be based on the fact that you relied on settled maps
when tomorrow the legislature could change these maps.
But, well, oh, good question.
So there's a real difference between the legislature
like in Tennessee or Texas deciding
we're not just going to change the maps,
we're going to appropriate millions of dollars
for the state to change the maps midstream.
What the cases are discussing is that when courts
require the changing of the maps,
the state has to find those millions of dollars
to change them now and then to change them again
after the census and changing those districts
in such a short amount of time results
to real prejudice outside of this courtroom.
And it also results in-
And what is that exactly?
Can you develop that a bit?
Okay, so a congressional map doesn't just exist on paper,
it exists in computers and you assign voters
to different districts so that when that voter
shows up to the voting booth or when they check
their mailbox, they get the right ballot
for their district.
That can cost millions of dollars to hype up
and, you know, across the case-
So there's a cost associated with changing maps,
is that what you mean by prejudice?
Yes, and that's-
So the correction of a constitutional violation
because it costs money, it should be not remedied?
You're on are no different than Brennan,
the court is in any latches analysis,
even in constitutional cases is highly aware
of the prejudice for late filed claims.
Nothing stopped plaintiffs from filing a lawsuit in 2011
or filing a lawsuit in 2021 or 2022 or 2023 or 2024,
alleging these maps were unconstitutional.
And so yes, just as was the case
with the Alabama congressional districts
and the Florida districts and the Illinois districts,
sometimes the challenge just comes too late.
And that's especially true here
where the legal arguments are very underdeveloped,
they are not different than the arguments presented in Johnson.
And so one way this court can decide this case
is just like the Alabama court decided chestnut,
which is to say, well, consider your arguments later,
Alabama courts absolutely considered those arguments later
after the last census,
but we're not going to consider them now
because of the prejudice.
And it's not just monetary prejudice, just one more point.
Okay, what's the other prejudice
because you're not gonna sell me that costs are enough?
You're on our, I'd urge you to read the decisions we've cited.
It's a real cost to the state and to the taxpayers
to change maps.
But the second point is-
The second point is, I assume everyone here is highly versed
in where the districts are and who their representatives are,
but not everyone in Wisconsin.
Not all six, nearly six million Wisconsinites are that way.
And the cases also discuss a prejudice
to the everyday voter who has been in a district
that looks one way for a while,
and then all of a sudden they're switched
into a new district that I would suspect
is gonna look fairly different.
Which could still happen tomorrow.
It could your honor, but that is the legislature's
prerogative under the elections clause.
I also wanna point out you went back to 2011
for purposes of counting latches,
but you don't wanna go back to 2011 otherwise.
Sorry, what was that?
You went back to 2011 for purposes of counting latches,
I noticed.
Well, your honor, if there are arguments,
I heard, maybe I misheard today,
but I heard today that the intent that matters
was the intent of the lawmakers who enacted Act 44.
And so if that's true from,
here's a fourth kind of prejudice,
there's a real evidentiary prejudice
in waiting to bring a claim until 15 years later,
because I don't know how we conduct discovery
about what happened in 2011.
It happened 15 years ago.
But you don't even,
Justice Dalit, you don't have to take 2011.
Brennan said two years was too late
to challenge the line item veto.
And here, these were well within two years
of counting the time in which they were brought
after our court case.
I think we're a year and a half.
I have to look at my math.
Under a year and a half.
Which we said in Clark was not undue delay.
In Clark, you said it was not undue delay to wait.
I have this here.
So the Johnson decision was in March 2022.
Clark was in August, 2023.
So in Clark, you said it's not undue delay
to wait 15 months to file a petition
for an original action.
And Brennan, you said latches is fact specific.
So let's look at the facts of this case.
Which are, they waited 14 years since Act 44.
Three years and four months
since the final judgment in Johnson II.
Nearly two years longer than the Clark petitioners
waited to challenge Johnson II.
And more than 18 months after the Clark decision.
And to come back to my first point,
if the plaintiffs are so sure
that the circuit court could have undone
this court's injunction,
not just today, but the minute after Clark,
they've offered no explanation
for why they didn't go to the circuit court.
There's no reason they had to act sequentially.
I assume their arguments taken to the logical extent
mean the circuit court has simultaneous jurisdiction.
So they can file their motion for relief from judgment here.
The same day they file their circuit court action.
And they have not explained why they decided to wait
until July of 2025 to challenge a final judgment issue.
In March of 2022.
And to say that that delay is reasonable.
There's a reconsideration motion
you're skipping over that was filed March 1st of 2024.
Right, yes, yes.
So they're not gonna count the time
that they were actually challenging
and even though that was denied.
Sorry, you're on, when I said motion
for to reopen the judgment, that's what I meant.
I don't understand how they couldn't also have filed
their circuit court action then or shortly thereafter.
Good point.
Okay.
We're just passing a note to see if one of your.
One of your colleagues may want to speak.
So.
Wants to speak.
That's okay.
But I'll give you an opportunity.
I don't know if you want to wrap things up
sort of bring your comments to your part to a close.
Sure.
I suppose I just want to get back
to the heart of the questions
which is we do think that in order to hold
that the Johnson two map
complied with all state and federal law.
Of course, this court had to decide
and consider in the more than three dozen paragraphs
that Wisconsin law does not require
politically fair districts.
And just my last point is that I do think
plaintiffs are setting the circuit court up for failure
if this comes, goes back.
They have not offered any standard
for this court to then adopt and hand down.
Justice Taylor, your earlier question about data.
Yes, we have the data,
but how do we count the one third
of Wisconsin's independence?
Where do they shake out in this new constitutional right?
How do we count the voter who votes for Tammy Baldwin
for Senate and her Republican candidate
in Assembly District 99
and the numerous other split ticket voters in this case?
The search for neutrality is for congressional districts
at least is what this court did in Johnson.
It's to defer to the legislative judgments
to remedy malapportionment and no more.
And if you read closely the bomb guard decision
and the prosser decision that was cited today,
that's actually what those courts were doing.
I'd urge the court to read to the end of prosser.
What the court said there is we as a court
will not upset the existing political landscape.
We will not pair incumbents
because that goes beyond our duties as a court.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Mr. Salin.
Thank you, Your Honor.
I'm going to try to do something a little bit different.
I hear there's a lot of sentiment on the bench
for eventually perhaps considering recognizing
and claim for partisan gerrymandering.
I would like to make the case here
that this is absolutely not the case
where this court should go down this path.