WEBVTT

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What all that might look like, and if you have some idea, is there a way to streamline it,

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is there, what are some of the ways that if we get to that point, we might want to think

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about handling it at that stage?

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Yes, Your Honor, and if the court decides to go down the gerrymandering route, whether

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it's partisan or anti-competitive or both, I think the structure that the court has already

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set up in designating two panels to adjudicate what I understand to be very different claims.

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But related, obviously, you know, our claim, you know, we've already established that

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our claim has, you know, well-worn, we've seen from other states.

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And I don't take a position on the anti-competitive gerrymandering claim, which I understand to

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be a novel claim under Wisconsin law.

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But I do think that two different panels can adjudicate those claims as a matter of liability

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if it turns out that the map is deemed either a partisan gerrymander or an anti-competitive

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gerrymander or both.

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I think at that point, either this court or those courts can decide to consolidate for

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purposes of remedy so that we're not having dueling remedy maps for the state of Wisconsin.

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Let me ask you about that, because if I understood your answer to Justice Crawford's question

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and to Justice Dallas' questions about the remedy and who would draw the maps, you said

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the three judge panels would.

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You can see where I'm going, right?

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We could end up with two maps, and that seems like a bad idea.

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And that's the existing structure, I think, is a function of having two different courts

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appointed for two different claims.

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How would we get those, how would you said either the three judge panels could draw the

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maps or we could?

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How would we get the maps back at that point?

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How would the remedy come back to us?

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Well the remedy could come back to you on appeal from either court, from any court.

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That has to happen.

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Yeah, that would have to happen.

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But at the same time, this court is certainly within its purview and certainly within this

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court experience to adjudicate the remedy itself.

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It did so in Johnson, it was prepared to do so in Clark.

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If the court decides that that's the route it wants to take.

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The kind of complexity that comes from the fact of having two different panels adjudicating

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two different claims, your honor absolutely is correct to point out, well then what if

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we end up with two different remedies that we then have to kind of pick between or adjudicate?

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That wasn't what happened in Clark or Johnson because those were only in front of us.

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They weren't going back to a three judge panel.

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Those were very different.

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Those are postured completely differently.

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Well both Johnson and Clark contemplated that the remedy phase of which map do we select

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would happen before this court.

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And I believe this court has the authority to say, yeah, that's what we do.

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We certainly can do that in the context of the separation of powers claim and it could

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even decide to do that in the context of a gerrymandering claim down the line.

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If the court instead decides to give the remedy phase over to the circuit court as well then

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I think this court has other tools at disposal to manage the docket to make sure that perhaps

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this case is below are consolidated for purposes of remedy and coming to a single map that resolves

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whatever the outstanding liability is at that point.

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Can they be consolidated though prior to remedy?

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Doesn't this court under 80501 have the authority to do that and would you agree that they're

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related claims?

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Absolutely this court has the authority to consolidate and to manage the docket.

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I don't think they necessarily have to be.

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They are related because they are both challenging the same map.

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I don't want to speak to the anti-competitive gerrymandering claims since I understand

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it to be a novel claim that is not already entrenched in it.

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Regardless of the claim, we're looking at similar evidence.

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You're making similar accusations about the 2011 maps and whether they are extreme partisan

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gerrymanders or extreme anti-competitive, those things both would seem to relate to

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one another.

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Absolutely your honor and it is well within this court's purview to decide to consolidate.

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We of course envision our claim and I don't have a position on how similar a different

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their claim is to ours.

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We understand the kinds of evidence that we would want to bring and we think would be

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relevant to a partisan gerrymandering claim based on established law.

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So I don't want to necessarily intertwine the two not having enough information about

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how that would work but certainly this court has the authority to do that whenever there's

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multiple challenges to the same map.

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And council I understand that you didn't brief the other or haven't argued the other case

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but it sounds like your position is that those two claims are not incompatible in the

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sense that it's either one or the other but they could be both.

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Is that correct?

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That is my understanding of that claim is that it's not necessarily incompatible with

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a partisan gerrymandering claim.

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A partisan gerrymander could also be an anti-competitive gerrymander.

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A district can be competitive in a primary or a general so I think there are many ways

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to slice that so that they're not fundamentally at odds with one another.

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Okay.

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Go ahead.

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Okay.

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Thank you.

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In terms of the burden of proof or the standard that's being applied here is the lower court

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going to have to make a determination as to the statewide map for these congressional

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districts or is it going to be obliged to look district by district and make findings

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as to each separate congressional district.

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How is that supposed to work?

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So I think the traditional way is for the district by district approach in terms of liability

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to decide that certain districts are configured in a way that is a what we would argue is

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a partisan gerrymander but in making that determination the court can consider statewide

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evidence.

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Thank you.

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Part of the problem here is we're kind of, I don't mean to be disparaging but making

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it up on the fly here.

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And I'm interested in the law here.

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I mean I read your briefs and obviously there's a lot of discussion here about mechanics and

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remedy and those sorts of things.

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I want you to put aside the separation of powers argument for a minute and just focus

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on this.

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Could you, your argument on why this is actually a thing which it hasn't been for 170 years

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ago and I rejected it explicitly on the same grounds in Johnson when we did ask the parties

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to brief every legal claim.

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We did ask whether we should consider partisan impact and we explicitly held that there is

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no legal basis for this claim but your argument is a little like we got some free government,

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we got some free press, we got freedom of the assembly, sprinkle in a little bit of salt

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and pepper and you know equal, we're all inherently equal, ergo districts can't be favored one

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party over the other too much which means I don't know what, nobody really knows what

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that means.

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I don't know how it fits with the next case.

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Help me out walk me through as precisely as you can, your logic from something on the

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law that gets me to a test that's based something on the law that is actually supposed

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to be adjudicated or dealt with below as opposed to just, it sounds a lot like this is unfair,

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please stop unfair things, bad things are happening, constitution must stop that, you

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know, please stop in court and stop bad things from happening.

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Help me see why that's not what's going on here.

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So your honor, I'll start with the language in Clark as it specifically held from a majority

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of this court that partisan gerrymandering remains an important and an unresolved area

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of Wisconsin law.

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So what we are asking is the court to resolve it and in resolving it, it can look at the

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various provisions of article one that we have pointed to, all of which center on democratic

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self-governance and equality under the law, that is antithetical to the idea that politicians

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get to choose their voters or that the deck is stacked with a thumb on the scale or a

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fist on the scale in favor of one party over another to the arbitrary disadvantage of the

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disfavored party.

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At this test that the courts would apply is exactly the test that other courts have

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deemed, have seen fit to apply and been able to apply.

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The fact that there is not a bright line rule that says as a binary, this is a partisan

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gerrymander and this is not, is not unique to the partisan gerrymandering context.

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Courts adjudicate the protection context frankly in the undue burden context all the time,

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when does something amount to a violation because it is just too much and I litigate

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undue burden claims all the time and that is a really just, it's always a weighing of

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the facts and it's always a judicial determination of making some of those hard calls in the absence

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of bright line rules but those are the exact time questions and answers that this court

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and all courts are equipped to make and they do it every day.

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So do you think that, you think taking, having partisan motivations is fine with drawing

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maps as long as it's just not too effective?

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I mean, so let's just go back to, for example, our Johnson litigation.

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We asked for submissions from a variety of different parties and let me submit to you

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that every map we got had a lot of partisan motivations behind it within the least changed

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principle we announced.

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Pretty clear that Governor Revers map, for example, was trying to make district one much

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more democratic than had been before within the limits and the congressmen submitted map

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that was trying to do some things and up north and district three.

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So whether I'm right or wrong on that, just file a track with me for a moment.

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There clearly were partisan motivations behind it.

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Is that fine as long as the whole map just isn't too democratic or too republican and

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why is that the standard that derives somewhere from the law?

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Because the law basically, the fact, the law recognizes that partisan actors, political

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actors will have political motives.

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It specifically says that judicial actors will not and cannot and need to make clear

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to make certain to not veer down that path.

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But when the law does recognize that political actors will have political motives and it

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doesn't sever the political actors from the redistricting process for that reason.

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But in allowing, in disallowing for extreme partisan gerrymandering, what it says is,

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we cannot allow those political motives.

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Specifically, this court looks at the free government provision, for instance.

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The idea of temperance and moderation cannot allow the self interest of those

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in power to essentially be at the expense of the citizens.

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Such that it is essentially canceling out the majority will and

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not being responsive to the vote of the citizens in the end.

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I want to roll up just on the intent portion of your intent effects test that

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you're that potentially disgusting.

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I know you have the other one subordinating the traditional redistricting principles.

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So you seem to be making two different arguments on what this court did.

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One, you're complaining from a separation of powers perspective that we blindly

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adopted a 2011 map without regard to what went into that map.

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And that was problematic.

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And then you're also arguing at the same time that this court,

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with regard to the partisan gerrymandering claim,

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actually had all the intentions of the 2011 map,

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which we didn't consider or say anywhere in our opinion.

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We didn't actually have evidence before us about what went into the 2011 map.

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But you're saying we borrowed that, so which is it?

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I think they're saying the same thing, Your Honor,

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that in adopting the 2011 map through the least changed principle and

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refusing to look at the partisan effects of that map,

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this court blindly deferred to a legally defunct principle based on a legally

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defunct principle that this court said was unlawful in Clark and

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outside the bounds of the judicial role.

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That's not what intent means.

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Intent means what you intend to do, want to do, right?

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So you might be arguing that was the effect of it.

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But what you're arguing is that Justice Dalit,

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Chief Justice Krowski and myself, who were in the majority adopting that,

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and I know a couple of my colleagues dissented from the underlying principle of least change.

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When you're arguing that our intent in that case was actually to adopt

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all of the partisan motivations in the 2011 map when we did that,

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is that the principle you're suggesting to us?

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I think the intent in that case, which is spelled out in this court's Johnson opinion,

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was to adopt the 2011 map and everything that went into and

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resulted from it without the other considerations.

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That's not what we said.

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We actually said what our motivation was.

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We didn't say our motivation was partisan interest at all.

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In fact, we said exactly the opposite.

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So how could possibly you satisfy an intent test

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that we had an intention to make a map that was overly sympathetic to Republicans

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when, in fact, we said we were not looking at that at all.

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We said what our intent was in that opinion.

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Right, and I'm not suggesting that the court had some nefarious intent,

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but the court said exactly what it said in this opinion,

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which is our intent, is to calcify in place whatever happened in 2011 with that map.

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The inputs, the outputs, the effects, with blind deference to all of that,

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we are essentially channeling that in, funneling that in,

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and adopting all of that as much as we possibly can to a 95% degree of certainty

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going forward.

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But not partisan motivation.

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That's not what the word intent means.

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Like in any kind of intent, you're looking at what did they mean to do?

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What were they considering?

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I understand your consideration at the practical effect of that

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is deferring to the political judgments that went into that in 2011,

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which my understanding was more or less an effort to keep the incumbents in power.

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Maybe now we can, you know, who knows?

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I don't know what all the details of that are, but whatever that was,

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that wasn't before us.

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We didn't have that before us when we were dealing with that.

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The word intent means you meant to do something.

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And what we, we said what we meant to do.

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We said we don't mean to do anything for partisan advantage.

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In fact, we mean to exclude that entirely from our consideration.

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So you can't meet an intent effects test when this court adopt,

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if we're looking at what this court meant to do,

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when this court said we're not in considering partisan motivation.

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There go, we weren't intending to do that.

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Respectfully, Your Honor, I think that's in Clark,

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this court made clear that that's actually not,

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that when the court did what it did,

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did what it intended to do, which was adopt wholesale,

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that previous map, it erred in not considering all of the inputs

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and the effects of that map.

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And that not necessarily that it was, you know,

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linking arms with all of the map drawers,

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but that in blindly deferring to that map,

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it therefore channeled, channeled in that entire process,

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both intent and the effects.

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Council, we're banking in.

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Let me just, I just want to follow up.

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I mean, essentially what least change is,

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is least change says we are going to bake in

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whatever the political motivations were of that 2011 legislature.

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And we're going to bake it in for perpetuity.

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If it's least changed from the 2011 maps,

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and we continue to follow least change in 2021,

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and in 2031, and 2041, and 2051,

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it all links back to what happened in 2011.

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Correct, Your Honor.

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Let me ask you some questions.

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I just had, can I ask one question on least change?

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I was not here at the time.

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I was adopted.

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But when we're doing constitutional interpretation,

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looking at constitutional harm,

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we're looking at the words of the Constitution,

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we're looking at history, precedent.

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Where does this least change come from?

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Because I've tried to find it somewhere,

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and I cannot find it in Wisconsin constitutional jurisprudence.

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Do you know where that comes from?

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I think this Court held in Clark that it doesn't come from anywhere.

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It is an extra constitutional concept

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that cannot be allowed to supersede

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the actual constitutional requirements for redistricting.

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And that's why Clark struck down least change.

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I understand that my interveners,

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are here to argue against Clark and argue for least change.

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But that issue has already been resolved

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by binding precedent at this Court,

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and all we ask is for this Court to apply that precedent

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to the ongoing maps that continue,

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that Wisconsin voters continue to vote on in future elections.

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Let me ask you some questions.

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We talked about, we've talked about a lot of things,

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so let me direct you to,

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we talked about this case going back for fact finding.

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To the three judge panel.

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I just want to ask some questions about some of that fact finding.

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How is a Court supposed to know,

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and these concerns were brought up in Johnson and Juan,

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these concerns are laid out in the Rucho majority.

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Am I saying that right?

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Do we say Rucho, Rucho?

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Rucho, Rucho, okay.

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All right, and Kayla.

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I don't know him either, so.

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Be clear.

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How do we know,

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so these concerns were laid out in Johnson and Juan,

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and they were laid out in the Rucho majority,

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and they've been laid out in other cases.

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And their questions are like,

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how do you know when a map is too partisan?

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How do you know when it has crossed the line

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of going from constitutional to unconstitutional?

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So, Your Honor, I've litigated partisan gerrymandering cases

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in other states,

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and some of the most probative evidence

17:59.480 --> 18:03.160
comes from the expert analyses of the maps themselves.

18:03.160 --> 18:05.640
And I'll specifically point to two kinds of evidence

18:05.640 --> 18:07.320
that we have often seen.

18:07.320 --> 18:09.480
One is the efficiency gap analysis,

18:09.480 --> 18:12.440
which I know this was born in Wisconsin,

18:13.000 --> 18:15.080
which really looks at the extent to which

18:15.080 --> 18:19.560
the map wastes votes of one party versus another,

18:19.560 --> 18:23.080
which courts have deemed a really reliable

18:23.560 --> 18:27.160
way of determining how extreme is this

18:27.160 --> 18:29.240
compared to previous Wisconsin maps

18:29.240 --> 18:31.080
and maps across the country.

18:31.080 --> 18:33.240
How far down the scale?

18:33.240 --> 18:35.400
Are we talking about efficiency gap of seven?

18:35.400 --> 18:37.880
Are we talking about an efficiency gap of 35?

18:37.880 --> 18:40.120
And that I think has been a really useful metric

18:40.120 --> 18:41.080
in other states.

18:41.080 --> 18:43.560
And the other piece of expert analysis

18:43.560 --> 18:45.800
that I think has been extremely helpful to courts

18:45.800 --> 18:47.880
is the outlier analysis.

18:47.880 --> 18:50.840
Your Honor mentioned looking at a bunch of simulated maps

18:50.840 --> 18:53.560
that don't take partisanship into effect.

18:54.360 --> 18:57.080
How often, if you're looking just at the political geography

18:57.080 --> 18:59.400
of the state and using that as the inputs,

18:59.400 --> 19:00.840
how often do you come up with a map

19:00.840 --> 19:03.560
that even approximates this kind of a split,

19:03.560 --> 19:05.720
or this kind of a partisan impact?

19:05.720 --> 19:09.320
And then you can see whether it's an extreme outlier or not.

19:09.320 --> 19:11.160
Those are just two of the pieces of evidence

19:11.160 --> 19:12.840
that in addition to any direct and other

19:12.840 --> 19:14.840
circumstantial evidence that is available

19:14.840 --> 19:17.400
on a state-specific or map-specific basis.

19:17.400 --> 19:19.640
And I want to, and so those are some of the tools

19:19.640 --> 19:20.920
that courts have used.

19:20.920 --> 19:23.320
To Justice Haggadorn's concern about,

19:23.320 --> 19:26.200
well, in this particular case, what happens since there's,

19:26.200 --> 19:28.840
you know, there's different map drawers or different stages.

19:28.840 --> 19:30.280
All of those questions go into like,

19:30.280 --> 19:32.520
well, what kind of evidence would plaintiffs be able

19:32.520 --> 19:34.840
to reduce at the lower court

19:34.840 --> 19:36.600
if we get to that fact-finding provision?

19:36.600 --> 19:38.600
It does not come to the question of whether or not

19:38.600 --> 19:40.760
partisan gerrymandering is a thing

19:40.760 --> 19:43.000
that is cognizable under Wisconsin law.

19:43.000 --> 19:45.160
Let me just ask a couple other questions

19:45.160 --> 19:46.840
regarding the fact-finding.

19:47.720 --> 19:52.520
Wisconsin's political geography is interesting.

19:52.520 --> 19:55.080
Every state's political geography is interesting.

19:55.080 --> 19:58.600
We tend to have two urban centers, obviously here,

19:58.600 --> 20:04.200
and in Milwaukee where Democrats tend to be clustered,

20:04.200 --> 20:08.600
as opposed to the more rural areas of our state.

20:08.600 --> 20:11.000
How is that taken into account?

20:11.000 --> 20:14.840
Just the political geography that is special,

20:14.840 --> 20:16.200
unique to Wisconsin?

20:16.200 --> 20:18.840
Yeah, and I think that specifically that the court

20:18.840 --> 20:20.520
will look at traditional districting principles,

20:20.520 --> 20:23.400
such as compactness and communities and counties

20:23.400 --> 20:25.480
and things like that, but I think that's especially

20:25.480 --> 20:27.080
where that efficiency gap comes in.

20:27.080 --> 20:29.880
And again, I'll point the court to the Pennsylvania decision.

20:29.880 --> 20:31.880
And the Pennsylvania partisan gerrymandering says,

20:31.880 --> 20:33.800
like, look, we can understand that there's,

20:33.800 --> 20:35.320
given the technology that we have,

20:35.320 --> 20:38.040
given the way that states that people reside,

20:38.040 --> 20:40.600
that there are ways to kind of check the boxes

20:40.600 --> 20:43.240
of things like compactness and county splits

20:43.240 --> 20:46.600
and still create very, very slanted maps.

20:46.600 --> 20:49.000
And that's why these tools, such as the efficiency gap,

20:49.000 --> 20:50.840
are able to smoke that out to make sure

20:50.840 --> 20:53.560
that we're not using the political geography

20:53.560 --> 20:56.680
to manipulate votes before votes are actually cast.

20:56.680 --> 21:00.680
And I just have one more question along these lines,

21:00.680 --> 21:05.800
which is we don't register by party affiliation in Wisconsin.

21:06.360 --> 21:10.440
So what evidence or information do you,

21:10.440 --> 21:13.800
would you be asking the experts and then the court

21:13.800 --> 21:17.800
to look at when it's making the determination,

21:17.800 --> 21:21.800
how is a court supposed to,

21:21.800 --> 21:24.800
or what evidence would you look at in that situation?

21:24.800 --> 21:26.800
Yeah, courts and political scientists routinely look

21:26.800 --> 21:30.800
at the political voting patterns of precinct basis.

21:30.800 --> 21:32.800
So they look at historical voting patterns.

21:32.800 --> 21:34.800
And that's something that these experts

21:34.800 --> 21:37.800
and courts around the country have examined for many years,

21:37.800 --> 21:39.800
not just in the partisan gerrymandering context,

21:39.800 --> 21:41.800
but in any kind of vote dilution claim,

21:41.800 --> 21:43.800
when you're trying to figure out what are the candidates of choice,

21:43.800 --> 21:45.800
and how are maps being drawn in a way that's meant

21:45.800 --> 21:48.800
to suppress a certain one viewpoint versus another?

21:48.800 --> 21:51.800
Council, we've already talked to think about articles,

21:51.800 --> 21:54.800
one section, one of the Wisconsin Constitution.

21:54.800 --> 21:57.800
But I'm just wondering about your take on this.

21:57.800 --> 22:00.800
The respondents argued that the Wisconsin Constitution

22:00.800 --> 22:03.800
does not have a provision addressing partisan gerrymandering.

22:03.800 --> 22:05.800
Like other states do.

22:05.800 --> 22:08.800
Other than article one, section one,

22:08.800 --> 22:11.800
do you have a response to that argument?

22:11.800 --> 22:14.800
Well, we point it to multiple provisions of article one

22:14.800 --> 22:16.800
for our partisan gerrymandering claim.

22:16.800 --> 22:18.800
And while it is true that the Wisconsin Constitution

22:18.800 --> 22:21.800
does not use the words partisan gerrymandering,

22:21.800 --> 22:24.800
that makes only make sense because the Wisconsin Constitution

22:24.800 --> 22:27.800
speaks in principles and not in particulars.

22:27.800 --> 22:29.800
It also does not use the words racial gerrymandering,

22:29.800 --> 22:32.800
or mal apportionment, or many of the other things

22:32.800 --> 22:35.800
that this court has found to be an equal protection violation

22:35.800 --> 22:37.800
because it is meant to apply those principles

22:37.800 --> 22:39.800
to the facts of a given claim.

22:39.800 --> 22:41.800
When it comes to the other states, yes,

22:41.800 --> 22:44.800
there are states like Florida or Ohio,

22:44.800 --> 22:46.800
which specifically contain constitutional provisions

22:46.800 --> 22:49.800
barring unlawful partisan intent or partisan gerrymandering.

22:49.800 --> 22:52.800
But there are also states like North Carolina or Pennsylvania

22:52.800 --> 22:55.800
or New Mexico that also do not use the words

22:55.800 --> 22:58.800
partisan gerrymandering, but have clauses very similar

22:58.800 --> 23:00.800
to the equal protection clause that we're talking about here,

23:00.800 --> 23:03.800
or free and equal election clauses that are more,

23:03.800 --> 23:06.800
that are more, sound more in principle

23:06.800 --> 23:08.800
and that are applied to those particulars.

23:08.800 --> 23:10.800
Thank you.

23:10.800 --> 23:13.800
Council, when we are looking at the,

23:13.800 --> 23:15.800
and this is more of a remand question,

23:15.800 --> 23:17.800
assuming that we get there,

23:17.800 --> 23:22.800
you just were speaking about

23:22.800 --> 23:29.800
looking at the efficiency gap

23:30.800 --> 23:34.800
and I'm curious, given the passage of time here,

23:34.800 --> 23:40.800
and how, you know, we don't have partisan registration in Wisconsin,

23:40.800 --> 23:44.800
is the correct data set to look at the 2010 data

23:44.800 --> 23:50.800
or the 2027 data, or 2026 data?

23:50.800 --> 23:55.800
You know, I'm just curious about

23:56.800 --> 23:59.800
the fact that a lot of time has passed

23:59.800 --> 24:04.800
from the sort of original sin that the plaintiffs are claiming here,

24:04.800 --> 24:07.800
which is the 2010 map.

24:07.800 --> 24:08.800
Can you respond to that?

24:08.800 --> 24:12.800
Even if this court decides to employ an intent element in the analysis

24:12.800 --> 24:15.800
that does look back at the original map drawers intent,

24:15.800 --> 24:18.800
courts would also look at the effects of that map

24:18.800 --> 24:19.800
and the ongoing effects of that map.

24:19.800 --> 24:20.800
And the current effects.

24:20.800 --> 24:21.800
The current effects.

24:21.800 --> 24:23.800
And that is traditionally in the case in partisan,

24:23.800 --> 24:24.800
again, not just partisan gerrymandering.

24:24.800 --> 24:26.800
Any kind of vote dilution claims.

24:26.800 --> 24:30.800
The courts and political scientists traditionally look to the most recent,

24:30.800 --> 24:34.800
all at four, six, eight years of election results

24:34.800 --> 24:37.800
to decide to look at a kind of a spate of elections

24:37.800 --> 24:40.800
to determine what has been the entrenched effect,

24:40.800 --> 24:43.800
if any, of the challenge map.

24:43.800 --> 24:47.800
And isn't the big question on the effects test

24:47.800 --> 24:51.800
that we are looking at is whether partisanship

24:51.800 --> 24:57.800
substantially dilutes a group, the disfavored groups right to vote?

24:57.800 --> 25:00.800
Isn't that at the core of the effects test?

25:00.800 --> 25:01.800
Absolutely, Your Honor.

25:01.800 --> 25:02.800
Okay.

25:02.800 --> 25:05.800
Because we haven't talked a lot about voting in this.

25:05.800 --> 25:07.800
But that is what we are looking at.

25:07.800 --> 25:08.800
Is that right?

25:08.800 --> 25:14.800
Whether someone's right to vote has been so substantially diluted

25:14.800 --> 25:16.800
that there is a constitutional harm.

25:16.800 --> 25:17.800
Absolutely.

25:17.800 --> 25:18.800
Okay.

25:18.800 --> 25:21.800
So that is the ultimate in the effects question,

25:21.800 --> 25:24.800
question that we want to ask.

25:24.800 --> 25:29.800
That is the ultimate question is whether or not the map has drawn,

25:29.800 --> 25:31.800
imposes such a thumb, and I get on to say,

25:31.800 --> 25:35.800
a fist on the scale in favor of one party over another

25:35.800 --> 25:38.800
that essentially is deciding elections before votes are cast.

25:38.800 --> 25:43.800
Well, the right to vote is my right to go to a place

25:43.800 --> 25:47.800
or mail in a ballot and vote.

25:47.800 --> 25:52.800
But you are conflating the effect of a vote

25:52.800 --> 25:54.800
with the right to vote.

25:54.800 --> 25:56.800
I see those as two different things.

25:56.800 --> 26:02.800
In Wisconsin, we have pretty liberal laws regarding your ability to vote.

26:02.800 --> 26:06.800
You can mail in ballots, you can go to your place

26:06.800 --> 26:09.800
and vote your right to vote.

26:09.800 --> 26:15.800
You are really arguing that the person's right to vote is

26:15.800 --> 26:17.800
not allowed to vote?

26:17.800 --> 26:19.800
No, it's dilution.

26:19.800 --> 26:20.800
That's what I asked.

26:20.800 --> 26:22.800
They have the right to vote.

26:22.800 --> 26:26.800
But my question was, is it so substantially diluted

26:26.800 --> 26:28.800
that there is a constitutional harm?

26:28.800 --> 26:30.800
Well, okay.

26:30.800 --> 26:35.800
Then that is conflating a right to vote with the effect of your vote.

26:35.800 --> 26:37.800
So in the vote dilution context, and again,

26:37.800 --> 26:40.800
we can take it out of the partisan gerrymandering question for a second.

26:40.800 --> 26:43.800
In any vote dilution claim, and these are part and parcel of state

26:43.800 --> 26:45.800
federal courts across the country for decades,

26:45.800 --> 26:49.800
the question is not just whether somebody had the ability

26:49.800 --> 26:52.800
to put a vote in the ballot box and have it counted.

26:52.800 --> 26:55.800
But courts have held that when it comes to vote dilution,

26:55.800 --> 26:58.800
it's about having a meaningful opportunity to vote,

26:58.800 --> 27:01.800
and a meaningful opportunity to translate your vote into power,

27:01.800 --> 27:03.800
not just to be able to show up at the ballot box,

27:03.800 --> 27:05.800
but to actually have an effect with your vote.

27:05.800 --> 27:08.800
And that is the essence of any vote dilution claim,

27:08.800 --> 27:10.800
including our partisan gerrymandering claim.

27:10.800 --> 27:12.800
We've never held that though.

27:12.800 --> 27:15.800
This court has never found a case to be a part of a map

27:15.800 --> 27:16.800
to be a partisan gerrymander.

27:16.800 --> 27:18.800
It is held that it is an unresolved issue of Wisconsin law.

27:18.800 --> 27:20.800
We've never held that.

27:20.800 --> 27:22.800
There's something like your votes being diluted

27:22.800 --> 27:24.800
if you can't elect the candidate of your choice.

27:24.800 --> 27:26.800
We've never held that before, right?

27:26.800 --> 27:29.800
Wisconsin federal courts have certainly talked about it

27:29.800 --> 27:31.800
in the Voting Rights Act context.

27:31.800 --> 27:32.800
Sure.

27:32.800 --> 27:34.800
I'm saying we're talking about this is an entirely Wisconsin law claim.

27:34.800 --> 27:37.800
So Wisconsin has never recognized what you just outlined.

27:37.800 --> 27:39.800
I agree, Your Honor, this court has made very clear

27:39.800 --> 27:41.800
that partisan gerrymandering remains

27:41.800 --> 27:43.800
an unresolved and important issue of Wisconsin.

27:43.800 --> 27:46.800
Has anyone ever asked us straight on to resolve that question

27:46.800 --> 27:48.800
before you're doing that here today?

27:48.800 --> 27:51.800
I believe that this is the first time that has come to this court.

27:51.800 --> 27:53.800
I know that there was a partisan gerrymandering claim

27:53.800 --> 27:56.800
in Gill in federal court, last cycle.

27:56.800 --> 28:00.800
But again, in the Johnson case, there was no partisan gerrymandering claim.

28:00.800 --> 28:02.800
The only claim was a malaportionment claim.

28:02.800 --> 28:04.800
Aren't you here last year?

28:04.800 --> 28:07.800
Didn't you file a petition for original action asking us to do this very thing?

28:07.800 --> 28:08.800
We did, Your Honor.

28:08.800 --> 28:10.800
And the court denied that petition for original action

28:10.800 --> 28:12.800
without issuing any opinion or judgment.

28:12.800 --> 28:17.800
So having exercised this discretion to not accept that procedural vehicle,

28:17.800 --> 28:19.800
we then exercised our right to go through them.

28:19.800 --> 28:24.800
And Johnson, we explicitly asked all the parties to that case,

28:24.800 --> 28:28.800
write us every single legal issue in the Wisconsin Constitution

28:28.800 --> 28:30.800
that needs to govern our adjudication,

28:30.800 --> 28:35.800
including the impact of partisanship on any maps we'd adopt.

28:35.800 --> 28:38.800
And we explicitly invited that claim,

28:38.800 --> 28:42.800
and we did not, and we answered that question.

28:42.800 --> 28:43.800
Did we not?

28:43.800 --> 28:44.800
In Johnson 1.

28:44.800 --> 28:48.800
In Johnson 1, in paragraph 8, the court said that it decided

28:48.800 --> 28:50.800
that it's not going to be looking at partisan effect,

28:50.800 --> 28:53.800
and it is not going to deem partisan claims just dishable,

28:53.800 --> 28:55.800
despite the fact that there was not a partisan gerrymandering claim

28:55.800 --> 28:56.800
before the court.

28:56.800 --> 28:58.800
But as Your Honor knows, Justice Hagenard,

28:58.800 --> 29:01.800
the concurrence did not join that paragraph 8.

29:01.800 --> 29:02.800
So that was only a three-

29:02.800 --> 29:05.800
That is true, but not accurate.

29:05.800 --> 29:09.800
I did not join paragraph 8, but I was very clear

29:09.800 --> 29:11.800
that I joined the holding on that question,

29:11.800 --> 29:13.800
and I wrote explicitly saying that.

29:13.800 --> 29:16.800
So while I did not join paragraph 8,

29:16.800 --> 29:20.800
there was no doubt about my joining that issue.

29:20.800 --> 29:22.800
So true, it didn't join paragraph 8,

29:22.800 --> 29:25.800
but I don't think it would be fair or accurate at all to suggest

29:25.800 --> 29:27.800
that that wasn't a holding of Johnson 1.

29:27.800 --> 29:28.800
Absolutely, Your Honor.

29:28.800 --> 29:32.800
And I guess all I have to go on is what the majority of this court held in Clark,

29:32.800 --> 29:35.800
which is that it remains an unresolved and important issue

29:35.800 --> 29:36.800
of Wisconsin law.

29:36.800 --> 29:37.800
That is not my opinion.

29:37.800 --> 29:38.800
That is this court's opinion.

29:38.800 --> 29:41.800
Is that an issue in Clark?

29:41.800 --> 29:43.800
The issue of partisan gerrymandering?

29:43.800 --> 29:45.800
No, which is why it did seem that it was not deciding

29:45.800 --> 29:47.800
that partisan gerrymandering claim.

29:47.800 --> 29:49.800
That was one of the questions brought to the court,

29:49.800 --> 29:51.800
but it decided not to take up that question

29:51.800 --> 29:53.800
and specifically said we are not deciding today

29:53.800 --> 29:55.800
whether or not partisan gerrymandering is.

29:55.800 --> 29:58.800
So any of those comments are probably a question.

29:58.800 --> 30:01.800
So any of those comments were probably dicta.

30:01.800 --> 30:03.800
They were not at the legal issue.

30:03.800 --> 30:05.800
That was being addressed at that point.

30:05.800 --> 30:09.800
That was a remedial question about how the court would exercise its powers

30:09.800 --> 30:12.800
after the violation, which simply focused on the constitutional

30:12.800 --> 30:13.800
contiguity question, right?

30:13.800 --> 30:15.800
Well, there's two different things that the court said.

30:15.800 --> 30:18.800
One is that the court said in Clark that we are not addressing

30:18.800 --> 30:21.800
what we believe to be an unresolved issue of Wisconsin law.

30:21.800 --> 30:23.800
That is partisan gerrymandering.

30:23.800 --> 30:25.800
So I'm taking the majority of the court at its word

30:25.800 --> 30:28.800
that is an unresolved issue of Wisconsin law that we, of course,

30:28.800 --> 30:30.800
are asking in the alternative the court resolved today.

30:30.800 --> 30:33.800
But the other part of Johnson that specifically overrules

30:33.800 --> 30:36.800
lease change as pre-expressed in any of the Johnson opinions,

30:36.800 --> 30:39.800
I don't believe anybody here has argued that that part is dicta.

30:39.800 --> 30:43.800
That is what binds Wisconsin with this court and Wisconsin courts

30:43.800 --> 30:45.800
when it comes to court-drawn maps,

30:45.800 --> 30:49.800
and it is a court-drawn map that continues to affect elections

30:49.800 --> 30:52.800
in Congress for Wisconsin going forward,

30:52.800 --> 30:54.800
and that's the court-drawn map that we're saying needs to be

30:54.800 --> 30:57.800
revisited in light of the holding in Clark.

30:58.800 --> 31:01.800
Are there any other questions?

31:01.800 --> 31:03.800
I think we're good.

31:03.800 --> 31:05.800
Thank you, Your Honor.

31:05.800 --> 31:07.800
I'm not seeing any.

31:07.800 --> 31:10.800
It is 1028.

31:10.800 --> 31:12.800
We're going to take a quick break.

31:12.800 --> 31:18.800
I might recommend you guys make sure your Uber apps are working.

31:18.800 --> 31:20.800
Your Uber Eats apps are working for lunch.

31:20.800 --> 31:26.800
We'll take a break at lunch, but it might be somewhat

31:26.800 --> 31:27.800
shortened.

31:27.800 --> 31:30.800
I don't want anyone to get hangry in here.

31:30.800 --> 31:33.800
So maybe just think forward a little bit.

31:33.800 --> 31:36.800
We'll take a quick break and try to get back in 10 minutes or so.

31:36.800 --> 31:38.800
Thank you.

