WEBVTT

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Or give me a couple of people to see if that's all I want.

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I'll give you a couple of people to see if that's all I want.

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I'll give you a couple of people to see if that's all I want.

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I'll give you a couple of people to see if that's all I want.

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I'll give you a couple of people to see if that's all I want.

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I'll give you a couple of people to see if that's all I want.

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I'll give you a couple of people to see if that's all I want.

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I'll give you a couple of people to see if that's all I want.

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I'll give you a couple of people to see if that's all I want.

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I'll give you a couple of people to see if that's all I want.

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I'll give you a couple of people to see if that's all I want.

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I'll give you a couple of people to see if that's all I want.

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I'll give you a couple of people to see if that's all I want.

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I'll give you a couple of people to see if that's all I want.

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I'll give you a couple of people to see if that's all I want.

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I'll give you a couple of people to see if that's all I want.

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I'll give you a couple of people to see if that's all I want.

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I'll give you a couple of people to see if that's all I want.

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I'll give you a couple of people to see if that's all I want.

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I'll give you a couple of people to see if that's all I want.

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I'll give you a couple of people to see if that's all I want.

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I'll give you a couple of people to see if that's all I want.

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I'll give you a couple of people to see if that's all I want.

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I'll give you a couple of people to see if that's all I want.

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I'll give you a couple of people to see if that's all I want.

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I'll give you a couple of people to see if that's all I want.

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I'll give you a couple of people to see if that's all I want.

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I'll give you a couple of people to see if that's all I want.

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I'll give you a couple of people to see if that's all I want.

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I'll give you a couple of people to see if that's all I want.

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I'll give you a couple of people to see if that's all I want.

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I'll give you a couple of people to see if that's all I want.

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I'll give you a couple of people to see if that's all I want.

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I'll give you a couple of people to see if that's all I want.

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I'll give you a couple of people to see if that's all I want.

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I'll give you one of them to see if that's what we want.

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I'll give you one of them to see if that's all I want.

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I'll give you one of them to see if that's all I want.

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I'll allow you to see if that's all I want.

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I'll allow you to see.

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I'll allow you to see if that's all I want.

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They're not going to tell us how much time I like to walk in and go over it out there.

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Yeah.

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It's like a loaded mac and cheese pizza.

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You're done with cheese for a little while.

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Yeah.

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Yeah.

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Yeah.

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Yeah.

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Yeah.

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Yeah.

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Yeah.

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You're going to get something to waste for a year.

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Should've never existed.

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Yeah.

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Yeah.

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It's like sandwiches probably would be nice.

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And we're going to be here about as well.

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I don't know, I mean, even though it happens to him, but like, I think we're in this kind of system all day, or even a lot of profiting maps.

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What do you think about some of the sandwiches for a computer in the office?

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Yeah.

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Do you guys care what it is?

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It's the same thing?

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No.

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All right.

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Having the opportunity to press the board.

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Would you like your stuff in the room?

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I think there's a reasonable...

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Are you going to stay with me?

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I think I missed it.

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No one's going to know or care.

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It's not your case.

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You don't have to.

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You don't have to.

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You don't have to.

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You're an audience.

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You're an audience.

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You're a spectator.

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You're a spectator.

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What do you mean it's true?

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It'll be probably between cases.

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Which means it's going to be like...

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Let's say let's break it down.

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I think I'll get that by now.

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I think both of those front records

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take these guys off.

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I think we're going to have to have

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power 15.

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I thought you said the entire thing.

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90 minutes is about a time between the schedule

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for when there are...

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We still have four.

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I don't think that would be possible.

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We'll set it up.

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It's very tough.

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Almost there.

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It's very tough.

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It's very tough.

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It's very tough.

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It's very tough.

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But otherwise,

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it's not that steep.

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It's very tough.

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It's very tough.

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It's very tough.

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It's very tough.

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I think it's like 4.20.

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I guess it's a question note.

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Whether I also stay with the whole band.

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We're going to figure that out.

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I find the three major airlines are so similar to each other.

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The three major airlines are very similar to each other.

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No opinion on Alaska.

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Just going to Seattle is less good.

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All rise.

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Hear ye, hear ye, hear ye.

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The Wisconsin Supreme Court is back in session.

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The Honorable Chief Justice Joe Braskman presiding.

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Your silence is commanded.

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Go ahead and have a seat.

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At long last year,

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if you can ask me something as you're taking the podium,

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sometimes when people are splitting up arguments,

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they're each taking an issue,

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you're going to start with that, weren't you?

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You weren't going to.

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Are you going to take an issue or not?

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You can save some questions.

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All three of us are ready for all your questions.

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He will let the argument unfold, however it's most helpful.

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Oh, cool.

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That's great.

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Then we are ready whenever you are.

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Good morning.

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May I please the court tailor me in on behalf of the Wisconsin legislature?

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Four and a half years ago,

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this court adopted the governor's proposed remedy for the then malaportioned congressional districts.

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The court held unequivocally that that remedy complied with all applicable state and federal laws.

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Nothing has changed since then that could warrant re-entering the political thicket

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of congressional redistricting and putting this court's injunction on trial in a circuit court.

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This court can affirm the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint on these simple grounds

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without reaching the merits, which is that the circuit court was exactly right

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that it could not unwind this court's final judgment in Johnson 2.

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Likewise, this court could affirm simply by holding plaintiffs waited too long

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to bring this suit in circuit court just as the Illinois Supreme Court held last year

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for the districting challenge in Illinois.

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Nor would there be any reason for this court, for the circuit court,

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to unwind the Johnson 2 injunction.

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As to plaintiff's separation of powers arguments,

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the circuit court was exactly right that plaintiffs' arguments rewrite this court's words in Clark

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to say something that this court did not say.

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The court needs no more authority than Clark itself to know that at least change's remedy

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is not categorically unconstitutional.

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That's cool.

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I want to go back to Clark, which I haven't set up to this point,

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but I'll say now is a well-written opinion.

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Indeed, your honor.

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Thank you.

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Appreciate it.

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Fishing for compliments this morning.

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It was really clear in 63 that these changes on workable in practice.

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It went through the whole analysis about it being unworkable and all the reasons it was

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unworkable.

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I certainly recall vividly sitting in this courtroom as we talked about the peanut's analogy of

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Lucy moving the football away from Charlie Brown because no one who was advocating for

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least change in this courtroom could agree to what it meant.

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Was at least change as far as the number of people, the population, and the district

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was at least change as to the lines.

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Were we trying to least change as to municipalities?

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It didn't work.

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There was nothing in the Constitution as Justice Taylor brought out a little while ago.

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There was nothing in Wisconsin law.

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There was nothing in the Wisconsin Constitution.

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I brought it forward that could be relied on to be the basis for it.

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In paragraph 63 of Clark just says, as illustrated across the course of the Johnson litigation,

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least change is unworkable in practice.

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As such, we overrule any portion of Johnson 1, Johnson 2, and Johnson 3, that mandate

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at least change approach.

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I would like to know what else could a judge or justice possibly write in an opinion to

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say, this is, we are overturning this.

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This does not apply going forward.

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This was wrong.

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It was unworkable in practice.

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I don't know how much more clearer I could have done it, but apparently there's something

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else I should have done.

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What do you suggest that was?

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Chief Justice Croft's view took the words right out of my mouth, which is that we're not

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going to apply this going forward.

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But the court's discussion about how lease changes is unworkable is not synonymous with

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a holding that lease changes was unconstitutional when applied in Johnson 2.

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And as for Justice Taylor's question about where this lease changes approach comes from,

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I think some table setting is really important here.

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You receive Justice Taylor an answer about Clark and the state constitution.

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Clark involved the state house districts.

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Of course, we are here about the congressional districts, and so to the question of where

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a lease changes approach might come from, I would point the court to the federal constitution

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here in this case, which assigns power to the legislature for redistricting, not courts.

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And when the last enacted plan by the legislature is Act 44, of course the elections clause could

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anticipate this.

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But we said, I'm sorry to interrupt you, but we said that those maps because they did

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not, the population had shifted, obviously, in the ten years.

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Those maps could no longer be violated.

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They violated federal law.

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They violated our constitution.

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Those maps were no longer in effect.

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They couldn't be.

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Your Honor, I think that mistakes the nature of the judicial power, which is when the court

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examined Act 44 and held Act 44 was unconstitutionally malapportioned, the court was not striking

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down the law or erasing it from the Wisconsin statutes.

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The court was remedying the malapportionment of those districts.

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Those districts are still the law on the books today with the additional layer of this court's

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injunction remedying the malapportionment of those districts at the margin.

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And as for the deference to the legislature and whether that could possibly work a constitutional

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legislation in a congressional redistricting case, any such rule would come as an enormous

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surprise, I would think, to the U.S. Supreme Court.

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But states have done it.

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State courts have looked at the issue of judicial ability.

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We have ten courts now that have come up with a standard.

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None of those Supreme Court decisions have been overturned.

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They've not been accepted on cert.

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They have not been accepted on a stay.

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We see state courts coming up with standards to measure whether votes have been improperly

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and unconstitutionally and substantially deluded.

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How do we not have that same ability, like these other state courts, state Supreme Courts

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have had?

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And your Honor, I do have arguments in response to the partisan gerrymandering claim and other

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states have done it, but I would like to finish my point on Justice Propsky's, the least changes

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approach and the very separate claim that plaintiffs have said they've brought here.

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And as for what state courts have done, let me start with the U.S. Supreme Court.

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In cases like White Against Wiser, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed a court for refusing to

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defer to the political judgments of the Texas legislature in a malaportionment case.

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And then state courts as diverse as courts in Minnesota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and New Hampshire

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have all done exactly what this court did.

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Let me ask you something about that.

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We are not talking about maps that the legislature put in place.

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The legislature put in place maps, the governor vetoed those maps.

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You are talking about a legislature from 2011.

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Correct.

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Correct.

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And just as courts in New Hampshire, Oklahoma, and all the other states I just listed off

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deferred to the same sort of maps, these are impasse cases, malaportionment cases, and those

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who say we are going to defer to the last enacted map.

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Because that is the last enacted map by the people's representatives.

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And our job here is to remedy malaportionment.

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It's not to strike a new political balance.

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We should talk about the people's representatives, right?

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Because if you start with Article 1, Section 1 of our Constitution, which says that the

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government derives its power from the consent of the governed.

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From the people, yes?

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Yes.

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Yes.

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And in your view, that means the legislature, not the court, that they should be deciding

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this issue of redistricting the 2011 legislature in this case, right?

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Yes.

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Okay.

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Because that legislature, if I'm understanding your argument, was elected by the people.

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They're closest to the people.

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They can be held accountable by the people.

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Yes.

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Yes.

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Okay.

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This is where I have some issues.

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The legislature that passed those original maps wasn't any old legislature, right?

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The legislature that passed that maps, they came from districts that many people claimed

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are the, were the most gerrymandered in the entire country.

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They were, as some say, a prime example of representatives choosing their voters rather

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than the other way around, rather than voters choosing their representatives.

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And because of those maps, many people felt that their votes were diluted, that they weren't

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representative of the people.

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They said that they felt like those districts lacked in representation.

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People felt like those maps weren't fair.

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Some people even called those maps rigged.

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That the legislators that came from those districts came from rigged maps.

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It is that legislature.

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Those representatives from those districts described as extremely gerrymandered that drafted

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the maps that we are talking about today.

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The maps that got baked in in 2021.

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And if I'm understanding your argument that under these change, which you're ardently

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defending, those maps, the baked in ones from the 2011 legislature, would go forward into

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perpetuity indefinitely.

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And I don't understand how that is not unconstitutional.

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Well, your Honor, whether we agree with it or not, the U.S. Constitution assigns redistricting

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authority to the legislature.

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Because 250 years ago, when we declared revolution, we said the people decide through their elected

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representatives.

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And there are two solutions for that, either of which plaintiffs could pursue.

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First, they could lobby Congress because, of course, Congress likewise has power under

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the elections clause to stop what some have said should not have happened in 2011.

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Or like Florida, like New York, like Ohio, plaintiffs could do the hard work of creating

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a constitutional amendment and saying any politics in redistricting is forbidden.

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Any desire to send Speaker Paul Ryan back to Congress is forbidden.

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They have not done that.

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And so, yes, as we stand here today, the only neutral way for this court to have proceeded

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in a malapportionment case about congressional districts was to just defer to the existing

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political and policy choices, like sending senior statesmen, be it Speaker Ryan, or

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Representative Obie back to Congress, and lessen until there's a change from Congress itself

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or a constitutional change to the Wisconsin Constitution.

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And that is regardless of how much constitutional harm is caused to an individual's right to

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vote.

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Is that what you're saying?

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Your Honor, as Justice Ziegler explained, every individual in Wisconsin can go to vote

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on election day or mail in their ballot and cast an equally weighted vote.

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That's been true in Wisconsin, by the way, since-

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That's not what gerrymandering allows, is it gerrymandering is the legislature determining

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their voters and assigning, treating class of voters as unfavored.

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And that can have the impact of deluding in individuals' right to vote.

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So they vote, yes, they go and vote, but their vote's meaningless because politicians have

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determined who their voters are.

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And that would seem to me so contrary to the language of our Constitution, which elevates

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the sovereignty of the people, that politicians have no power without the people.

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Your Honor, our founders risk their lives so that our representatives who we elect can

23:56.280 --> 24:02.240
represent the people, not a king, and with all due respect, not courts, because the Wisconsin

24:02.240 --> 24:08.640
Constitution provides this court, no judicially manageable standards, to decide that loyal

24:08.640 --> 24:13.240
Republicans and loyal Democrats have this super-constitutional right.

24:13.240 --> 24:14.880
But other courts have done it.

24:14.880 --> 24:18.160
They have done it, Your Honor, and I'm so glad you asked that question, because there

24:18.160 --> 24:22.520
is no free and fair elections clause in Wisconsin's Constitution.

24:22.520 --> 24:29.200
And there is no Board of Fair Districts amendment saying considering incumbents is forbidden.

24:29.200 --> 24:33.680
And even in states that have done it, even in North Carolina with the free and fair elections

24:33.680 --> 24:37.080
clause, I'd urge this court not to take my words for it, go look at the Supreme Court

24:37.080 --> 24:38.560
opinions in that case.

24:38.560 --> 24:43.800
They threw up their hands, Justice Taylor, and they said, we understand this is a political

24:43.800 --> 24:49.400
problem, and this is hotly debated at kitchen tables and in academic classrooms.

24:49.400 --> 24:53.680
But what we can't do as a court is solve that problem, because even the free and fair

24:53.680 --> 24:56.720
elections clause doesn't give us the tools to do so.

24:56.720 --> 25:03.160
So our Constitution is different in that we, there's a provision that says there's

25:03.160 --> 25:10.040
a remedy for wrongs, section nine, says every person's entitled to a certain remedy in the

25:10.040 --> 25:18.480
laws for all injuries or wrongs, which he may receive in his person, property or character,

25:18.480 --> 25:21.200
he ought to obtain justice freely.

25:21.200 --> 25:24.120
So that is unique to our Constitution.

25:24.120 --> 25:33.440
Our task is to interpret our Constitution, to evaluate legislation, to see if it poses

25:33.440 --> 25:36.640
a constitutional harm to these rights.

25:36.640 --> 25:46.720
So it's just very hard, I think your argument is challenging when I look at our own Constitution

25:46.720 --> 25:54.280
and the language of that Constitution, and the embodiment of the sovereignty of people,

25:54.280 --> 25:57.840
government has no power without the people.

25:57.840 --> 26:07.360
So if a class of voters, if their vote is being deluded or infringed upon, that seems

26:07.360 --> 26:15.560
to me to violate these principles of the people being sovereign, because we have been elevated

26:15.560 --> 26:22.760
the power of politicians above individual's right to choose their government.

26:22.760 --> 26:28.760
Your Honor, the question assumes the answer to the question I thought we were all here

26:28.760 --> 26:36.480
to address today, which is, is there a right to Republican districts or Democratic districts

26:36.480 --> 26:37.480
in the Wisconsin Constitution?

26:37.480 --> 26:41.400
That's not the framing though, it's not, that's not, you're framing it in a certain

26:41.400 --> 26:45.120
way that I think is not how I'm seeing it.

26:45.120 --> 26:52.080
I'm looking at our state Constitution, and I am pondering as we do with all legislation

26:52.080 --> 26:55.080
that we review, the concept of judicial review.

26:55.080 --> 26:57.400
Is there a constitutional harm here?

26:57.400 --> 26:59.040
That's what I'm looking at.

26:59.040 --> 27:04.800
I'm not looking at, it's not up to us to imbue our policy choices.

27:04.800 --> 27:07.960
That's very clearly belongs to the legislature.

27:07.960 --> 27:13.760
What I'm looking at is there a constitutional harm here, and I'm sure you agree that the

27:13.760 --> 27:17.480
right to vote is the most precious constitutional right we have.

27:17.480 --> 27:23.200
We have Wisconsin case law that says that, it is the most precious right.

27:23.200 --> 27:31.600
So isn't that our inquiry, is there a constitutional harm here in infringing or diluting an individual's

27:31.600 --> 27:32.600
right to vote?

27:32.600 --> 27:33.840
That seems to be the question.

27:33.840 --> 27:36.040
Yes, three points, Your Honor.

27:36.040 --> 27:40.720
First, Wisconsin was ahead of the curb in terms of the right to vote in the Cunningham

27:40.720 --> 27:41.720
case.

27:41.720 --> 27:45.520
In the Cunningham, this court did something decades, perhaps a century before the Supreme

27:45.520 --> 27:51.040
Court did in Westbury, which it said, that right to vote is so precious that we in Wisconsin

27:51.040 --> 27:56.320
are going to ensure that you have a numerically equally weighted vote back in, I think it

27:56.320 --> 28:02.840
was 1892, and that, and no one here disputes that this court could not adjudicate a claim

28:02.840 --> 28:06.680
of malapportionment, just as the court did in Johnson.

28:06.680 --> 28:11.760
The second point, beyond that, the right to vote is not a right to get the election

28:11.760 --> 28:13.320
outcomes you want.

28:13.320 --> 28:19.440
The very nature of the political branches is that someone loses and someone wins on election

28:19.440 --> 28:20.440
day.

28:20.440 --> 28:26.120
And when it comes to who decides what those districts look like, the Wisconsin Constitution

28:26.120 --> 28:31.600
gives this court no judicially manageable standard to override what the federal Constitution

28:31.600 --> 28:36.240
says, which is that the legislature does get to decide, and it was okay in remedying

28:36.240 --> 28:40.120
malapportionment to defer to those legislative choices.

28:40.120 --> 28:44.560
A good case on that is the McGraill case where it certainly involved the right to vote.

28:44.560 --> 28:49.440
It involved whether you could be identified by party on a ballot, whether someone knew

28:49.440 --> 28:55.160
I was a Republican or a Democrat or the Constitution Party or something else, and this court deferred.

28:55.160 --> 28:56.160
This court...

28:56.640 --> 29:02.720
Courts do apply substantiality of harm all the time.

29:02.720 --> 29:07.600
We weigh that, whether it be in civil criminal cases.

29:07.600 --> 29:14.240
We are applying those standards and not set out necessarily in the Constitution, but it

29:14.240 --> 29:18.960
seems to me that we're looking at, is there a substantial delusion?

29:18.960 --> 29:21.080
Is there a substantial harm here?

29:21.080 --> 29:24.240
And of course, do that all the time in jurisquigence.

29:24.240 --> 29:31.120
We are always looking at harms and weighing whether there's a substantiality issue.

29:31.120 --> 29:35.400
Your Honor, I suppose that brings me to the third point, which is whether a plaintiff

29:35.400 --> 29:40.920
might be able to establish there is a cognizable harm in some case.

29:40.920 --> 29:46.380
Later on, this court could leave unresolved whether it wants to overrule Johnson One.

29:46.380 --> 29:52.120
But in this particular case, plaintiffs have not done the hard work to walk back what

29:52.120 --> 29:57.000
were more than three dozen paragraphs in addition to Justice Hagedorn's concurrence

29:57.000 --> 30:04.360
explaining that the Constitution, as it sits today and as it sat then, does not give the

30:04.360 --> 30:08.200
court the tools to adjudicate those kinds of thorny claims.

30:08.200 --> 30:09.200
So that's what you were...

30:09.200 --> 30:11.120
Why do we have a remedy for every wrong?

30:11.120 --> 30:17.680
Every person is entitled to a certain remedy because of the laws for all injuries.

30:17.680 --> 30:21.800
Because your Honor, plaintiffs have not identified what the constitutional wrong is at this

30:21.800 --> 30:22.800
time.

30:22.800 --> 30:25.680
Vote delusion is not a constitutional wrong.

30:25.680 --> 30:31.440
When our Constitution explicitly says it is the people who choose their government,

30:31.440 --> 30:35.680
the only mechanism by which they do that is the right to vote.

30:35.680 --> 30:39.200
And no one disputes that the districts are equally apportioned, they can cast an equally

30:39.200 --> 30:40.200
weighted vote.

30:40.200 --> 30:44.320
So it does not matter the extent of a partisan gerrymandering.

30:44.320 --> 30:51.200
It does not matter the extent of the harm that is caused by a disfavored group.

30:51.200 --> 30:56.440
What sounds to me like if you're saying an extreme gerrymandering, an extreme partisan

30:56.440 --> 30:59.280
gerrymander is constitutional.

30:59.280 --> 31:01.720
Your Honor, understanding that is your argument?

31:01.720 --> 31:06.560
Your Honor, I'm not sure at this point in time how to define an extreme partisan gerrymander

31:06.560 --> 31:12.080
versus a sort of partisan gerrymander versus we wanted to send Speaker Ryan back to Congress.

31:12.080 --> 31:17.400
Would you say five percent, double digits, ten percent, fifteen percent?

31:17.400 --> 31:22.560
I think we certainly have districts across the state that hit those numbers.

31:22.560 --> 31:28.880
We do, Your Honor, and I can't tell you that District 2, for example, here where we stand

31:28.880 --> 31:31.720
today is an extreme partisan gerrymander.

31:31.720 --> 31:36.280
The representative there won by 70 to 30 percent vote in 2024.

31:36.280 --> 31:42.680
There's every reason to think he did so because Democrats are densely populated in

31:42.680 --> 31:43.680
the Madison area.

31:43.680 --> 31:46.240
Right, there could be compactness, for sure.

31:46.240 --> 31:49.800
But you look at some of the other districts and the way they're drawn.

31:49.800 --> 31:54.800
What I'm almost hearing you say is that there's not a constitutional claim for extreme partisan

31:54.800 --> 31:57.840
gerrymandering under the Wisconsin Constitution.

31:57.840 --> 32:01.840
If that's what it boils down to, tell us.

32:01.840 --> 32:07.520
Your Honor, right now the Wisconsin Constitution does not define with any level of judicial

32:07.520 --> 32:13.480
certainty what an extreme partisan gerrymander would be and in states that have been displeased

32:13.480 --> 32:18.640
with that constitutional reality, that they have amended their constitutions with clear

32:18.640 --> 32:24.920
rules that courts can apply, the Utah case, the New York case, the Florida case that plaintiffs

32:24.920 --> 32:31.240
have brought to you all involve either reticulated statutes or constitutional amendments saying

32:32.240 --> 32:35.120
we extirpate politics from redistricting.

32:35.120 --> 32:45.720
Council, your opposing council has urged us to adopt New Mexico and Pennsylvania's cases.

32:45.720 --> 32:50.360
And it took the opportunity on break to take a look at their constitutional provisions.

32:50.360 --> 32:56.760
You mentioned earlier that Wisconsin does not have a free and equal elections clause.

32:56.840 --> 33:03.000
The courts in those cases did point to and reference, and the New Mexico and Pennsylvania

33:03.000 --> 33:09.040
constitutions do specifically have a free and equal elections clause.

33:09.040 --> 33:14.600
Do you think that has any impact on whether we should follow Pennsylvania and New Mexico?

33:14.600 --> 33:18.760
I do, and I think, I can't remember if it's the Pennsylvania decision or the first North

33:18.760 --> 33:22.280
Carolina decision that explores the history of that clause.

33:22.280 --> 33:23.720
It's extremely interesting.

33:23.720 --> 33:27.840
There in other state constitutions, they are very specific to elections and your ability

33:27.840 --> 33:29.400
to go cast a vote.

33:29.400 --> 33:34.640
And so there was far more history in those cases to connect that constitutional text

33:34.640 --> 33:41.640
admittedly broad with a right to have fairer districts, however one expert might define

33:41.640 --> 33:43.240
fairer districts.

33:43.240 --> 33:47.280
Here the history points in entirely the opposite direction.

33:47.280 --> 33:49.520
There's precious little of it in the briefs here.

33:49.520 --> 33:52.400
There were more than 100 pages about it in Johnson.

33:52.840 --> 33:57.280
The history boils down to this state's constitutional convention in 1848.

33:57.280 --> 33:59.640
There was a lot of talk about gerrymandering.

33:59.640 --> 34:04.160
And there was a lot of discussion about whether the way Wisconsin's first congressional

34:04.160 --> 34:08.720
districts had been drawn was fair to have a very compact district in the southeast of

34:08.720 --> 34:13.480
the state and the sprawling district capturing 20 counties in the rest of the state.

34:13.480 --> 34:18.080
And the solution to that then answers the question before this court now.

34:18.080 --> 34:22.880
The solution was the people voted through their delegates at the convention and then

34:22.880 --> 34:29.640
through ratifying the constitution and that's been the unchanged history for over 100 years

34:29.640 --> 34:34.440
in this state until 2011 when parties started bringing partisan gerrymandering claims.

34:34.440 --> 34:43.000
Council, I wanted to just follow up with the Chief Justice's question about the 2011 maps.

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My recollection of the history here is that I think Democrats controlled the legislature

34:52.040 --> 34:55.880
entirely from 2006 to 2006 to 2010.

34:55.880 --> 34:58.880
There was a Democratic governor at that time.

34:58.880 --> 35:04.200
Then in the 2010 elections, Republicans won the governorship in both houses of the legislature

35:04.200 --> 35:11.280
and using maps that were in place at that time and then it was that legislature which

35:11.280 --> 35:18.400
actually enacted the law that we are dealing with here at 44 in 2011.

35:18.400 --> 35:24.600
And so it was not the quote rigged maps or any later maps that were enacted for example

35:24.600 --> 35:28.000
after our Johnson decision that are at issue here.

35:28.000 --> 35:32.600
But that was in fact a series, a legislature that was chosen with maps that clearly were

35:32.600 --> 35:36.560
quite competitive and led to both Republicans and Democrats controlling both chambers.

35:36.560 --> 35:37.560
Is that accurate?

35:37.720 --> 35:43.120
The points will take in your honor and to finish the point I would say those, the maps

35:43.120 --> 35:47.280
that others have called rigged, I won't endorse that language today, have since also been

35:47.280 --> 35:51.240
replaced through the democratic process where the legislature passed maps and the democratic

35:51.240 --> 35:52.240
governor signed them.

35:52.240 --> 35:56.600
But yes, for purposes of the congressional districts which we're here to talk about today,

35:56.600 --> 35:59.440
the Congress members didn't enact that map.

35:59.440 --> 36:03.520
The people's representatives in the small districts that make up the state legislature

36:03.520 --> 36:08.960
did and that's exactly what the Constitution has envisioned would happen until 1787 and

36:08.960 --> 36:12.520
so to bring us back to what was going on in Johnson.

36:12.520 --> 36:17.120
In Johnson the court was not enacting a new map.

36:17.120 --> 36:21.600
The court was doing what it always does Justice Taylor, it was remedying a constitutional

36:21.600 --> 36:26.520
wrong of malapportionment and going no further.

36:26.520 --> 36:27.520
And it must-

36:27.520 --> 36:33.320
It's not embedded in Wisconsin law.

36:33.320 --> 36:39.560
It comes from a federal case which comes from an interpretation of voting rights act.

36:39.560 --> 36:44.320
There's just no, I wasn't here when it was done, but it seems disconnected.

36:44.320 --> 36:49.000
Your honor, if the standard your honor is referring to is the least changes standard.

36:49.000 --> 36:54.080
That's the approach the US Supreme Court has taken to redistricting cases always and for

36:54.080 --> 36:59.560
purposes of this congressional redistricting case, certainly that standard is allowable

36:59.560 --> 37:05.280
under the elections clause, lest this court rests from the legislature, it's the legislature.

37:05.280 --> 37:07.880
Well, we're supposed to change the least.

37:07.880 --> 37:08.840
Pardon?

37:08.840 --> 37:13.320
What was supposed to change the least and least change?

37:13.320 --> 37:18.000
Well, for a malapportionment case, I think the way the opinion shook out in Johnson 2 for

37:18.000 --> 37:20.120
the congressional districts makes perfect sense.

37:20.120 --> 37:22.000
We looked at core retention scores.

37:22.000 --> 37:27.280
We moved the fewest number of people to repopulate with people the districts.

37:27.280 --> 37:32.640
Of course, other parties in Johnson had differing arguments, but your honor, back to the first

37:32.640 --> 37:38.120
question, whether or not your honor thought that was unworkable to use core retention,

37:38.120 --> 37:45.120
a metric that legislators use all the time, isn't the same as the argument plaintiffs

37:45.120 --> 37:51.400
have brought this court, which is they are asking this court to hold it's not just unworkable,

37:51.400 --> 37:58.360
it's unconstitutional to defer to the legislature when remedying a malapportionment claim.

37:58.360 --> 38:04.440
And I can think of a rule no better suited for an elections clause problem than to say

38:04.440 --> 38:09.240
in a malapportionment case, it's the courts and not the legislature that must decide what

38:09.240 --> 38:11.520
the political balance should be in districts.

38:11.520 --> 38:19.000
That is really, I think, disingenuous reading of more, right?

38:19.000 --> 38:22.040
That's not what Moore said.

38:22.040 --> 38:30.200
Moore said that certainly state courts can utilize traditional principles of judicial

38:30.200 --> 38:35.080
review in reviewing the actions of their legislature.

38:35.080 --> 38:40.360
What we're not supposed to do is go outside the bounds of judicial review.

38:40.360 --> 38:47.400
It's not our, we do not make policy here, we're not, we don't consider that.

38:47.400 --> 38:52.280
We consider the constitution and the text of our constitution, and whether there's

38:52.280 --> 38:54.640
a constitutional harm.

38:54.640 --> 38:59.560
And that was very clearly stated and more.

38:59.560 --> 39:08.400
In Rucho itself, the majority looks to state courts to address some of these issues of

39:08.400 --> 39:10.640
gerrymandered districts.

39:10.640 --> 39:18.000
So there's nothing unusual or strange about this court examining whether an act of the

39:18.000 --> 39:21.800
legislature causes a constitutional harm.

39:21.800 --> 39:23.360
It's what we do every day.

39:23.360 --> 39:24.360
It's our function.

39:24.360 --> 39:30.960
Well, the elections clause point I was reading was about how it would be highly unusual to

39:30.960 --> 39:37.360
hold that this court is prohibited from using the last enacted maps as a starting point,

39:37.360 --> 39:41.520
from using a lease changes approach, because that's what the Supreme Court did in white.

39:41.520 --> 39:45.160
It's what the Minnesota Supreme Court did in hip hurt in the Oklahoma case, in the South

39:45.160 --> 39:48.920
Carolina case, in the New Hampshire case, I'm sure there are more.

39:48.920 --> 39:54.320
And so that remedial approach would be highly unusual because the court isn't enacting

39:54.320 --> 39:59.680
a new map, it's remedying mal apportionment in a lease changes way.

39:59.680 --> 40:03.720
Surely that's allowable under the elections clause.

40:03.720 --> 40:08.760
Now separate and apart from that, as for the partisan gerrymandering claim, no court

40:08.760 --> 40:14.480
has ever held to a final judgment that the map is a partisan gerrymandering or that partisan

40:14.480 --> 40:19.960
gerrymandering is a cognizable claim under the Wisconsin Constitution.

40:19.960 --> 40:23.440
And so I do think it puts the cart before the horse to say plaintiffs have presented

40:23.440 --> 40:28.120
a constitutional harm, partisan gerrymandering, don't we have to remedy it?

40:28.120 --> 40:32.840
First, we have to ask, have plaintiffs done the hard work to present this court with

40:32.840 --> 40:38.640
new text and new history and new reasons not already rejected in Johnson 1?

40:38.640 --> 40:41.480
Okay, I want to take you back to this already rejected in Johnson 1.

40:41.480 --> 40:47.240
Johnson 1 did not have the claim of extreme partisan gerrymandering in front of us.

40:47.240 --> 40:51.600
What was in front of us was a map, creating a map.

40:51.600 --> 40:56.800
And the question that was asked is, should this court, in doing so, consider partisanship?

40:56.800 --> 40:59.920
That is a very different question.

40:59.920 --> 41:05.960
If no one here is saying or thinking that partisanship doesn't come into play when

41:05.960 --> 41:09.000
the legislature makes maps, of course it does.

41:09.000 --> 41:15.760
We're talking about a claim that it has gone so far that extreme partisanship has gone

41:15.760 --> 41:19.720
so far so as to dilute the vote.

41:19.720 --> 41:26.720
And that claim can be, they're making the claim of that that can be found in our Constitution,

41:26.720 --> 41:31.440
those important rights to democracy and the democracy principle that set forth in their

41:31.440 --> 41:32.440
briefs.

41:32.440 --> 41:38.120
So when you sit here and say, we already decided in Johnson 1, I was there and we didn't decide

41:38.120 --> 41:39.120
it.

41:39.120 --> 41:42.880
And they may have been in an opinion that the majority wrote and oftentimes things are in

41:42.880 --> 41:48.040
our opinions that aren't squarely in front of the court, we give that what we give it.

41:48.040 --> 41:52.400
But it was not an issue that has ever been brought to our court, aside from as was pointed

41:52.400 --> 41:56.480
out, we did not take a vehicle of an original action petition.

41:56.480 --> 42:01.840
This case was filed in the circuit court just like every other case starts out in the circuit

42:01.840 --> 42:04.240
court and usually in our district.

42:04.240 --> 42:09.720
So I want to push back on that and it seems like you're giving an awful lot of reliance

42:09.720 --> 42:16.520
on a couple of statements, a couple of paragraphs about an issue that was not squarely in front

42:16.520 --> 42:17.520
of the court.

42:17.520 --> 42:20.680
Yes, Turner, sort of take one of your last points first and then to address the heart

42:20.680 --> 42:22.440
of what was an issue at Johnson 1.

42:22.440 --> 42:26.160
The fact that this case started in circuit court, I actually think irrespective of a

42:26.160 --> 42:31.800
debate on partisan fairness, is the easiest grounds to say, while we might reconsider

42:31.800 --> 42:36.840
it or while we might consider it in another case, we can't consider it in this case.

42:36.840 --> 42:41.920
Because this injunction exists by virtue of an exercise of our original jurisdiction and

42:41.920 --> 42:47.480
now a circuit court has been asked to put that injunction on trial and that turns upside

42:47.480 --> 42:48.480
down the judicial.

42:48.480 --> 42:54.040
Aren't they being asked to issue a declaratory judgment and don't courts issue declaratory

42:54.040 --> 42:55.800
judgments all the time?

42:55.800 --> 42:57.360
Well, initially, no, you're honored.

42:57.360 --> 42:58.560
The complaint's very clear.

42:58.560 --> 43:02.800
They wanted the circuit court to enjoin this court's injunction and it's up to this court

43:02.800 --> 43:07.640
to decide whether it wishes that to continue not just in this case, but in all future cases.

43:07.640 --> 43:11.680
As for the declaratory judgment, the same fundamental problem still persists.

43:11.680 --> 43:16.920
Like academically, that sure sounds like an advisory proceeding because there's nothing

43:16.920 --> 43:22.240
that the court could do alongside the declaratory judgment to enjoin this court's injunction.

43:22.240 --> 43:23.240
But sort of-

43:23.240 --> 43:28.680
I know I want to make a second point, but it sort of feels like what you would have your

43:28.680 --> 43:33.880
friends on the other side do is just chase their tails around indefinitely.

43:33.880 --> 43:40.200
I mean, they have come at this several different ways to be fair.

43:40.200 --> 43:44.720
They have asked for, let's see, reconsideration.

43:44.720 --> 43:48.320
They filed a motion for relief from the judgment.

43:48.320 --> 43:55.000
They filed an original action, and then they filed the complaint in circuit court.

43:55.000 --> 44:00.360
I may have left out something, actually.

44:00.360 --> 44:05.560
I feel like it wouldn't matter which way they came at this, you would say, no, that's

44:05.560 --> 44:06.560
not good enough.

44:06.560 --> 44:10.560
And they have tried, they have come at it at least three or four different ways.

44:10.560 --> 44:12.400
Your Honor, I disagree.

44:12.400 --> 44:17.600
I think they came at it with a motion for reconsideration or a motion for relief from

44:17.600 --> 44:18.920
judgment.

44:18.920 --> 44:22.680
And I don't think there's any dispute that that's actually the most typical way for this

44:22.680 --> 44:28.600
court to address its final injunctions was to reopen Johnson itself.

44:28.600 --> 44:34.320
Then they came at it just like the Clark petitioners and asked this court to revisit its original

44:34.320 --> 44:39.200
jurisdiction injunction with another original jurisdiction action.

44:39.200 --> 44:44.200
And that this court denied those requests doesn't mean that then we can invert the hierarchy

44:44.200 --> 44:51.600
of the judicial branch in this state and allow a circuit court to put your injunction on trial.

44:51.600 --> 44:55.720
But it goes back to Justice, I'm not seeing it.

44:55.720 --> 44:57.240
It's a declaratory judgment.

44:57.240 --> 44:58.240
Well, sure.

44:58.240 --> 45:04.480
They would be declaring that this court acted unconstitutionally in 2022 in Johnson 2.

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I can find no authority and plaintiffs have pointed to no authority of any circuit court

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in this state having ever done so.

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How about a trial court that declares something our court did was unconstitutional in the

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criminal setting?

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What if a trial court said what if there was a violation of the Constitution and we said

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it didn't occur and it goes back and we later learned that the council was ineffective and

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all of a sudden there's an issue in front of the court.

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I mean, there's a myriad of ways in which cases that we have found to be constitutional

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or that we have ruled on then are potentially later found otherwise.

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I mean, what you're basically saying is that once we decide something, no one else can

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ever review it, including us.

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No, you're honored.

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This court can.

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And while I don't want to devolve into a discussion of habeas, what a habeas case is asking

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is actually for a separate writ.

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I'm not even talking habeas.

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I'm just talking about ineffective assistance of council in our state.

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I think I could probably find cases where that's happened, where this court has said

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that something was constitutional and it later turns out that actually it wasn't.

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Right.

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There's a well trodden collateral attack often called writs of habeas corpus on final criminal

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judgments, but that's not undoing the criminal judgment.

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It's granting a writ of habeas corpus for purposes of this case, your honor.

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Of course, this court could exercise its original jurisdiction again if it wanted

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to just as it did in Clark.

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So long as that original action was pursuant to the usual norms of judicial procedure.

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So council, let me just pick up on that point because if we were to find that there's a

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justiciable claim here and to remand it to the three judge panel to take evidence and

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determine whether the illegal standard for that claim is met and to find a constitutional

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violation, I'm just not following you in determining why it is that this three judge

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panel does not have jurisdiction or the authority to hold such a trial and draw such a conclusion

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on the evidence based on something that was said in Johnson to in which such a claim

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was not squarely in front of the court.

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Can you answer that, please?

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Yes, your honor.

47:33.200 --> 47:39.200
So first on the on the most fundamental procedural procedural point, I'm not aware of a circuit

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court putting on trial a final injunction of this court in another case, right?

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The circuit court would have to.

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It's not putting an injunction on trial.

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It is looking at the maps that are currently in place and making a determination about

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whether there is a partisan gerrymander in those maps.

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An issue that this court did not consider because it had no evidence at that point of

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partisan gerrymandering.

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Why are you saying that the Wisconsin law or the Wisconsin Constitution would prohibit

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an examination of that issue now for maps that are going to be used for future elections?

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The maps, just to be very clear, are and they exist by-

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They were adopted by this court, I understand that.

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They were adopted by this court without consideration for whether the maps were created with the

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partisan gerrymandering.

48:33.960 --> 48:34.960
Sure.

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So to answer that question directly, and Justice Dalit, I apologize the heart of your question

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directly.

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I too was here in Johnson and the parties were asked because some parties had raised whether

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the Wisconsin Constitution requires districts to be politically fair.

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And the parties submitted, as I mentioned, over 100 pages of briefing on that question,

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and there are more than three dozen paragraphs of legal analysis in the Johnson One opinion

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about why we cannot find anywhere in the Wisconsin Constitution a right to political fairness.

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And all the questions that such a right should it proceed in court cases would raise as opposed

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to should it proceed in the halls of Congress with anti-partisan gerrymandering legislation?

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And you don't see any sunlight between a right to political fairness and a claim that something

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is so unfair, it is violative of our Constitution.

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Political fairness sounds to me like, you know what, if you've got a Republican in charge,

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they might draw the maps more, a little more Republican, a Democrat, the same thing.

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That is not, how can that possibly be the same thing as this is so unfair, it rises to a

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level of a constitutional harm, which is extreme partisan gerrymandering, which is

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what we're being asked about, not political fairness.

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Well, your honor, again, having litigated these cases, the difference between the two is not clear,

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and that is why you see states like Florida saying we're just not considering it at all.

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It's either considered, there's either politics in the map or there's not,

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but there's no way, there's no way to assess in a judicially manageable way,

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whether there's just enough politics, but not too much.

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Because what that means is in the eye of the beholder absent some constitutional direction,

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that this is too much, and this is just enough.

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It feels like what you're asking us to do is to stick our hat in the sand,

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and I'm not your honor.

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It feels that way.

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I am not your honor, but I want to be emphatic about this.

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This is the adversarial system, and plaintiffs have to come to this court with arguments in history,

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just as you remarked in your concurrence in the MMC case,

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that maybe just maybe there's some history yet to be discovered out there

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that shows there's a right to partisan gerrymandering or shows there's this right living

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in Wisconsin's Equal Protection Clause, but it's not there in these briefs.

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And as much as it pains me to say it, I would urge the court to compare these briefs to the briefs

50:58.360 --> 51:03.960
in Clark, and the arguments that led this court in Clark that were historically rooted,

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they grappled with old precedents that weren't about mortgages or farmland,

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but about districts themselves and what continuity meant.

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It helped that the words contiguity were there.

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Well, your honor, I'm never going to get it.

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I can't concede that my contiguity argument is not one I still think about every day,

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but boy, was that a well-fought fight, your honor.

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And it was there, it was there, and that is an express requirement in the Constitution that

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the Constitution isn't about, Constitution isn't about express requirements, right?

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The Constitution is written in broad language, we're talking about a document

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that came right after that in 1848, right?

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And it set broad principles that Justice Taylor has been talking about.

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So it's not, we don't look for every single, it's not, this isn't connecting the dots,

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like can we find the word here, and then it means something, and if we don't find the exact word

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here, the principle must not exist. I think the legal scholars lay this out really well in their

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amicus brief. I think Justice Penny laid it out really well in his concurrence in Cunningham,

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which is that there are broad principles throughout the Wisconsin Constitution,

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and not all of those principles allows this court to subject legislative action to strict scrutiny.

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In the McGrail case about the ballots, the legislative action was okay because it was reasonable,

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even though it affected the right to vote, and if we go back to 1848,

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the messy work of what the district should look like was done by the political branches,

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and the delegates, and then later the people's representatives, and so there's just no similar

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history that was, as was that issue in Clark, to allow this court to invite this court to step

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into that political thicket now. I mean, deciding what is fair, whether it's extremely unfair, or

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fair, has plagued the federal courts for so long until we get to Rucho, and it's likewise plagued

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the state courts absent some bright line rule. Doesn't that show us something? The fact that

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these issues have been raised repeatedly, and that courts have struggled with them

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repeatedly, doesn't that, in some sense, show that there is a problem? There is a problem that is

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infecting our political landscape, not just in Wisconsin, but probably across the country.

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Voters struggle with that. I think you could pick just about anybody off the street in Wisconsin

53:36.760 --> 53:43.080
and ask them, do you think legislators should be able to draw a map in a way that

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locks in a particular political party, they would say? No. Doesn't it show us that there

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is some underlying problem there? The fact that courts have struggled with this for decades now?

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I think two things are true at once. Some voters could think there is a problem, and that courts

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have struggled with it so much means that it's not the court's problem to solve. And instead,

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it's been Congress's problem to solve, for example, in the 1840s, when Congress required single member

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congressional districts as a bulwark to gerrymandering, it's a problem for voters to solve with fair

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districts amendments. It's a problem for Congress potentially to solve now later on. Congress is

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constantly asked, by the way, to pass legislation to eliminate partisan gerrymandering. Congress passed

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and it's a hard thing to accomplish when you have a gerrymandered body. But let me just turn to

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another point. I want to return to a point you made a few minutes ago about distinguishing our case

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from other courts that have found a justiciable claim for partisan gerrymandering such as New

54:47.960 --> 54:54.040
Mexico. And it seemed to me you were leaning pretty heavily into the fact that the New Mexico

54:54.040 --> 55:00.280
Constitution, just as one example, has an explicit clause protecting free and equal elections.

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No, I think the New Mexico case rests on their equal protection clause and their history.

55:05.720 --> 55:09.240
It's a different state that you have in Pennsylvania and North Carolina.

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Okay, thank you. In any event, the point I wanted to raise is, is it your belief that because the

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Wisconsin Constitution lacks an explicit clause protecting fair and equal elections,

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that therefore the Wisconsin Constitution has no protection for fair and equal elections?

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No, Your Honor, that's not our position. Because clearly, constitutions are generally composed

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of broad principles. And this Constitution in Wisconsin is replete with phrases that point

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to the importance of popular sovereignty, the consent of the governed. Correct? Correct.

55:52.280 --> 56:00.280
So how is that different in substance than another state constitution that includes a clause such

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as fair and equal elections? Aren't those protections inherent in the clauses that protect popular

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sovereignty in Wisconsin? Well, as I mentioned before, there is a unique history to a free

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and equal elections clause and what those were, the evils that were perpetuated before America,

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that those were meant to guard against, specific to voting in elections. But in Wisconsin,

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just as everywhere else for these federal congressional districts, there is an absolute

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equality requirement at this point. You know, this court was asked to entertain an original

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action last year because the congressional districts deviated by one additional person.

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And as this court said in Cunningham, that promise of equality of an equally weighted vote,

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that is how people effectuate their right to vote. That is how votes are not diluted. And of course,

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Wisconsin protects that. And also, through our separation of powers, Wisconsin protects the

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right to vote. The founders assigned congressional redistricting power to the legislature and keeping

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with the people's representatives who are closest to them, the legislature, now in these territorial

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districts, can carry out the will of the people. Now, as for court struggling with this, Justice

57:24.920 --> 57:30.920
Crawford, I think it's very telling that even coming here today, counsel equivocated about what

57:30.920 --> 57:37.000
their test would be. And if counsel can't identify what their test would be, to me, that's proof

57:37.000 --> 57:41.880
positive that there is no judicially manageable standard hiding in the Wisconsin Constitution.

57:41.880 --> 57:45.960
I would agree with you. It's frustrating that they haven't articulated a test and I certainly

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wish they would have. That being said, let's talk about workability going forward in the event

57:53.720 --> 57:59.400
that we find both of the claims, both the partisan and anti-competitive gerrymandering

57:59.400 --> 58:08.440
cognizable. What are your thoughts about consolidating the gerrymandering claims and having just one trial?

58:09.080 --> 58:16.040
Again, it's inconceivable to me that there could be a trial in this posture, but to take your question,

58:16.040 --> 58:20.840
you know, assuming all of that, of course, I think the cases would need to be consolidated.

58:21.560 --> 58:25.800
I've participated. Other councils can participate in, for example, the Alabama congressional

58:25.800 --> 58:31.160
redistricting case. Those were consolidated at the trial court for purposes of trial proceedings.

58:32.520 --> 58:37.160
And again, I can't really conceive of how you have a new injunction in joining this courts

58:37.240 --> 58:42.200
injunction, but of course, you only want to do that one time versus two times, and so they should

58:42.200 --> 58:48.120
proceed together. But I don't want to lose sight of my latch as point two. We're talking about a

58:48.120 --> 58:55.800
lot of procedure, a lot of costs, and we are well over halfway into the decennial. And as federal

58:55.800 --> 59:02.040
courts and other courts have held, or the Illinois Supreme Court just held, sometimes plaintiffs are

59:02.040 --> 59:07.960
just too late because congressional districts, the census is about to come. And the prejudice

59:07.960 --> 59:13.800
here, well, let me start with it. The delay, I think, is clear from Brennan. Plaintiffs waited

59:14.520 --> 59:21.160
arguably 15 years to challenge Act 44 is unconstitutional. They waited three years since the

59:21.160 --> 59:25.640
congressional districts were settled. But I do want to point to the prejudice point, or I do

59:25.640 --> 59:30.120
want to discuss the prejudice point, Justice Protece, because it goes to the trial and everything.

59:30.120 --> 59:35.640
Will that be costly? Absolutely. But what's also costly and what's recognized in these cases

59:35.640 --> 59:41.640
we've cited on our latch's argument is the ensuing cost to the state, to the counties,

59:41.640 --> 59:47.640
and to voters should this court agree that the congressional districts need to change again.

59:47.640 --> 59:52.040
Maybe it's before the 2028 elections or the 2030 elections. And then, of course,

59:52.040 --> 59:57.240
the congressional districts will change again in 2032. Can't the congressional maps change

59:57.240 --> 01:00:00.040
anytime? How can your latch's argument appear?

