  elsewhere.  And he begins his book on the  Bush years by saying that the  biggest mistake that members of  the Bush Administration and many  Americans made was that they  thought the world had changed.  Well the world has changed, but  when the world changes, the past  doesn't go away, the past is  still with you.  And the past is not only there  to haunt the present, the past  is also there to guide the  present.  The past is not only a  nightmare, it's not only a  ghost.  It's also a lodestone for where  we go from here.  The United States has a history  of making good and bad policies. 

 The United States has been a  force for good in many parts of  the world.  It has been a force for not so  good in many parts of the world  as well.  We have been at our best, I will  argue, when we have worked most  closely with our European  allies.  We have been at our worst when  we have sought to go it alone.  And the same could be said for  Europe.  Europe has had, especially a new  Europe that's come together  through the European Union and  elsewhere, it has had great  successes in some ways.  Great successes in pushing  forward ideas of human rights,  pushing forward new standards  for industry, pushing forward a  new developmental agenda,  pushing forward a new agenda for  health reform around the world.  This Europe has been best when  it has worked with the US.  It has been least effective  and it has been most flawed when  it has sought to be an  alternative to the US.  The future of US-European  relations is the future of a new  era of cooperation, and there's  really no other choice. 

 There is really no other way to  move forward.  And I want to talk about a few  ways in which I see this  cooperation coming to bear again  not only because I say it but  because I see no other  alternative, no other way to go  forward.  These are going to be my  historical lessons, my four  "P's" for us today.  Prosperity, partnership,  prudence, and power.  Prosperity, partnership,  prudence, and power.  I think I've spent too much time  with my four and five year old,  I try to make everything into  these sort of easy rote things  so I remember it myself.  So prosperity, partnership,  prudence, and power.  Leave here remembering the "four  P's" one way or another.  And let me begin with  prosperity.  This is I think the most  important graph you need to see  for the entire Twentieth  Century, the most important  graph you need to see. 

 Look at the -- the black and red  lines -- I don't know if you can  see the colors in the back, the  two top lines.  Look at the slope of those.  Look at the growth in Gross  Domestic Product which is the  top line and the growth in  Personal Consumption  Expenditures in the United  States during the Twentieth  Century.  And look at that takeoff, right?  The post-war period.  Look at that.  That's what has made us rich and  fat or at least until a few  months ago, right?  Look at that takeoff in American  society, unprecedented.  I can't find another example of  it on anywhere near this scale.  The growth of American -- the  growth of American wealth and  the growth of American  consumption resulted from a  variety of things, a variety of  decisions that were made.  I'll get back to that in a  minute, but actually, what's  most significant for today is to  then put it in the context of  other parts of the world.  Right?  Here's the Gross Domestic  Product today across regions. 

 And look at where the United  States and the European Union  are in relation to the others,  right?  And look at what is projected  for 2013.  The Chinese growth is faster,  but it's still, by this  projection, and I think this is  a pretty standard line  projection, still going to be  behind the United States and the  European Union by 2013 in  growth.  The United States and Europe  have benefited enormously,  benefited enormously and Europe  not quite on the same scale,  enormously from the growth of  prosperity in the post-war  period.  Right?  And that prosperity has been  about more than just people  getting wealthy, it's been  actually about peacemaking and  cooperation.  Wealthier, more healthy, more  resource rich societies might be  destroying the environment, but  they are less likely to fight  wars with one another.  And more significant than that,  they are more likely to share  common interests.  This is not to say in normal  angle terms that peace is coming  because everyone is getting  wealthy, but it is to say that  this is a pre-requisite to some  extent.  It is to say this is a  prerequisite.  We all know that a German and  French war again after WWII  might have been thinkable if  this had been another continent  of depression and poverty,  right?  But the wealth that was created,  the fact that everyone could be  better off in the post-war  period made it easier for  societies to get along, easier  for societies to learn to work  together, easier for societies  to see common interests.  And what happened in the  post-war world was that the  United States as a leader in  this process, cooperating with  its European allies worked to  create new structures and  anchors for prosperity across  societies for more people. 

 Investments were made,  investments were made that had  not been made before.  Cooperative investments along  terms of infrastructure,  education and basic public  works.  At the end of WWII, the United  States, in spite of its coming  out of a depression, invested  more than $50 billion of its own  money not in buying banks ladies  and gentleman but in building,  in building infrastructure and  in building parts of societies  that would produce long term  wealth.  The United States went into  Germany and France, the very  societies in the case of Germany  that we had leveled, and built  new power stations and helped  the Germans build new power  stations, went in and built new  BMW and Mercedes factories and  helped the Germans build new BMW  and Mercedes factories and in  the most extraordinary  transformation in American  society, the federal government  made itself supportive of  education.  Before WWII the federal  government had almost no role in  financing education.  The federal government decided  at the end of WWII with the  United States in cooperation  with its European allies to  create a renaissance in higher  education.  To create a renaissance in  higher education.  Major investments in American  universities.  Just walk around campus and look  at the post-war structure of  this university.  You see major investments in  tuition payments, so middle  class soldiers and veterans and  others could come to school with  the GI Bill. 

 And the investment in the  architecture infrastructure and  enrollment of schools in Europe  as well.  How many people have been to  Berlin and seen the free  university?  Freie Universität?  You have right?  Built by the United States,  built by the United States in  cooperation with German  academics and others.  Investment in prosperity was  actually the key at the end of  WWII.  Historians have been very quick  to criticize this because the  argument, and some of my  students know this, is fairly  often made that these  investments were to secure a  capitalist world order, they  were to secure for the United  States interests in Europe,  markets in Europe, access to  goods and the ability to import  and consume more.  And that's true, that's true.  And I say that was good.  I say that was the most  intelligent thing Americans and  Europeans ever did.  They came out of war and decided  that their economies were hinged  to one another and that their  economies could only prosper if  they prospered together.  And the United States made  up front investments in that.  The United States delayed  consumption for long term  consumption. 

 Notice this in the graph?  That's it's not in the 40s the  takeoff really occurs.  It's not even in the early 50s.  It's after that.  Right?  The investments are made early,  for long term consumption and  growth.  Right?  This is what my grandfather  always told me right?  That actually after the war,  they didn't live a lot better  initially.  It took a while.  It took a while to actually get  a lot better.  Americans could have lived much  better immediately after the  war, but they chose not to.  They chose not to.  Europeans, especially the victor  powers could have lived a lot  better, really after the war. 

 But they chose not to.  They invested in their futures.  Post-war, US-European  joint investment in  economic change, in economic  growth, in economic preparation,  was crucial to the creation of a  prosperous world order between  these societies.  And that ladies and gentleman I  think is more than just about  economics, it's also about  consensus.  The leaders of these societies  spent enormous energy educating  their publics about this,  educating their publics about  this -- about the importance of  doing this, about the importance  of thinking about their future  in these terms and about how  they could do it together as a  team and everyone would benefit.  That's the story of Winston  Churchill.  That's the story of Conrad --.  That's the story of Charles  De Gaulle.  Henry Kissinger put this to me  once in an interview in a way  that I thought was really quite  stark.  He said "after the war, we  convinced ourselves and everyone  else that we would rise or fall  together, and there was no other  alternative, and there was no  other alternative. 

 And the institutions that were  created were larger than the  individuals.  The Bretton Wood system that  provided the basis for the US  Dollar as the currency of  reserve through the use of gold  backing of the dollar at $35 per  ounce of gold provided the basis  for a system of trade to be  created.  And when that system was no  longer sustainable, the dollar  had gained enough credability,  the dollar could do this with  almost nothing behind it.  I worry one day that we might  lose that credability.  We seem to now assume that  people will always assume  dollars are worth something,  right?  Even though they might not  always be worth something.  The creation of the World Bank,  International Monetary Fund, the  Marshall Plan ladies and  gentleman was more than just an  institution to give money to  different places, it was the  creation of local networks,  local groups of people,  businessmen usually who  cooperated with Americans and  invested money, money provided  by the US  but also raising local money.  It was a classic --  move, to go and provide funding  and bring people together,  Americans and Germans.  Americans and Frenchmen and  women, Americans and Brits and  Italians and for them to work  together in their own mutual  investments.  We did not go in and tell  Europeans how to do it, but we  did not turn our backs and say  they should do it themselves.  We did it together. 

 We invested together.  We invested in the future.  I see no alternative moving  forward.  I think we're at another  post-war moment now, we're at  another post-war moment now.  We all know this graph is not  going to continue, right?  We all know this graph is not  going to continue this way.  Or, let me put it another way.  I'm not so certain that my  children are going to live  better than I live, right?  I live pretty well, so I guess  -- problem.  But this is not going to  continue.  There have to be investments  made if we want something like  this to continue or at least  stability in those terms.  And the easiest, most effective,  I think most proven method is  for the US and  Europe to do it again. 

 We are -- again this graph, we  are the largest economies.  We trade more with each other  than with anyone else.  We have more similarities of  institutions, but most  significantly, we have what I  just said.  We have this history of economic  cooperation.  We don't have to build it again,  right?  It's already there, and I see no  better way to move forward than  to do that.  Think of the investments, think  of the investments in new energy  products, in new energy areas.  Think of the investments in new  lines of products for consumer  uses.  Think of the technological  solutions and technological  areas in which the US  and Europe share so many  interests, share so many  overlaps in organization and  share in many ways even common  experiences in education and  elsewhere.  The future of these societies is  a future of mutual prosperity,  mutual prosperity.  I don't think, I don't think  China is an alternative to that. 

 I don't think China is an  alternative to that.  There are too many problems, too  many differences, too many lacks  of or absences of cooperation in  the past.  Don't get me wrong, I think  cooperation with China is very  important, but it will not  substitute for cooperation with  Europe.  As Kissinger said, we will live  and die, we will be rich or poor  with our European brothers and  sisters.  There is no other way around it  in the world we live in today.  And I think the future of US-  European relations is going  to be a reexamination and a new  emphasis on economic  cooperation, not just the  diplomacy and questions of  whether to intervene overseas or  not, but how to build new  cooperative relationships with  our societies, with our business  people, with our technological  elements and others.  We need more of that, not less.  And that brings me to my next  point here about partnership,  the second "P."  I love this image as well.  This is George Washington, it's  of course in a drawing here, but  George Washington saying goodbye  to Lafayette at the end of the  early part of the American Union  in 1784, early history of ours.  And Lafayette leaving and this  is clearly the societies coming  together, US and France,  continued friendship long  after the revolution. 

 Partnership is actually the  center of American foreign  policy historically.  There is this myth, and actually  it's a terrible myth of the  United States as a lone actor,  as a unilateral actor.  Nothing could be further from  the truth.  Nothing could be further from  the truth.  In every major experience of  war, in every major action  Americans have undertaken, they  have always acted in partnership  with allies.  If we have done it successfully.  The French were crucial in the  Revolutionary War.  No French support, no  independence for the United  States.  The British were crucial in the  Monroe Doctrine.  No British Navy, no enforcement  of the Monroe Doctrine. 

 We did not have a ship in 1823  to enforce that doctrine with.  It was the British who enforced  the Monroe Doctrine.  No British and Russian  willingness to work with the  Union during the Civil War and  no Union victory in the Civil  War.  I'll say that again, no British  and Russian willingness to work  with the Union during the Civil  War, and no Union victory in the  Civil War.  If the British had recognized  the Confederacy and had been  willing to buy the Confederacy's  cotton, they could have fought  forever.  Lincoln's most important task  other than winning the battles  on the ground was keeping the  British out.  And British popular opinion by  every account was against  Lincoln, was against the killing  that they believed the Union  army was responsible for.  It was a partnership that held  between the US and Britain  that saved the  Union as much as it was Grant  and Sherman and Lincoln.  I'm happy to talk more about  that if anyone is interested.  We get so caught up in  legitimately what's happening  within the United States during  the Civil War, we forget about  that international context. 

 Just think for a second.  If the British Empire had  recognized the Confederacy, it  would have been virtually    impossible for Lincoln to bleed  the Confederacy dry in any  reasonable time frame.  And if he couldn't have done it  in five to eight to nine years,  that would have been the end.  That would have been the end in  that sense.  American cooperation with  Britain and France, Japan and  Germany was crucial in the late  Nineteenth, early Twentieth  Century as all these powers  moved into Asia.  The first major multi-national  operation undertaken by Western  powers outside of Europe was the  Boxer Rebellion in 1900 where  the United States, was a  cooperative endeavor with  American forces serving under  European command, fighting  against violent forces within  China, fighting side by side the  British, the French, the  Japanese and the Germans.  In WWI the United States was an  associate power, you know that  with France, Britain, Italy,  Belgium and Japan.  WWII a grand alliance and the  Cold War of course with NATO.  During the Cold War, the United  States went so far as to say it  would give up its own future in  defense of Western Europe.  Right?  The NATO agreement is an  agreement that our future --  right?  We will jeopardize our security  if your security is jeopardized  and vice versa. 

 If you attack West Germany,  you're attacking the United  States.  Now, if you attack Poland,  you're attacking the United  States.  Think about that for a second.  If you attack Poland, you're  attacking the United States.  And vice versa.  Right?  After 9/11, actually, NATO  warplanes were actually  patrolling the skies around the  United States with non-American  pilots, non-American planes as  part of NATO.  Partnership has been at the core  of American foreign policy.  Most significantly for our  purposes today, it was American  partnership with Europeans that  actually created the European  Union.  American partnership with  Europeans that actually created  the European Union.  Early on, it was Dean Atcheson  and others who encouraged the  Europeans to work together with  the Coal and Steel Union. 

 And then it was Dean Atcheson  and Henry Kissinger and others  who encouraged the Europeans to  build a cooperative military  force of some kind, really  hinged upon the Bundeswehr, the  German Army.  It was the United States that  encouraged the Europeans to  build a central bank, to build  the institutions for a European  Union.  No US-European cooperation,  no European Union  in quite those terms.  Partnership then is about more  it seems to me than strategic  interest.  Partnership between the United  States and Europe is about more  than economics.  It's about politics.  It's about a common way of  conducting politics.  It is about democracy.  I want to argue today, and maybe  I'm going much to far, but I'll  do it anyway.  I want to argue that you can not  think of democracy in  international terms without US-  European cooperation. 

 These are the centers of  democracy in the world.  Where else are they?  These are the centers of popular  government.  These are the centers of good  government, not always great  government, not government  without mistakes, but still,  good government.  These are the areas where there  is transparency.  These are the areas where  government actually serves the  people and doesn't serve a few  people.  These are the areas where  governments actually fulfill  their commitments.  How on earth can you imagine  these societies operating  without working in tandem?  There are too many alternatives,  too many dangers, too many  challenges.  The world must be made safe for  democracy, and it can only be  made safe for democracy if the  democracies work together.  In a world of terror, in a world  of authoritarianism, in a world  of rampant militarism, there  seems to be no alternative.  Take what's happened in the  Middle East as the greatest  example of this. 

 Take what's happened in the  Middle East as the greatest  example of this.  The biggest problem the United  States had was not just that it  didn't know what to do.  That was a big enough problem,  that we didn't have enough force  in the area, but that we didn't  have the mobilized opinion of  democratic states behind us.  It de-legitimized what we did  from the very start.  To go back to Wilson, how can  you build democracy if you are  not democratically aligned  yourself?  How can you build democracy if  you are not working with the  other democracies.  How can you be credible when you  come into another society, and  we will have to do that again,  and you try to convince another  society to trust you, you try to  convince another society to work  with you when other  democratically recognized states  say you're doing the wrong  thing.  And when you flaunt that, you  disregard that.  Disagreements are inevitable,  but democratic cooperation is  absolutely necessary.  There is this crazy notion that  some of my political science  friends have that just  democracies by being democracies  can make other societies  democratic.  I think democracies have to work  together actively to make  societies democratic. 

 And that's actually what  Lafayette and what Washington  were doing.  That's actually why I put this  image up.  Think of this as the early  Obama-Angela Merkel meetings.  Right?  They're talking about democracy,  right?  Lafayette is a believer not in  the radicals of the French  Revolution but in a more  democratic for that time French  Society.  And that's what Washington is  seeking to know.  They were not just military  allies, they believed they were  making the world democratic, and  they believed they needed each  other in those terms.  And by the way, this propaganda  image was made for that purpose,  to show that, to convince  Americans and to convince  Frenchmen of just that.  This was legitimizing Washington  as it was also legitimizing  Lafayette.  Right?  It's made in 1784, right?  It's made in 1784 before the  French Revolution really gets  started.  When there are extensive debates  in both of these societies over  what democracy will look like. 

 And the artist here is saying  that democracy comes from this  kind of partnership and this  kind of environment.  The propaganda is the --.  The propaganda is the message it  seems to me in so many ways.  And that takes us to our third  point that I want to talk about,  prudence, prudence.  This is something that we seem  to lack the most these days  though I think we're going to  develop more of it.  And this is my favorite image of  prudent politics for you.  And my students know I love this  image.  This is from Tehran in 1943.  Winston Churchill, Franklin  Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin,  right?  You know if you've seen any of  these pictures, Roosevelt is  always in the middle.  Churchill always looks like he's  finished his first liter of  whatever it is. 

 And Stalin is always rim rod  straight.  Stalin is always rim rod  straight.  What's extraordinary is  Roosevelt places himself in the  middle.  He's always in the middle.  Roosevelt was highly criticized  in this time.  He was accused by some of being  a socialist.  He was accused by others of  being in the hands of New York  capitalists.  He was accused by some of being  too nice to Uncle Joe.  He was accused by others of  being seduced by that rabid,  belligerent, Winston Churchill.  And all of these things were  true, and all of them were false  at the same time. 

 Franklin Roosevelt said in one  of his most honest moments, he  said "my politics are simple,  I'm a juggler.  I never let my left hand know  what my right hand is doing.  Sometimes my right hand goes off  and does one thing and my left  hand goes off and does the  other, but eventually,  eventually these two hands will  find some way to get things  done.  I know no other way to do  things.  I know no other way to do  things."  Roosevelt met with John  Meynard Keynes during the  Depression and Keynes thought  that he had convinced Roosevelt.  And then Keynes' opponents met  with Roosevelt and they thought  they had convinced Roosevelt.  Right?  He made everyone think -- he  listened, and he made everyone  think he was doing what they  wanted him to do.  We have come in our society, and  Europeans have also come in many  of their societies to condemn  this as being morally vacuous,  as being ambiguous.  As having a lack of moral  clarity, right?  Members of the Bush  Administration would say this is  dealing with the Devil too much  and Europeans would say this is  American self interest too much.  Right?  They're both wrong. 

 Good politics, prudent politics  are about balancing  irreconcilable interests and  working in ways that are not  always clear or not always  coherent.  It's about embracing the  messiness of the world, and it's  about embracing the different  ways in which different people  come at change.  We cannot convince everyone to  agree with us, but we cannot  forget that we have to try to  convince people to do some  things that we want them to do  with us.  And that's where Europe comes  in.  What's extraordinary about this  is not just that FDR is sitting  in between, but that his key  friends, his key actors are  European statesman.  Right?  It's not Chiang Kia-Shek who he  always included as the fourth  policemen, and it's not simply  because Chiang Kai-Shek doesn't  have the same power, it's  because as Roosevelt put it, as  a juggler, I always seek the  most options, I always seek  the most options.  And if you think about the  vibrance of US  and European states.  If you think about the vibrance  of those societies, they offer  the most options, they offer the  most options.  It is only these societies that  are filled with a true diversity  of opinion across areas.  It is only these societies that  have the truly diversified  economies in the world, and it  is only these societies that  have cultures of dissent, that  allow a leader to hear different  sides of the same argument. 

 That was also FDR's genius.  He surrounded himself with  people who disagreed, people who  hated each other.  Lincoln did that too.  Those of you who have read --  know that as well,  surrounded himself with people  who disagreed with one another  and never told them where he  stood as he never was sure of  that.  That was his genius.  That was his genius as a prudent  political leader.  It is impossible in this world  today to imagine an American  leader having that kind of  relationship with someone other  than a European because those  other societies don't function  that way.  You don't have a discussion with  Hu Jintao over the merits of  communism.  You don't have a discussion with  Ahmadinejad who I think we  should have discussion with in  Iran over the merits of Islam.  You don't have a discussion with  the Israeli leadership over the  merits of a Zionist state. 

 And I support the existence of  the State of Israel, but I also  think there are a lot of  criticisms that should be made  about --, right?  You cannot have those discussion  with those societies in the way  they are structured, but you  can, because of the cultures and  the experiences of the US  and European societies have  those kinds of discussions with  leaders across the Atlantic.  Those discussions happen all the  time.  They've continued over the last  few years, just no one's  listened in the White House.  Those discussions have been  going on.  The argument I'm making here is  that prudent politics are about  a political culture of dissent,  about a political culture of  conversation, about a political  culture of not making firm  choices but constantly tacking  between alternatives.  Understanding differences,  understanding contradictions and  working with them.  That's how FDR won WWII.  That's how FDR got the United  States out of the Depression.  He didn't have a plan to get out  of the Depression.  He didn't have a plan to win  WWII. 

 He just kept working and  working, listening to different  sides and bringing things  together, bringing things  together.  He drove Eisenhower and Marshall  and Mc Arthur mad because he  never made the clear decisions  they wanted him to make.  But that was his genius.  That was his genius.  He drove the great New Dealers  around him mad and the bankers  of New York mad because he  never made decisions.  Was he going to nationalize the  banks or not?  No, he declared a bank holiday  instead.  Was he going to create Social  Security or not?  Well he created something in  between.  It's not like Social Security in  Europe.  He constantly tacked between  positions, he constantly heard  different points of view.  He constantly embraced different  points of view. 

 That's prudent politics and  that's US-European politics  in the world today.  It is not possible in my  conceptualization to see those  kinds of politics operating any  other way and if the United  States does not embrace that, it  is cutting itself off from that  opportunity.  I think that's what Obama's trip  to Europe was about.  I just want to go back to that  for a second.  I think that's what this was  about.  Those who were cheering for him  in the crowd, they're not  cheering for American policy,  but they're cheering for an  image of American society that's  open and embraces the discussion  that in fact is open to more  discussion than their own  society in Germany.  That's the irony.  If you read the German press  around Obama's visit, it was  deeply pro-American and  anti-Bush, deeply critical of  Germany at the same time.  Americans can have more open  discussion if they can have a  black man at that position, even  to make it to be a candidate  before he was elected, right?  They can have discussion on  certain issues, right?  They can do that, and we should  embrace that ourselves.  That's the image of prudent  politics I think we need. 

 And that brings us to the last  point I wanted to make which  comes back to Henry Kissinger  here.  Kissinger's career and in many  ways the career of American  society and European societies  after WWII is a career of power,  final one of my four "P's,"  power.  Power drives the world.  Ideals are important.  Money is important.  But in the end, power matters.  Who can get people to do things  in their own way.  Who can get people to follow  their lead.  Who can get people to change the  way they act.  And Kissinger thought I think  more about this, not always in  the right way but thought more  about it than anyone else or at  least as much as anyone else. 

 And Kissinger understood, as  many Americans and Europeans  have forgotten that power is  multi-dimensional.  Power is multi-dimensional.  Europeans do tend to underrate  the importance of military  power.  They have not yet worked to  create an EU military.  There will be no real EU until  there is some kind of military  force in place.  But the US has perhaps  underrated other forms  of power that we knew a  lot more about before.  Cultural power, the power of  negotiation, the power of  example.  How can you be a powerful,  magnetic society when you put  people into prison in  Guantanamo, torture them, don't  even tell them who they are and  why they're being held and then  realize later on that you're  holding the wrong people in some  cases.  How can you be an example and a  model to the world.  How can you be powerful if you  do that?  We are killing our own power,  and I think Kissinger and Obama  both recognized that. 

 Power is also not about telling  people what to do.  Power is about leading by  example and embracing ambiguity  and finding ways to move forward  with ambiguity.  That's exactly what Kissinger  did throughout his life as a  German Jew making US policy  toward Europe.  That's what he did as a believer  in the sacredness of the  American nation but also a  negotiator with the nation's  gravest enemies.  That's what American leaders  must do.  Power is about negotiation  ambiguity, not clarity and  ordering.  I'm reminded of that just as a  parent also.  I mean I can never get my kids  to do anything if I just tell  them they have to do it because  I said they have to do it.  Right?  I mean this works at the  household level as much as at  the international level it seems  to me.  And then last, and I will close  on this. 

 And this is actually more than  any other reason why I'm so  taken with Henry Kissinger's  career and so taken with Obama's  career so far, power is about  shared sacrifices.  Power doesn't work when one side  leads and another side  sacrifices.  Power is about shared sacrifice.  Kissinger knew that because that  was his life.  And I've talked a lot about that  in the book.  I think someone like Obama knows  that because that to some extent  has been his life.  He's had to make many sacrifices  along the way from where he came  from.  He certainly saw the sacrifices  of his mother and his  grandmother as he came along the  way.  Many European leaders today are  more cognizant of that then  their immediate predecessors.  They're more cognizant of that  than their immediate  predecessors. 

 Angela Merkel comes from  Eastern Germany.  She is the first East German  leader of the Unified German  State.  That matters enormously.  Nicolas Sarcozy who is not my  favorite person, but  nonetheless, Sarcozy comes from  an immigrant Jewish family, no  longer is Jewish himself, but  immigrant family with some  Jewish heritage from Hungary  that fled to France during  difficult times.  These are leaders, and I don't  want to fetishize their  sacrifices in the past, but  they're leaders who understand  that politics is about shared  sacrifices.  They've lived that themselves.  I would say they all entered  politics for that reason.  And that might be the most  hopeful thing we can say about  the future of US-European  relations.  These are not going to be  relations about easy prosperity.  These are not going to be  relations about easy policy  choices in places like Iran and  elsewhere, but they are going to  be relations where a lot can be  achieved through shared  sacrifice. 

 And just taking the financial  crisis of the world today.  It seems to me the only way that  we're going to get through this  and the only way the British,  the Germans, the French and  others are going to get through  this is if we make decisions  within our societies to share  the sacrifice in terms of  taxation policy, in terms of  domestic spending, in terms of  the ways we spend and print our  money.  And insofar as we don't do that,  we're going to get deeper and  deeper.  Insofar as we begin to do that,  I think our future is actually  quite bright.  And I think we can find  ourselves -- oops, well I won't  put up the -- I was going to put  the FDR slide up again.  I think we will eventually find  ourselves once again in a world  that is still bigger than we are  that we cannot master, but  working with our European  partners and with our European  partners working with us, we can  get maybe back to the kind of  position that FDR said.  That's my vision for our future  relations.  >> We have some time for  questions and to be sure that  everybody can hear the question,  I will come around with the  microphone if you have one and  you can ask it into the mic.  So, I invite questions at this  point.  >> Hi. 

 Yeah, I suppose this fourfold  statement: prosperity,  partnership, prudence and power  covers the period until 2000  before the neo-cons came.  >> Yeah, let me just -- I'm  trying to find it again.  Did I lose it?  Well, yes and no.  It did at the level of certain  particularly powerful figures,  yes.  The story didn't apply there.  But I think what's  extraordinarily instructive is  that it continued to work below  the level perhaps of the White  House and even within the  government at other areas.  There hasn't been the eruption  in US-European relations that  one might have expected after  2001 and 2002 and it shows how  strong these connections are.  It shows how much the history  matters.  That's my source of optimism.  It's my source of frustration as  well, but I think it's there,  and it's built into all of us. 

 It's built into our  institutions.  This is a European-American  institution.  Universities, and especially the  University of Wisconsin.  Our greatness was we took the  best of the German university  and applied it to the American  west in a sense at that time.  Now, the Midwest.  Right?  So, yes, these principles were  not followed, but they still  remain powerful nonetheless.  >> I'm pretty sure you're fully  aware of the Bucharest Synod,  annual Synod, and you know the  disaster there.  And I would say that the  Europeans are very careful right  now with us.  That is, I fully agree with you  with what you said that  something is continuing the way  it did before.  Otherwise, first of all, Obama  would not be possible for  starters. 

 But I do see that we're having  problems now with the European  Union because you see in 2003,  Germany and France told us in  addition to what the United  Nations said that look you know  don't go into Iraq.  The General Secretary said the  same thing.  And then the French and the  Germans said "back off, don't go  into Iraq."  And of course the result was  quite bad for us because they  never helped us, they're not  helping us right now in  Afghanistan, certainly not in  Pakistan you know, so we have to  be realistic.  The Europeans are very very,  let's put it this way.  The neo-cons created the  situation and even now they're  not quite sure that this is all  over.  >> Right, no I agree.  I don't want to say this is  going to be easy.  but I think equally so is a  desire that Europeans have to  turn the page.  I think one of the things that  makes Obama so popular in Europe  is that he seems so different  and he seems to return back to  another.  .. So it's not that it -- so I  think -- I'm agreeing with you,  yeah. 

 >> (inaudible)  >> Right.  Right, no you're absolutely  right.  >> (inaudible)  >> Excellent point.  Let's just get some others in,  but excellent point.  Thank you, sir.  Thank you.  >> This is real broad, but would  you just comment on the notion  of European-US partnership as it  relates to American policy with  Israel.  >> Yes, I was afraid someone was  going to ask about that.  I think Israel is a really  difficult nut to crack in this  because I do think that it is  one area where the US and Europe  are pretty far apart.  Even more so, I think we're  actually closer on Afghanistan  than we are on Israel. 

 I think the United States,  because of the demographics of  the United States and because of  its particular history and self  image for very good reasons sees  itself as being a very close and  staunch supporter of Israel.  And I think many of the major  European states, because of  their own history and because of  their demographics are very  weary of being associated too  closely with the state of  Israel.  And this is a very deep problem.  It goes back to '67 and '73 in  particular.  I think this is a case where the  United States really has to take  a proactive role as a mediator  and not allow itself to be seen  as only acting on behalf of  Israel.  And I don't think most Americans  want that.  I don't think most Jews, as a  Jew myself, I don't think most  Jews want the United States to  be the surrogate for Israel.  I think what -- and I've said  this in my book, I think one of  the best things that Henry  Kissinger did was to actually  make the United States the key  mediator between Israel and  Egypt.  And that's the only agreement in  the Middle East that has held up  in 30 years.  The United States must do that. 

 We were too quick to give Israel  a blank check.  This is not to say we shouldn't  support Israel.  I think we should a strong  supporter and anyone who wants  to eliminate Israel will have to  deal with us I think, but we  also have to be a key negotiator  in the region.  We all know there is going to be  a Palestinian state.  There is going to be a two-state  solution of one kind or another.  We need to move in that  direction.  That would help with the  Europeans.  It would help make it less  polarized between the US and  European views of this.  I am, I will say though also  very disheartened by what I do  see as some anti-Semitism in  Europe.  There is a lot more of it than  there is in the United States. 

 And we need to encourage, by  showing our credability in not  being in Israel's back pocket,  we need to encourage European  leaders to discourage within  their own societies the kinds of  anti-Semitism that are accepted  too easily in parts of France  and other countries today.  I think you've got one over  there.  >> What about all of the  descendents and children of  Europe in both North and South  American in the Western  Hemisphere.  Do you foresee any sort of  cooperation developing between  all of these children of Europe?  >> I think that this comes back  to the investments in education.  And I meant to say more about  this I just ran out of time and  I got too excited.  But one of the things that's  done after WWII is a lot of  investment is put in exchanges  and particularly in exchanges of  students, right?  The DAAD goes back before WWII  and gets greatly expanded,  right?  The Marshall Fellows.  All sorts of exchanges were  created that allow for these  kinds of interactions in both  areas, for students, especially  young people to go back and  forth.  That's enormously powerful  because many of those figures  then become the leaders of those  societies.  Henry Kissinger had a seminar at  Harvard that included people  like Ilon-Bar.  So you have this kind of  relationship that develops that  is very important. 

 What worries me and what I hope  will change.  And I didn't put this in the  talk because in this audience  it's not a problem, but I've  been yelled at about this from  other audiences.  I think immigration policy is  really important here.  I'm not an expert on immigration  policy.  The harder you make it for  people to come into your  society, the more you cut  yourself off from that.  I don't think the problem is  funding for exchanges though we  could use more funding.  I think the issue is more how  easy do you make it for people  to come in.  And we need to make it easier,  not so hard.  And we also need to be more  welcoming.  And this where we're behind the  Europeans. 

 Let me give you an example.  This summer, I had the  privilege of being out at the  Nobel Institute in Oslo with my  family.  We were able to just go, not a  problem.  Right?  We didn't need a visa or  anything like that.  We'd just go.  Across the street from the Nobel  Institute in the center of Oslo  is the American Embassy, the  largest building in all of Oslo.  It's got more security than any  building in Oslo.  The palace of the king has less  security than the American  Embassy in Oslo.  They have two layers of Marine  guards with bulletproof glass,  and you need to wait outside in  line when you want a Visa.  And then they call you in one by  one, search you and let you  go and apply for you visa. 

 So every morning when I would go  into my office, I would see good  Norwegians, business people,  lined up in suits outside the US  Embassy around the block,  waiting to go in.  Now in Norway, it's sometimes  raining in the morning and it's  cold, and how welcoming are we  making our society.  I didn't have to do that to go  there.  It was easy.  I just got on a plane and went.  Right?  And same with my kids and my  wife.  They need to stand in that line  to come to our society.  That more than anything I think  discourages their students from  coming here.  It's an offense to them.  We don't need to do that. 

 We don't need to do that.  Our immigration policy and the  way we conduct visa giving and  visa authority is despicable and  we need to change that.  We need to change that quickly I  think.  >> Any last questions?  >> I think -- has got one.  >> Okay.  >> Great talk Jeremi.  One question you touched on was  NATO and the situation with  Poland and how is your feeling  on the expansion.  Do you think that maybe we got a  little ahead of ourselves in  expanding NATO since that is  probably the primary working  between America and the EU and  do we really want to be the  front line with Poland and now  perhaps even the Ukraine and  with the Black Sea Fleet sitting  down in what is now the Ukraine,  isn't that sort of engineering a  major confrontation?  >> Right, I think it certainly  has the risk of doing that.  The more we expand NATO, the  more we get in the face of the  Russians, the more we make them  feel like they're not part of  Europe and the more we also  expose ourselves to one of two  things.  Either having to go to war over  an incident in the Ukraine, or  losing all credability because  we don't go to war when we say  we would in that situation. 

 You're kind of damned if you do  and damned if you don't.  So that's a real problem.  On the other hand, I think there  is a strong argument for some of  the expansion of NATO.  Take a country like Poland.  Poles have very good reason to  be fearful of both of their  neighbors.  Right?  If you're Polish, this is with  you every day, right?  That your nation was divided and  destroyed for a century and a  half by both of your big  neighbors.  NATO provides a sense of  security.  Poles really believe that's not  going to happen again now in  part because of NATO.  And it's hard to imagine a  vibrant democracy being built  without that sense of security.  Right?  So it's really important in some  cases. 

 I think we just have to be  careful.  I think I support the expansion  of NATO in cases where there is  evidence that doing that --  first of all that there is a  need to do it, but secondly  that will have positive benefits  within those societies that  might outweigh the risks.  And I think in Poland that would  be the case.  I think you could make a case  for that in Ukraine, perhaps.  I don't think you could make a  case for that for Georgia.  And I think we need to think  about it again in a prudential  way, again in an FDR way, case  by case.  FDR never would have said he was  for or against NATO expansion.  He would have said, tell me what  your question is and I'll tell  you whether we're going to do  that now or not.  And I think that's what we  should work toward.  I also thought we had under Bush  Sr. and Clinton,  there were some  good ideas in building  intermediary stages. 

 It doesn't have to be all or  nothing.  Part of the Partnership for  Peace idea was to create an  intermediary stage and that  would be fine too.  Why does the alliance have to  stay the same?  Why does it have to be all or  nothing?  Why can't you have intermediary  stages.  I worry a lot about what will  happen in Ukraine if Russia  begins to push more.  So I do think we need to do  something there, but I'm also  worried about just what you  implied, that all of a sudden we  provoke the Russians when we  start talking about NATO  expansion in Ukraine.  I think that happened in  Georgia, that negative effect.  >> (inaudible)  >> Right.  I agree.  And that's why I think again we  need these kinds of in between  positions.  We need FDRs in a sense. 

 >> We'll take this last  question, but Jeremi said he  would stay around as long as  anybody would like to, so if you  have another question for him,  feel free to approach him  afterwards.  So, this last question.  >> Jeremi, with regard to  re-engaging the EU, particularly  Germany, given that the Russian  stranglehold on the German  economy with their natural gas  dependency and now Russia and  Libya are talking about --  getting into Libya which is  going to cut the Europeans out  of the -- they thought their  alternative source.  How do you see that operating in  trying to get the Germans to  cooperate with us in view of a  if you will a resurgent Russia.  >> Right.  I think there's no doubt.  You're absolutely right that  Russia is seeking to push much  harder and trying to use  leverage especially with natural  resources.  And one of the few good things  that has come of the financial  crisis right is that the bottom  has fallen out of Russian oil.  This is a great thing.  And those of you that know the  history of the 1970s know that  Putin is falling into exactly  what Brezhnev fell in. 

 Right?  Brezhnev believed after '73 that  he had endless money, so he  started investing money in  Angola, in Ethiopia.  Did you know that in 1978, the  Soviets -- the largest source  of Soviet foreign aid was  Ethiopia.  That makes absolutely no sense  at all, right?  They thought they were rich and  could do everything and then the  price just collapsed and well we  all saw what happened in the  Soviet Union.  Putin has fallen into that.  What's dangerous about that is  unlike Brezhnev he's not going  to go quietly.  The more that the prices go  down, the more he's going to try  and turn the spicket on and off  to get control and gas is  another area of course where  he's doing this.  So, he's trying to push himself  more and use this for as much  leverage as he can.  I think that the appropriate  response is not to go around  saying negative things about  Russia but to work with  Europeans to build alternatives.  Right?  One of the reasons that the  Europeans are so dependant upon  that gas pipeline is there  hasn't been enough work to  create alternatives to it.  You can't fully liberate  yourself, but there are ways to  get around that both in terms of  other gas sources but also in  terms of alternatives to gas,  right?  Creative partnership I think is  the best way to do this. 

 I don't think continuing to rely  on the same sources, in this  case Russian sources and trying  to badger the Russians about it  is actually going to get you  where you want to go.  I see that as more than anything  a reason for partnership.  And I think the Europeans see it  that way too.  I think they are much more  comfortable taking risks to work  with an American leadership that  they feel comfortable with than  with Putin.  And so that's where I see things  going with that, but these are  certainly not easy issues.  >> Okay.  Jeremi, thank you very much for  today.  >> Thank you.