1 00:00:26,150 --> 00:00:27,749 Noble Ray, welcome to InFocus. 2 00:00:27,750 --> 00:00:28,609 Thank you very much. 3 00:00:28,610 --> 00:00:29,169 Glad to be here. 4 00:00:29,170 --> 00:00:30,769 I got to tell you, you and I have 5 00:00:30,770 --> 00:00:32,188 not seen each other since we did the 6 00:00:32,189 --> 00:00:33,289 Wisconsin in Black and White 7 00:00:33,290 --> 00:00:34,569 Project. Thank you for your service 8 00:00:34,570 --> 00:00:34,979 on that. 9 00:00:34,980 --> 00:00:36,139 No, thank you. 10 00:00:36,140 --> 00:00:37,479 It was really good. 11 00:00:37,480 --> 00:00:38,499 Yeah, and for a lot of folks that 12 00:00:38,500 --> 00:00:39,899 don't know, you're a former police 13 00:00:39,900 --> 00:00:40,779 chief, you've been in law 14 00:00:40,780 --> 00:00:41,780 enforcement for? 15 00:00:42,880 --> 00:00:44,219 Um, now 40 years. 16 00:00:44,220 --> 00:00:46,059 40 years, wow. 17 00:00:46,060 --> 00:00:47,439 And give me a little snapshot of 18 00:00:47,440 --> 00:00:48,439 what made you go into law 19 00:00:48,440 --> 00:00:49,459 enforcement. What was it about law 20 00:00:49,460 --> 00:00:51,179 enforcement that made you say, I'd 21 00:00:51,180 --> 00:00:52,899 like to commit my life to that? 22 00:00:52,900 --> 00:00:54,779 Well, I originally started 23 00:00:54,780 --> 00:00:57,279 off into looking 24 00:00:57,280 --> 00:00:58,619 at being an attorney going into 25 00:00:58,620 --> 00:00:59,919 politics, but... 26 00:00:59,920 --> 00:01:00,780 That was too much work, huh? 27 00:01:00,781 --> 00:01:02,619 There's too much work 28 00:01:02,620 --> 00:01:05,219 and you know at UW-Milwaukee 29 00:01:05,220 --> 00:01:07,099 where I was going they had a really 30 00:01:07,100 --> 00:01:09,179 good criminal justice program and 31 00:01:09,180 --> 00:01:11,759 I just got really into 32 00:01:11,760 --> 00:01:14,039 you know protection, justice 33 00:01:14,040 --> 00:01:15,479 and understanding what those things 34 00:01:15,480 --> 00:01:17,319 meant and just connected with 35 00:01:17,320 --> 00:01:18,320 it. 36 00:01:18,830 --> 00:01:21,629 And so you knew you wanted to 37 00:01:21,630 --> 00:01:22,809 climb that ladder to get to the 38 00:01:22,810 --> 00:01:24,669 chief mode of things, or? 39 00:01:24,670 --> 00:01:26,569 About two years in, after being a 40 00:01:26,570 --> 00:01:28,329 police officer, said, if I leave 41 00:01:28,330 --> 00:01:30,369 this profession, I want to leave it 42 00:01:30,370 --> 00:01:32,769 at a minimum as a mid-manager. 43 00:01:32,770 --> 00:01:34,349 And that, in most departments, is a 44 00:01:34,350 --> 00:01:36,089 lieutenant or above. 45 00:01:36,090 --> 00:01:36,829 Yeah. 46 00:01:36,830 --> 00:01:39,049 I love asking people things like if 47 00:01:39,050 --> 00:01:40,869 you had a mission statement for the 48 00:01:40,870 --> 00:01:43,369 kind of work and the kind philosophy 49 00:01:43,370 --> 00:01:45,129 you carry with yourself as you do 50 00:01:45,130 --> 00:01:46,509 your profession, what would that for 51 00:01:46,510 --> 00:01:47,510 you, you think. 52 00:01:48,000 --> 00:01:50,019 My mission statement would 53 00:01:50,020 --> 00:01:52,099 be that we 54 00:01:52,100 --> 00:01:53,779 are here, here for people, 55 00:01:54,940 --> 00:01:56,659 and criminal justice and humanity 56 00:01:56,660 --> 00:01:58,399 are one and the same, and how do we 57 00:01:58,400 --> 00:01:59,909 make that work? 58 00:01:59,910 --> 00:02:01,429 And you've been retired now for how 59 00:02:01,430 --> 00:02:02,209 long? 60 00:02:02,210 --> 00:02:04,749 I've been retired now for about 12, 61 00:02:04,750 --> 00:02:05,509 13 years. 62 00:02:05,510 --> 00:02:07,549 I get the impression you worked just 63 00:02:07,550 --> 00:02:08,689 as much as you did when you were 64 00:02:08,690 --> 00:02:09,288 working. 65 00:02:09,289 --> 00:02:11,209 Why do you stay involved? 66 00:02:11,210 --> 00:02:13,889 I stay involved because it's 67 00:02:13,890 --> 00:02:15,789 part of my belief system. 68 00:02:15,790 --> 00:02:17,729 I still believe that I can have an 69 00:02:17,730 --> 00:02:20,609 impact on helping people 70 00:02:20,610 --> 00:02:22,529 see what police officers 71 00:02:22,530 --> 00:02:25,189 see. I had a unique perspective, 72 00:02:25,190 --> 00:02:27,049 not only unique perspective as a 73 00:02:27,050 --> 00:02:28,169 police officer, but a unique 74 00:02:28,170 --> 00:02:29,789 respective as an African-American 75 00:02:29,790 --> 00:02:30,629 male. 76 00:02:30,630 --> 00:02:32,429 And also I've been very close to the 77 00:02:32,430 --> 00:02:34,889 community. So bridging those two has 78 00:02:34,890 --> 00:02:36,559 been really. 79 00:02:36,560 --> 00:02:38,299 Really important in my life to 80 00:02:38,300 --> 00:02:40,359 ensure this continues. 81 00:02:40,360 --> 00:02:42,659 And one of the reasons I think you 82 00:02:42,660 --> 00:02:43,959 and I are sitting here now is 83 00:02:43,960 --> 00:02:45,539 because I bumped into you a few 84 00:02:45,540 --> 00:02:47,419 weeks ago when they opened up 85 00:02:47,420 --> 00:02:49,099 the center. 86 00:02:49,100 --> 00:02:50,100 The center. 87 00:02:50,840 --> 00:02:52,239 Just to give some context, we're at 88 00:02:52,240 --> 00:02:54,279 the Black Business Hub 89 00:02:54,280 --> 00:02:56,139 here on the Madison South Side 90 00:02:56,140 --> 00:02:58,039 and I know you've probably done 91 00:02:58,040 --> 00:02:59,019 all kinds of things in this 92 00:02:59,020 --> 00:02:59,669 building. 93 00:02:59,670 --> 00:03:01,889 Absolutely, on the board, 94 00:03:02,890 --> 00:03:05,249 also as 95 00:03:05,250 --> 00:03:07,169 another member of another board, the 96 00:03:07,170 --> 00:03:09,629 Rennebaum Foundation, we gave funds 97 00:03:09,630 --> 00:03:12,049 for this building. 98 00:03:12,050 --> 00:03:13,009 So this is important. 99 00:03:13,010 --> 00:03:15,149 I also worked as head 100 00:03:15,150 --> 00:03:17,329 of the Urban League, 101 00:03:17,330 --> 00:03:19,159 as interim CEO and vice president. 102 00:03:19,160 --> 00:03:20,349 You don't sound retired to me, man. 103 00:03:20,350 --> 00:03:21,689 No, no. 104 00:03:23,410 --> 00:03:24,709 But one of the things that we were 105 00:03:24,710 --> 00:03:26,369 talking, you were telling me about 106 00:03:26,370 --> 00:03:28,229 you have a fellowship with the 107 00:03:28,230 --> 00:03:29,329 Fellowship of Law Enforcement 108 00:03:29,330 --> 00:03:31,409 People, and 109 00:03:31,410 --> 00:03:32,629 I found it really interesting when 110 00:03:32,630 --> 00:03:34,669 you talked a little bit about kind 111 00:03:34,670 --> 00:03:36,589 of what you guys do and what the 112 00:03:36,590 --> 00:03:38,109 mission of that organization is. 113 00:03:38,110 --> 00:03:39,209 Why don't you tell us a little about 114 00:03:39,210 --> 00:03:39,739 that? 115 00:03:39,740 --> 00:03:41,579 Yeah, there's a fellowship 116 00:03:41,580 --> 00:03:43,519 that started two years ago, and it 117 00:03:43,520 --> 00:03:45,679 involved retired 118 00:03:45,680 --> 00:03:47,559 law enforcement executives, as 119 00:03:47,560 --> 00:03:49,539 well as people from the university 120 00:03:49,540 --> 00:03:51,919 community, as well current 121 00:03:51,920 --> 00:03:53,979 law enforcement professionals. 122 00:03:53,980 --> 00:03:55,919 And what we wanted to do 123 00:03:55,920 --> 00:03:58,459 was to look ahead, 124 00:03:58,460 --> 00:04:00,439 see what policing was going to 125 00:04:00,440 --> 00:04:02,319 be in 2030 and 126 00:04:02,320 --> 00:04:04,079 2050, because there are a number of 127 00:04:04,080 --> 00:04:05,599 changes taking place. 128 00:04:05,600 --> 00:04:07,319 One of the areas that we started to 129 00:04:07,320 --> 00:04:09,479 focus in on, was the area of 130 00:04:09,480 --> 00:04:11,159 technology, given that it has had 131 00:04:11,160 --> 00:04:13,059 such a major impact in our 132 00:04:13,060 --> 00:04:14,999 lives in so many different ways, 133 00:04:15,000 --> 00:04:17,088 but specifically in law enforcement. 134 00:04:17,089 --> 00:04:19,069 So when we say technology, are we 135 00:04:19,070 --> 00:04:20,849 speaking specifically to like AI 136 00:04:20,850 --> 00:04:21,929 technology? 137 00:04:21,930 --> 00:04:24,009 AI technology, it is 138 00:04:24,010 --> 00:04:26,049 impacting every aspect 139 00:04:26,050 --> 00:04:27,949 of policing, everything down 140 00:04:27,950 --> 00:04:30,029 to how police reports are 141 00:04:30,030 --> 00:04:32,009 done, how surveillance 142 00:04:32,010 --> 00:04:33,829 is done, things 143 00:04:33,830 --> 00:04:37,089 like body-worn cameras, 144 00:04:37,090 --> 00:04:39,089 facial recognition, 145 00:04:39,090 --> 00:04:40,989 to something as simple 146 00:04:40,990 --> 00:04:43,269 as, if you've got this information, 147 00:04:43,270 --> 00:04:44,729 how do you go to court? 148 00:04:44,730 --> 00:04:46,609 How do you explain this information 149 00:04:46,610 --> 00:04:47,409 in court? 150 00:04:47,410 --> 00:04:48,709 Do you have the subject matter 151 00:04:48,710 --> 00:04:50,209 experts? Where do you store it? 152 00:04:50,210 --> 00:04:51,899 Who has access to it. 153 00:04:51,900 --> 00:04:53,939 So this is kind of 154 00:04:53,940 --> 00:04:55,999 a quiet revolution that 155 00:04:56,000 --> 00:04:57,839 we feel that needs to be 156 00:04:57,840 --> 00:04:59,719 discussed more to make sure that 157 00:04:59,720 --> 00:05:01,539 the laws and justice are keeping 158 00:05:01,540 --> 00:05:03,369 up with the technology. 159 00:05:03,370 --> 00:05:04,709 And mission-wise, what would you say 160 00:05:04,710 --> 00:05:05,029 the mission? 161 00:05:05,030 --> 00:05:06,449 Here is, is it just simply to 162 00:05:06,450 --> 00:05:07,589 educate people? 163 00:05:07,590 --> 00:05:09,929 Our mission is to 164 00:05:09,930 --> 00:05:13,009 stimulate or be the catalyst for 165 00:05:13,010 --> 00:05:14,869 communities, both 166 00:05:14,870 --> 00:05:16,549 state, federal and local, to start 167 00:05:16,550 --> 00:05:18,449 thinking about this in a 168 00:05:18,450 --> 00:05:20,389 way where they can kind of shape 169 00:05:20,390 --> 00:05:22,829 how balancing 170 00:05:22,830 --> 00:05:24,989 on one side public 171 00:05:24,990 --> 00:05:26,889 safety and on the other side 172 00:05:26,890 --> 00:05:27,729 privacy. 173 00:05:27,730 --> 00:05:29,229 Because there's some major privacy 174 00:05:29,230 --> 00:05:31,989 concerns, major justice 175 00:05:31,990 --> 00:05:33,989 concerns. So the so our 176 00:05:33,990 --> 00:05:36,939 mission was to give guidance, 177 00:05:36,940 --> 00:05:39,579 start the conversation on guidance. 178 00:05:39,580 --> 00:05:41,359 What does it look like when you have 179 00:05:41,360 --> 00:05:43,179 technology in maintaining 180 00:05:43,180 --> 00:05:44,799 trust with the community? 181 00:05:44,800 --> 00:05:47,199 What does is look like when 182 00:05:47,200 --> 00:05:49,199 you, you 183 00:05:49,200 --> 00:05:51,219 have a license plate readers, 184 00:05:51,220 --> 00:05:53,259 for example, and 185 00:05:53,260 --> 00:05:55,419 do you use that 186 00:05:55,420 --> 00:05:56,839 technology for everyone? 187 00:05:56,840 --> 00:05:59,179 Do you use it on certain people? 188 00:05:59,180 --> 00:06:01,259 Do you predict through analysis 189 00:06:01,260 --> 00:06:02,919 and data where that's gonna go? 190 00:06:02,920 --> 00:06:05,269 Because there's always an impact. 191 00:06:05,270 --> 00:06:07,729 To any time we do something. 192 00:06:07,730 --> 00:06:09,649 And we also wanted to highlight the 193 00:06:09,650 --> 00:06:11,609 fact that even though a 194 00:06:11,610 --> 00:06:13,189 lot of this technology is not only 195 00:06:13,190 --> 00:06:15,169 being used in policing, 196 00:06:15,170 --> 00:06:17,529 but any time the government, 197 00:06:17,530 --> 00:06:19,549 any time that government uses this 198 00:06:19,550 --> 00:06:21,489 type of information, there are 199 00:06:21,490 --> 00:06:23,289 constitutional principles that must 200 00:06:23,290 --> 00:06:24,429 be upheld. 201 00:06:24,430 --> 00:06:26,229 One of which that we'll probably 202 00:06:26,230 --> 00:06:28,189 talk about more and more is 203 00:06:28,190 --> 00:06:30,329 the impact on the Fourth Amendment. 204 00:06:30,330 --> 00:06:31,929 Yeah, and the Fourth Amendment that 205 00:06:31,930 --> 00:06:33,869 deals with, help me out 206 00:06:33,870 --> 00:06:35,209 here. Unreasonable searching. 207 00:06:35,210 --> 00:06:36,210 That's right, searching. 208 00:06:38,290 --> 00:06:40,209 And when I think about, you 209 00:06:40,210 --> 00:06:41,709 know, the evolution of technology, 210 00:06:41,710 --> 00:06:42,869 and especially for a person like 211 00:06:42,870 --> 00:06:44,609 yourself who spent 40 years in this 212 00:06:44,610 --> 00:06:46,629 industry, it brings 213 00:06:46,630 --> 00:06:48,509 back, you, know, I think about 214 00:06:48,510 --> 00:06:50,049 the things that, you know, that I've 215 00:06:50,050 --> 00:06:51,789 seen just in my lifetime, your 216 00:06:51,790 --> 00:06:52,790 lifetime. 217 00:06:53,630 --> 00:06:55,989 I just kind of took some notes here. 218 00:06:55,990 --> 00:06:59,069 I've seen things on 219 00:06:59,070 --> 00:07:00,419 cuffing techniques. 220 00:07:00,420 --> 00:07:03,879 I've seen things on 221 00:07:03,880 --> 00:07:05,699 bulletproof vests, 222 00:07:05,700 --> 00:07:07,760 changing body cameras, 223 00:07:08,860 --> 00:07:10,619 license plate readers, 224 00:07:12,360 --> 00:07:14,779 facial recognition systems. 225 00:07:14,780 --> 00:07:16,159 What stands out to you in terms 226 00:07:16,160 --> 00:07:17,129 of... 227 00:07:17,130 --> 00:07:18,969 Well, when I started, things were 228 00:07:18,970 --> 00:07:20,929 a lot different back then. 229 00:07:20,930 --> 00:07:22,789 I mean, most 230 00:07:22,790 --> 00:07:24,089 police officers were using 231 00:07:24,090 --> 00:07:25,469 revolvers. 232 00:07:25,470 --> 00:07:27,909 You had to take your time and put 233 00:07:27,910 --> 00:07:29,969 the round in the 234 00:07:29,970 --> 00:07:30,970 gun. 235 00:07:32,409 --> 00:07:33,729 Like a musket, are you saying like a 236 00:07:33,730 --> 00:07:33,779 mutt? 237 00:07:33,780 --> 00:07:35,739 Like a musket. 238 00:07:35,740 --> 00:07:37,599 You know bulletproof vests were 239 00:07:37,600 --> 00:07:39,139 just coming into their own. 240 00:07:39,140 --> 00:07:41,199 Now what you see is 241 00:07:41,200 --> 00:07:43,299 you see vests 242 00:07:43,300 --> 00:07:45,259 that are worn on the exterior with 243 00:07:45,260 --> 00:07:47,459 all kinds of different things 244 00:07:47,460 --> 00:07:49,299 on it from from lights 245 00:07:49,300 --> 00:07:51,659 to maybe a second handgun 246 00:07:51,660 --> 00:07:53,519 to extra rounds and things like 247 00:07:53,520 --> 00:07:54,319 that. 248 00:07:54,320 --> 00:07:56,439 We didn't even have trauma plates. 249 00:07:56,440 --> 00:07:57,499 And a trauma plate was really 250 00:07:57,500 --> 00:07:59,339 important. A trauma plate 251 00:07:59,340 --> 00:08:01,679 is what is on a bulletproof 252 00:08:01,680 --> 00:08:03,619 vest that when the 253 00:08:03,620 --> 00:08:05,719 round hits the 254 00:08:05,720 --> 00:08:07,779 bulletproof vests that it reduces 255 00:08:07,780 --> 00:08:09,699 the damage to the heart 256 00:08:09,700 --> 00:08:11,899 because that's a major impact. 257 00:08:11,900 --> 00:08:13,239 We didn't even have those kind of 258 00:08:13,240 --> 00:08:15,079 things. Of course we 259 00:08:15,080 --> 00:08:16,879 didn't have the great uniforms. 260 00:08:16,880 --> 00:08:18,419 We're wearing polyester. 261 00:08:18,420 --> 00:08:20,999 Everyone had to wear, you 262 00:08:21,000 --> 00:08:23,339 know, the. Three, the 263 00:08:23,340 --> 00:08:25,239 police cap, there were no baseball 264 00:08:25,240 --> 00:08:26,839 caps, that was not allowed. 265 00:08:28,180 --> 00:08:30,539 And so it was, it almost, 266 00:08:30,540 --> 00:08:32,579 it's almost laughable now what 267 00:08:32,580 --> 00:08:34,918 we have available to us than 268 00:08:34,919 --> 00:08:36,798 what we do right 269 00:08:36,799 --> 00:08:37,319 now. 270 00:08:37,320 --> 00:08:38,639 Yeah, and those tools are really 271 00:08:38,640 --> 00:08:40,579 every time something comes out. 272 00:08:40,580 --> 00:08:42,658 I guess the whole idea is that 273 00:08:42,659 --> 00:08:44,559 it makes law 274 00:08:44,560 --> 00:08:46,079 enforcement and enforcing the laws 275 00:08:46,080 --> 00:08:47,289 easier. Is that the whole? 276 00:08:47,290 --> 00:08:49,269 The tool should make 277 00:08:49,270 --> 00:08:51,349 communities safer, law enforcement 278 00:08:51,350 --> 00:08:53,769 easier, but 279 00:08:53,770 --> 00:08:55,749 it still comes down to even 280 00:08:55,750 --> 00:08:57,649 back then, the tool that you 281 00:08:57,650 --> 00:08:59,769 used the most was 282 00:08:59,770 --> 00:09:01,929 a pad of paper and a pencil to 283 00:09:01,930 --> 00:09:03,509 get information. The tool that used 284 00:09:03,510 --> 00:09:05,349 the the most, was talking and 285 00:09:05,350 --> 00:09:06,909 engaging with citizens. 286 00:09:06,910 --> 00:09:08,069 That is transcended. 287 00:09:08,070 --> 00:09:09,989 That will never change. 288 00:09:09,990 --> 00:09:10,989 I was going to say, and do you think 289 00:09:10,990 --> 00:09:12,549 we've moved too far away from that 290 00:09:12,550 --> 00:09:13,819 because of technology? 291 00:09:13,820 --> 00:09:15,899 I think the risk is 292 00:09:15,900 --> 00:09:18,139 there and what 293 00:09:18,140 --> 00:09:19,959 I'm hoping is that 294 00:09:19,960 --> 00:09:22,059 we're starting to create awareness 295 00:09:22,060 --> 00:09:24,159 on that we don't lose 296 00:09:24,160 --> 00:09:24,959 those things. 297 00:09:24,960 --> 00:09:26,819 Things like building trust 298 00:09:26,820 --> 00:09:27,679 with the community. 299 00:09:27,680 --> 00:09:29,519 Things like, you know, are 300 00:09:29,520 --> 00:09:31,379 we operating in a bias and 301 00:09:31,380 --> 00:09:33,499 non-transparent manner? 302 00:09:33,500 --> 00:09:35,459 Are we listening to 303 00:09:35,460 --> 00:09:37,539 people when there are complaints? 304 00:09:37,540 --> 00:09:39,319 Those are some of the things that I 305 00:09:39,320 --> 00:09:41,519 hope that we lose the 306 00:09:41,520 --> 00:09:42,520 empathy for people. 307 00:09:43,589 --> 00:09:47,329 When you have technology, 308 00:09:47,330 --> 00:09:49,169 one of the things that you lose at 309 00:09:49,170 --> 00:09:50,989 times with technology is that it 310 00:09:50,990 --> 00:09:53,189 is an objective standard. 311 00:09:53,190 --> 00:09:55,829 You see the video, you see DNA, 312 00:09:55,830 --> 00:09:58,009 you know, you'll see things 313 00:09:58,010 --> 00:09:59,169 that are there. 314 00:10:00,450 --> 00:10:02,709 But in policing, 315 00:10:02,710 --> 00:10:05,389 subjectivity, discretion, humility, 316 00:10:05,390 --> 00:10:07,329 empathy, and trust, those 317 00:10:07,330 --> 00:10:09,429 are hallmarks that are 318 00:10:09,430 --> 00:10:11,429 in behind good policing in 319 00:10:11,430 --> 00:10:12,359 America. 320 00:10:12,360 --> 00:10:14,239 So then when I, you think about some 321 00:10:14,240 --> 00:10:15,339 of the things that you see out there 322 00:10:15,340 --> 00:10:17,439 now, especially with all the social 323 00:10:17,440 --> 00:10:19,499 media things that are out there, 324 00:10:19,500 --> 00:10:21,479 and you'll see things that 325 00:10:21,480 --> 00:10:23,220 are very easily manipulated, 326 00:10:24,360 --> 00:10:25,539 it almost to the point where you 327 00:10:25,540 --> 00:10:27,399 look at something and you have 328 00:10:27,400 --> 00:10:29,220 to ask yourself, is that real? 329 00:10:31,380 --> 00:10:33,259 It seems like there needs to be and 330 00:10:33,260 --> 00:10:35,039 should be some sort of a balance 331 00:10:35,040 --> 00:10:36,879 between the technology 332 00:10:36,880 --> 00:10:38,819 and the person that's managing 333 00:10:38,820 --> 00:10:40,239 that technology. 334 00:10:40,240 --> 00:10:41,919 How do you see that? 335 00:10:41,920 --> 00:10:43,939 This is something that 336 00:10:43,940 --> 00:10:46,059 I think communities, law enforcement 337 00:10:46,060 --> 00:10:49,179 need to get together on, 338 00:10:49,180 --> 00:10:51,059 as well as the 339 00:10:51,060 --> 00:10:53,200 manufacturers of technology. 340 00:10:54,380 --> 00:10:56,519 You can have 341 00:10:56,520 --> 00:10:59,119 video that 342 00:10:59,120 --> 00:11:00,979 will give a false negative. 343 00:11:00,980 --> 00:11:03,019 Still, we have not resolved 344 00:11:03,020 --> 00:11:05,399 this idea of 345 00:11:05,400 --> 00:11:07,519 women of color and small children. 346 00:11:07,520 --> 00:11:09,339 Showing a 347 00:11:09,340 --> 00:11:11,259 pretty good high percentage of false 348 00:11:11,260 --> 00:11:13,479 positives when we're 349 00:11:13,480 --> 00:11:15,039 looking at surveillance video, 350 00:11:15,040 --> 00:11:16,559 facial recognition. 351 00:11:16,560 --> 00:11:18,599 So those are some things that we 352 00:11:18,600 --> 00:11:20,439 should always be concerned 353 00:11:20,440 --> 00:11:21,309 about. 354 00:11:21,310 --> 00:11:22,709 What kind of thing would cause 355 00:11:22,710 --> 00:11:24,349 something like that to be happening, 356 00:11:24,350 --> 00:11:24,899 you think? 357 00:11:24,900 --> 00:11:27,539 It is 358 00:11:27,540 --> 00:11:29,399 the technology, and when you 359 00:11:29,400 --> 00:11:31,519 talk to the experts in the field, 360 00:11:31,520 --> 00:11:33,399 the ones that are, 361 00:11:33,400 --> 00:11:34,479 not only the experts on the field 362 00:11:34,480 --> 00:11:36,719 but the ones who are producing this, 363 00:11:36,720 --> 00:11:38,819 they have not resolved that. 364 00:11:38,820 --> 00:11:39,820 However, 365 00:11:40,740 --> 00:11:41,819 one of the things that you always 366 00:11:41,820 --> 00:11:43,939 have to be mindful of is 367 00:11:43,940 --> 00:11:45,899 that even the manufacturers, 368 00:11:45,900 --> 00:11:47,459 all human beings have implicit 369 00:11:47,460 --> 00:11:48,399 biases. 370 00:11:48,400 --> 00:11:50,239 So sometimes those implicit 371 00:11:50,240 --> 00:11:52,049 biases can come through through the 372 00:11:52,050 --> 00:11:53,429 manufacturer's work. 373 00:11:53,430 --> 00:11:55,029 Sometimes implicit biases can come 374 00:11:55,030 --> 00:11:56,989 through through how the 375 00:11:56,990 --> 00:11:58,869 technology is deployed. 376 00:11:58,870 --> 00:12:00,189 What's your simple way of how you 377 00:12:00,190 --> 00:12:01,909 would describe what an implicit bias 378 00:12:01,910 --> 00:12:02,869 is? Because I think some people 379 00:12:02,870 --> 00:12:04,549 don't understand what that is 380 00:12:04,550 --> 00:12:05,569 sometimes. 381 00:12:05,570 --> 00:12:07,929 This implicit bias is 382 00:12:07,930 --> 00:12:09,849 a bias that 383 00:12:09,850 --> 00:12:12,329 is not 384 00:12:12,330 --> 00:12:14,809 overt, it is not necessarily 385 00:12:14,810 --> 00:12:16,089 animus. 386 00:12:16,090 --> 00:12:17,909 It is those things that 387 00:12:17,910 --> 00:12:20,149 we do subconsciously 388 00:12:20,150 --> 00:12:22,229 that we may not 389 00:12:22,230 --> 00:12:24,189 be aware of, but it 390 00:12:24,190 --> 00:12:26,489 adversely affects our behavior, 391 00:12:26,490 --> 00:12:28,609 it adversly affects how we 392 00:12:28,610 --> 00:12:30,769 do things, how we make judgments, 393 00:12:30,770 --> 00:12:32,098 and how we. 394 00:12:32,099 --> 00:12:33,219 Perceive things. 395 00:12:33,220 --> 00:12:35,279 So that's how it impacts police. 396 00:12:35,280 --> 00:12:36,359 It's like a pre-judgment kind of 397 00:12:36,360 --> 00:12:37,839 thing? It's a pre judgment. 398 00:12:37,840 --> 00:12:39,999 It's it's a it's a pre judge of 399 00:12:40,000 --> 00:12:41,839 what we do and what we see. 400 00:12:41,840 --> 00:12:43,659 That person's overweight so that's. 401 00:12:43,660 --> 00:12:45,559 To eat a lot. And it's not true. 402 00:12:45,560 --> 00:12:46,779 Absolutely. 403 00:12:46,780 --> 00:12:48,979 And the 800 pound gorilla 404 00:12:48,980 --> 00:12:51,719 in the United States is 405 00:12:51,720 --> 00:12:53,819 implicit bias based 406 00:12:53,820 --> 00:12:55,019 upon race. 407 00:12:55,020 --> 00:12:56,239 That's the 800-pound gorilla. 408 00:12:56,240 --> 00:12:58,239 That's what everyone focuses on. 409 00:12:58,240 --> 00:13:00,399 But as you just mentioned, 410 00:13:00,400 --> 00:13:01,460 weight, age, 411 00:13:02,800 --> 00:13:04,699 language, height, all 412 00:13:04,700 --> 00:13:07,899 of those things we prejudge. 413 00:13:07,900 --> 00:13:10,359 And the one that we prejudged 414 00:13:10,360 --> 00:13:11,329 that we... 415 00:13:11,330 --> 00:13:13,409 We need to really get a handle on, 416 00:13:13,410 --> 00:13:15,029 and those are the social economic 417 00:13:15,030 --> 00:13:15,849 factors. 418 00:13:15,850 --> 00:13:17,529 Sometimes they cut across all of 419 00:13:17,530 --> 00:13:18,629 those categories. 420 00:13:18,630 --> 00:13:20,489 When we see someone that is 421 00:13:20,490 --> 00:13:22,689 homeless, looks destitute, 422 00:13:22,690 --> 00:13:24,809 we in the back of our minds 423 00:13:24,810 --> 00:13:26,969 develop a detachment. 424 00:13:26,970 --> 00:13:28,809 There are some telltale signs, 425 00:13:28,810 --> 00:13:30,929 some watch outs for implicit 426 00:13:30,930 --> 00:13:32,749 bias. One is if 427 00:13:32,750 --> 00:13:34,669 you start to see a 428 00:13:34,670 --> 00:13:36,709 group of people and thinking 429 00:13:36,710 --> 00:13:38,889 all of them do something 430 00:13:38,890 --> 00:13:40,109 a certain way. 431 00:13:40,110 --> 00:13:42,329 Or everyone does it this way. 432 00:13:42,330 --> 00:13:44,209 Those are things that you may 433 00:13:44,210 --> 00:13:46,489 wanna do a self-check because every 434 00:13:46,490 --> 00:13:47,869 human being is different. 435 00:13:47,870 --> 00:13:49,589 And when you start to include 436 00:13:49,590 --> 00:13:51,509 everyone and saying everyone does a 437 00:13:51,510 --> 00:13:53,569 certain way, that's when you become 438 00:13:53,570 --> 00:13:55,429 susceptible to 439 00:13:55,430 --> 00:13:56,809 treating people differently and 440 00:13:56,810 --> 00:13:58,549 prejudging. It sounds dangerous to 441 00:13:58,550 --> 00:14:00,029 policing, is it? 442 00:14:00,030 --> 00:14:01,329 It is dangerous. 443 00:14:01,330 --> 00:14:03,689 And it is dangerous because 444 00:14:03,690 --> 00:14:05,809 you can prejudge, I remember 445 00:14:05,810 --> 00:14:07,889 as a 446 00:14:07,890 --> 00:14:09,129 rookie cop. 447 00:14:09,130 --> 00:14:11,729 Pre-judging a situation where, 448 00:14:11,730 --> 00:14:14,249 because it was a female involved, 449 00:14:14,250 --> 00:14:16,349 I assume that 450 00:14:16,350 --> 00:14:17,969 she did not have a weapon, that she 451 00:14:17,970 --> 00:14:19,569 was not a threat. 452 00:14:19,570 --> 00:14:21,629 But I have run into encounters 453 00:14:21,630 --> 00:14:23,889 where a female was 454 00:14:23,890 --> 00:14:25,729 involved and they had a 455 00:14:25,730 --> 00:14:27,749 weapon and they were just as 456 00:14:27,750 --> 00:14:29,869 much of a threat, but I was pre- 457 00:14:29,870 --> 00:14:31,309 judging the situation and that 458 00:14:31,310 --> 00:14:33,029 placed me at danger. 459 00:14:33,030 --> 00:14:34,989 You have to evaluate 460 00:14:34,990 --> 00:14:36,829 the situation based upon what you 461 00:14:36,830 --> 00:14:39,469 have. That is called individualized 462 00:14:39,470 --> 00:14:41,569 suspicion and making sure 463 00:14:41,570 --> 00:14:43,809 that you're calculating place, 464 00:14:43,810 --> 00:14:45,869 size, manner, how the person 465 00:14:45,870 --> 00:14:47,129 deports themself, how they're 466 00:14:47,130 --> 00:14:49,029 looking at you, and always more 467 00:14:49,030 --> 00:14:51,039 importantly, where their hands are. 468 00:14:51,040 --> 00:14:52,999 Yeah, and when we talk 469 00:14:53,000 --> 00:14:54,819 about implicit bias in 470 00:14:54,820 --> 00:14:56,779 humans, is there 471 00:14:56,780 --> 00:14:58,019 such a thing when it comes to 472 00:14:58,020 --> 00:14:59,819 technology, especially AI technology 473 00:14:59,820 --> 00:15:01,159 and how it's being facilitated? 474 00:15:02,440 --> 00:15:04,259 Yes, in a number 475 00:15:04,260 --> 00:15:05,099 of different ways. 476 00:15:05,100 --> 00:15:07,099 One, implicit bias can come through 477 00:15:07,100 --> 00:15:08,959 in how it's deployed. 478 00:15:08,960 --> 00:15:10,839 Let me give you an example. 479 00:15:10,840 --> 00:15:13,079 If I start off and 480 00:15:13,080 --> 00:15:16,739 I deploy, say, 481 00:15:16,740 --> 00:15:18,839 cameras in an area that 482 00:15:18,840 --> 00:15:20,719 are license plate readers, 483 00:15:20,720 --> 00:15:22,959 and I deployed that based upon I've 484 00:15:22,960 --> 00:15:25,399 got information that there's 485 00:15:25,400 --> 00:15:26,859 a higher incidence of people 486 00:15:26,860 --> 00:15:28,859 violating certain things, 487 00:15:28,860 --> 00:15:31,239 that may be true at the beginning, 488 00:15:31,240 --> 00:15:32,209 okay? 489 00:15:32,210 --> 00:15:33,609 But if I don't come back and check 490 00:15:33,610 --> 00:15:35,489 that, that camera can 491 00:15:35,490 --> 00:15:37,089 start to produce a self-fulfilling 492 00:15:37,090 --> 00:15:38,949 prophecy because what will 493 00:15:38,950 --> 00:15:40,789 happen is that it will continue 494 00:15:40,790 --> 00:15:42,329 to see the same people. 495 00:15:42,330 --> 00:15:44,209 And that will continue even though 496 00:15:44,210 --> 00:15:46,089 it may have changed that that's 497 00:15:46,090 --> 00:15:47,789 not the highest area, the highest 498 00:15:47,790 --> 00:15:49,189 percentage of area, but because 499 00:15:49,190 --> 00:15:50,549 they're taking that information, 500 00:15:50,550 --> 00:15:52,389 we're looking at saying, oh, this is 501 00:15:52,390 --> 00:15:53,409 the highest percent. 502 00:15:53,410 --> 00:15:55,789 The other way that it can 503 00:15:55,790 --> 00:15:57,769 become an 504 00:15:57,770 --> 00:16:00,129 implicit bias is 505 00:16:00,130 --> 00:16:02,369 is how it is designed. 506 00:16:02,370 --> 00:16:04,689 What is it designed to pick up on? 507 00:16:04,690 --> 00:16:06,649 What are the features and 508 00:16:06,650 --> 00:16:08,449 what are the locations and what of 509 00:16:08,450 --> 00:16:10,469 the things that it is design 510 00:16:10,470 --> 00:16:11,470 to do? 511 00:16:12,230 --> 00:16:13,949 That gets a bit complicated and I 512 00:16:13,950 --> 00:16:15,369 don't know if I can get into it in 513 00:16:15,370 --> 00:16:17,789 this particular 514 00:16:17,790 --> 00:16:18,790 moment. 515 00:16:19,270 --> 00:16:21,189 But again, highlighting one 516 00:16:21,190 --> 00:16:23,089 of the telltale signs is anytime 517 00:16:23,090 --> 00:16:25,409 there is like a predictive 518 00:16:25,410 --> 00:16:27,229 analysis that takes place 519 00:16:27,230 --> 00:16:29,109 before it is deployed. 520 00:16:29,110 --> 00:16:30,949 That's when you should start taking 521 00:16:30,950 --> 00:16:33,229 a closer look at is 522 00:16:33,230 --> 00:16:34,329 there a bias inherent? 523 00:16:34,330 --> 00:16:36,489 Because that's when discretion is 524 00:16:36,490 --> 00:16:38,329 used. Human discretion, as 525 00:16:38,330 --> 00:16:40,369 always, opens up human 526 00:16:40,370 --> 00:16:40,739 error. 527 00:16:40,740 --> 00:16:41,999 Yeah, I can't resist this. 528 00:16:42,000 --> 00:16:43,599 But you and I joked earlier before 529 00:16:43,600 --> 00:16:44,639 we kind of began this interview 530 00:16:44,640 --> 00:16:46,399 about the red cup. 531 00:16:46,400 --> 00:16:48,399 And I told you 532 00:16:48,400 --> 00:16:49,639 a story about me going to a badger 533 00:16:49,640 --> 00:16:51,379 game when I first moved here, and I 534 00:16:51,380 --> 00:16:53,339 had water in my red cup, 535 00:16:53,340 --> 00:16:54,959 and the police officer made me put 536 00:16:54,960 --> 00:16:57,599 it out because they assumed that 537 00:16:57,600 --> 00:16:59,699 it might be liquor in there. 538 00:16:59,700 --> 00:17:01,579 Is that an implicit bias? 539 00:17:01,580 --> 00:17:02,859 The fact that I have a red cup that 540 00:17:02,860 --> 00:17:04,338 there is something in there other 541 00:17:04,339 --> 00:17:05,339 than water? 542 00:17:06,130 --> 00:17:08,169 That implicit bias can come 543 00:17:08,170 --> 00:17:10,549 in so many ways, and I'll 544 00:17:10,550 --> 00:17:12,108 say the reason why it's complicated. 545 00:17:12,109 --> 00:17:14,149 One is, why did they select you? 546 00:17:14,150 --> 00:17:16,929 Two, to even ask you that question. 547 00:17:16,930 --> 00:17:19,588 Just because a cup is red, there's 548 00:17:19,589 --> 00:17:21,409 no reason to believe, 549 00:17:21,410 --> 00:17:23,368 there is not a 100% reason to 550 00:17:23,369 --> 00:17:25,209 believe that. But if someone is 551 00:17:25,210 --> 00:17:27,328 operating on this principle 552 00:17:27,329 --> 00:17:29,589 that any and all people 553 00:17:29,590 --> 00:17:31,449 with red cups have liquor 554 00:17:31,450 --> 00:17:33,569 in it, they have prejudged 555 00:17:33,570 --> 00:17:34,839 the situation. That's what I felt. 556 00:17:34,840 --> 00:17:36,899 So, that 557 00:17:36,900 --> 00:17:39,779 leads to 558 00:17:39,780 --> 00:17:41,160 problematic policing. 559 00:17:43,000 --> 00:17:44,939 And so what we would ask that police 560 00:17:44,940 --> 00:17:47,519 officer to do is 561 00:17:47,520 --> 00:17:49,779 review what they do, 562 00:17:49,780 --> 00:17:51,300 ask themselves some questions. 563 00:17:53,500 --> 00:17:55,479 But for this person 564 00:17:55,480 --> 00:17:57,359 having the red cup, would I have 565 00:17:57,360 --> 00:17:58,879 contacted them? 566 00:17:58,880 --> 00:18:01,439 But for believing that 567 00:18:01,440 --> 00:18:03,999 every person with a red cup has 568 00:18:04,000 --> 00:18:06,159 liquor in it, 569 00:18:06,160 --> 00:18:08,199 would I had done what 570 00:18:08,200 --> 00:18:10,179 I did and would I've 571 00:18:10,180 --> 00:18:11,999 contacted this 572 00:18:12,000 --> 00:18:14,259 person? Those are the questions that 573 00:18:14,260 --> 00:18:16,219 we can do it. There are good people. 574 00:18:16,220 --> 00:18:17,779 All people have implicit biases. 575 00:18:17,780 --> 00:18:18,839 There are people. People. 576 00:18:18,840 --> 00:18:20,779 The thing is we are 577 00:18:20,780 --> 00:18:22,609 bound to 578 00:18:22,610 --> 00:18:24,829 to provide service in 579 00:18:24,830 --> 00:18:27,029 a fair and impartial manner. 580 00:18:27,030 --> 00:18:28,889 So that's the difference between 581 00:18:28,890 --> 00:18:30,589 a police officer or someone in 582 00:18:30,590 --> 00:18:31,809 government and just an everyday 583 00:18:31,810 --> 00:18:32,689 person. 584 00:18:32,690 --> 00:18:34,509 Because I have the right 585 00:18:34,510 --> 00:18:36,669 to take away your freedom as 586 00:18:36,670 --> 00:18:37,789 a police office. 587 00:18:37,790 --> 00:18:39,769 Because I can use force up 588 00:18:39,770 --> 00:18:41,669 to including, physical force 589 00:18:41,670 --> 00:18:43,629 up including, 590 00:18:43,630 --> 00:18:45,529 unfortunately, the potential 591 00:18:45,530 --> 00:18:47,009 of taking your life. 592 00:18:47,010 --> 00:18:50,089 I have that constitutional, 593 00:18:50,090 --> 00:18:52,189 that burden of being, 594 00:18:52,190 --> 00:18:55,349 and it's not a burden, it is what we 595 00:18:55,350 --> 00:18:57,009 take that oath for, 596 00:18:58,230 --> 00:19:00,229 to do it in a way 597 00:19:00,230 --> 00:19:02,209 where I'm a guardian of 598 00:19:02,210 --> 00:19:04,109 democracy and not trying 599 00:19:04,110 --> 00:19:06,549 to get away with something, 600 00:19:06,550 --> 00:19:08,869 or trying to be overbearing 601 00:19:08,870 --> 00:19:10,789 and tyrannical on those things. 602 00:19:10,790 --> 00:19:12,909 It's an awesome power, 603 00:19:12,910 --> 00:19:15,209 but it's only awesome 604 00:19:15,210 --> 00:19:16,210 when it's used correct. 605 00:19:17,220 --> 00:19:19,319 And you talked about license 606 00:19:19,320 --> 00:19:21,159 plate readers, tools 607 00:19:21,160 --> 00:19:22,619 that are used to kind of gather 608 00:19:22,620 --> 00:19:23,620 information. 609 00:19:25,060 --> 00:19:26,499 And during our pre-interview, you 610 00:19:26,500 --> 00:19:28,339 know, I learned about 611 00:19:28,340 --> 00:19:30,319 this technique 612 00:19:30,320 --> 00:19:32,499 of called, is it 613 00:19:32,500 --> 00:19:33,459 the flocking? 614 00:19:33,460 --> 00:19:34,479 Flock. 615 00:19:34,480 --> 00:19:36,029 Explain what that is. 616 00:19:36,030 --> 00:19:37,969 A plot camera is a camera that is 617 00:19:37,970 --> 00:19:41,029 deployed in certain parts of 618 00:19:41,030 --> 00:19:42,869 a particular geographic area 619 00:19:42,870 --> 00:19:45,209 and what it does is 620 00:19:45,210 --> 00:19:47,249 it picks up information and it goes 621 00:19:47,250 --> 00:19:48,949 back to a certain point. 622 00:19:48,950 --> 00:19:51,489 Many times it's a command center and 623 00:19:51,490 --> 00:19:53,429 what is does is reads license 624 00:19:53,430 --> 00:19:55,369 plates, it reads information about 625 00:19:55,370 --> 00:19:57,429 it and depending upon the technology 626 00:19:57,430 --> 00:19:59,249 they're starting to be able to 627 00:19:59,250 --> 00:20:01,169 pick up and extract more 628 00:20:01,170 --> 00:20:03,029 information from that. 629 00:20:03,030 --> 00:20:05,109 But... 630 00:20:05,110 --> 00:20:07,309 It can pick up 631 00:20:07,310 --> 00:20:09,269 by reading a plate, 632 00:20:09,270 --> 00:20:11,989 does this person have a violation? 633 00:20:11,990 --> 00:20:14,249 Has this person been previously, 634 00:20:14,250 --> 00:20:16,769 I mean, does this have 635 00:20:16,770 --> 00:20:18,629 warrants out for their arrest? 636 00:20:18,630 --> 00:20:20,649 All of that type of information is 637 00:20:20,650 --> 00:20:22,669 there. So the question with flock 638 00:20:22,670 --> 00:20:24,529 cameras really comes down 639 00:20:24,530 --> 00:20:25,729 to this. 640 00:20:25,730 --> 00:20:27,549 Are they there to be 641 00:20:27,550 --> 00:20:29,509 used after the 642 00:20:29,510 --> 00:20:31,389 fact when we say 643 00:20:31,390 --> 00:20:32,489 a crime was committed? 644 00:20:32,490 --> 00:20:34,469 Then they come back and they look at 645 00:20:34,470 --> 00:20:35,249 it and say... 646 00:20:35,250 --> 00:20:37,189 Yeah, this person was 647 00:20:37,190 --> 00:20:39,329 driving in this area at 648 00:20:39,330 --> 00:20:40,769 this particular time. 649 00:20:40,770 --> 00:20:42,489 This is when the crime was 650 00:20:42,490 --> 00:20:43,669 committed. 651 00:20:43,670 --> 00:20:46,089 I think people probably 652 00:20:46,090 --> 00:20:48,169 have a better feel 653 00:20:48,170 --> 00:20:50,449 for that. It's just like the 654 00:20:50,450 --> 00:20:53,049 bombing incident 655 00:20:53,050 --> 00:20:54,869 in 656 00:20:54,870 --> 00:20:56,849 Boston with the marathon. 657 00:20:56,850 --> 00:20:58,249 They went back and they start 658 00:20:58,250 --> 00:21:00,089 checking the cameras and they could 659 00:21:00,090 --> 00:21:01,529 start to piece together things. 660 00:21:01,530 --> 00:21:03,469 I think most citizens 661 00:21:03,470 --> 00:21:05,419 understand that use. 662 00:21:05,420 --> 00:21:07,559 Where it becomes a question 663 00:21:07,560 --> 00:21:09,439 is proactively how 664 00:21:09,440 --> 00:21:10,779 it is used. 665 00:21:10,780 --> 00:21:12,859 So if I'm using this information and 666 00:21:12,860 --> 00:21:14,719 then I act on it, 667 00:21:14,720 --> 00:21:16,659 even if you have not 668 00:21:16,660 --> 00:21:18,659 committed a crime right then 669 00:21:18,660 --> 00:21:20,559 and there, I go knock on your 670 00:21:20,560 --> 00:21:22,439 door and say, hey, you came through 671 00:21:22,440 --> 00:21:24,559 this intersection at 672 00:21:24,560 --> 00:21:25,839 such and such date and time. 673 00:21:25,840 --> 00:21:27,359 This is a potential. 674 00:21:27,360 --> 00:21:29,059 And based upon the information we 675 00:21:29,060 --> 00:21:30,939 have, you have a warrant for your 676 00:21:30,940 --> 00:21:31,799 arrest. 677 00:21:31,800 --> 00:21:34,289 So people ask those questions or 678 00:21:34,290 --> 00:21:36,409 You were here 679 00:21:36,410 --> 00:21:38,689 and you're being surveilled 680 00:21:38,690 --> 00:21:40,529 now. People complain about 681 00:21:40,530 --> 00:21:42,449 the issues of privacy. 682 00:21:42,450 --> 00:21:43,589 And what's done with that 683 00:21:43,590 --> 00:21:44,889 information once it's gathered, what 684 00:21:44,890 --> 00:21:45,839 happens to it at that 685 00:21:45,840 --> 00:21:48,479 That's, that's another issue. 686 00:21:48,480 --> 00:21:50,759 In the, in, in most states, 687 00:21:52,620 --> 00:21:54,479 information has been historically 688 00:21:54,480 --> 00:21:56,399 treated in their laws that 689 00:21:56,400 --> 00:21:58,299 govern. How long you can maintain a 690 00:21:58,300 --> 00:22:00,019 record. Where does the information 691 00:22:00,020 --> 00:22:02,059 go? Who has access to 692 00:22:02,060 --> 00:22:03,899 it? So one of 693 00:22:03,900 --> 00:22:05,699 the other concerns that communities 694 00:22:05,700 --> 00:22:07,699 need to wrestle with is that 695 00:22:07,700 --> 00:22:09,599 if, if a third 696 00:22:09,600 --> 00:22:11,899 party has data and information 697 00:22:11,900 --> 00:22:13,839 and if the government has access 698 00:22:13,840 --> 00:22:15,659 to that. Have they made 699 00:22:15,660 --> 00:22:17,599 that third party become a de 700 00:22:17,600 --> 00:22:20,099 facto part of the government because 701 00:22:20,100 --> 00:22:22,619 they're accessing their information? 702 00:22:22,620 --> 00:22:24,779 But where is that stored? 703 00:22:24,780 --> 00:22:26,299 What information do they have on 704 00:22:26,300 --> 00:22:28,499 you? Don't you have a right to 705 00:22:28,500 --> 00:22:30,359 know what your government has 706 00:22:30,360 --> 00:22:32,219 on you?" These are questions 707 00:22:32,220 --> 00:22:34,159 that communities really do need to 708 00:22:34,160 --> 00:22:34,669 wrestle with. 709 00:22:34,670 --> 00:22:36,909 Yeah, and we know that some 710 00:22:36,910 --> 00:22:39,289 law enforcement agencies, 711 00:22:39,290 --> 00:22:40,829 departments around the state have 712 00:22:40,830 --> 00:22:42,989 been moving away from that system. 713 00:22:42,990 --> 00:22:43,909 Why do you think it's so 714 00:22:43,910 --> 00:22:46,009 controversial, and why would they 715 00:22:46,010 --> 00:22:47,499 move away from it, you think? 716 00:22:47,500 --> 00:22:49,839 I think, first 717 00:22:49,840 --> 00:22:51,959 of all, I think it was 718 00:22:51,960 --> 00:22:53,899 developed, in many 719 00:22:53,900 --> 00:22:55,859 instances, to 720 00:22:55,860 --> 00:22:57,919 improve public safety. 721 00:22:57,920 --> 00:22:59,379 I'm not going to conclude that that 722 00:22:59,380 --> 00:23:01,199 was not the reason. 723 00:23:01,200 --> 00:23:03,359 But I think 724 00:23:03,360 --> 00:23:05,259 that right now, we're 725 00:23:05,260 --> 00:23:07,259 behind the curve. 726 00:23:07,260 --> 00:23:09,359 We are behind the curves because 727 00:23:09,360 --> 00:23:11,219 we have not, 728 00:23:11,220 --> 00:23:13,439 as a community, 729 00:23:13,440 --> 00:23:15,359 provided what they 730 00:23:15,360 --> 00:23:16,789 should be used for. 731 00:23:16,790 --> 00:23:18,569 What are the standards? 732 00:23:18,570 --> 00:23:21,009 What are standards of privacy that 733 00:23:21,010 --> 00:23:23,209 that community accepts? 734 00:23:23,210 --> 00:23:25,109 How should the police department 735 00:23:25,110 --> 00:23:25,909 use it? 736 00:23:25,910 --> 00:23:27,669 Some communities have gone and what 737 00:23:27,670 --> 00:23:29,509 they've done is that they've pulled 738 00:23:29,510 --> 00:23:31,529 together stakeholders and 739 00:23:31,530 --> 00:23:33,389 they've discussed from 740 00:23:33,390 --> 00:23:35,189 every branch. 741 00:23:35,190 --> 00:23:37,109 They've pulled people that 742 00:23:37,110 --> 00:23:39,129 are community 743 00:23:39,130 --> 00:23:40,969 members, civil liberties, 744 00:23:40,970 --> 00:23:42,629 they've pull together people that 745 00:23:42,630 --> 00:23:44,529 are subject matter experts, the 746 00:23:44,530 --> 00:23:46,349 manufacturers, and they have come 747 00:23:46,350 --> 00:23:48,859 up with. Some broad guidelines, 748 00:23:48,860 --> 00:23:50,679 and then the community starts 749 00:23:50,680 --> 00:23:52,559 to lay out for 750 00:23:52,560 --> 00:23:54,479 law enforcement, here's 751 00:23:54,480 --> 00:23:56,059 some policies, here are some 752 00:23:56,060 --> 00:23:58,219 procedures, here is some ordinances 753 00:23:58,220 --> 00:24:00,139 that we think would work, and they 754 00:24:00,140 --> 00:24:02,939 all have to be constantly improved. 755 00:24:02,940 --> 00:24:04,999 But right now, we're behind the 756 00:24:05,000 --> 00:24:06,759 eight ball because we have not done 757 00:24:06,760 --> 00:24:08,979 that. And so we're 758 00:24:08,980 --> 00:24:11,039 reaching for this technology before 759 00:24:11,040 --> 00:24:13,059 we know its total impact, 760 00:24:13,060 --> 00:24:14,899 and we're before we know the 761 00:24:14,900 --> 00:24:15,939 total impact. 762 00:24:15,940 --> 00:24:17,799 One of the numbers I heard, 763 00:24:17,800 --> 00:24:18,919 don't quote me, 764 00:24:20,120 --> 00:24:22,339 but I went to a seminar last summer 765 00:24:22,340 --> 00:24:24,479 and talked about AI and 766 00:24:24,480 --> 00:24:26,379 how it was being used and I 767 00:24:26,380 --> 00:24:27,919 think at that time they were saying 768 00:24:27,920 --> 00:24:29,979 that it's 769 00:24:29,980 --> 00:24:32,619 only correct 80% of the time. 770 00:24:32,620 --> 00:24:33,959 And so is it okay for something 771 00:24:33,960 --> 00:24:36,199 that's wrong 20% 772 00:24:36,200 --> 00:24:38,079 of time, is it ok 773 00:24:38,080 --> 00:24:39,299 to use that as a tool? 774 00:24:42,350 --> 00:24:44,249 How do you weigh the value 775 00:24:44,250 --> 00:24:46,349 it brings in terms of 776 00:24:46,350 --> 00:24:47,789 what it brings to law enforcement 777 00:24:47,790 --> 00:24:49,109 versus 778 00:24:51,230 --> 00:24:53,209 the problem it creates 779 00:24:53,210 --> 00:24:55,989 from it being used improperly 780 00:24:55,990 --> 00:24:57,540 by the humans that control it? 781 00:24:59,510 --> 00:25:01,289 It's a very complex question, but a 782 00:25:01,290 --> 00:25:02,769 good one. 783 00:25:02,770 --> 00:25:04,449 So I gave the example of a fly 784 00:25:04,450 --> 00:25:06,289 camera. If someone is 785 00:25:06,290 --> 00:25:07,809 wanted for murder, you want that 786 00:25:07,810 --> 00:25:08,729 person off the street. 787 00:25:08,730 --> 00:25:10,109 You want that fly camera to be able 788 00:25:10,110 --> 00:25:10,989 to pick that up. 789 00:25:10,990 --> 00:25:12,589 But let me give you an example that 790 00:25:12,590 --> 00:25:14,389 happens every day. 791 00:25:14,390 --> 00:25:16,509 One, if you are under, 792 00:25:16,510 --> 00:25:18,929 if you go to go 793 00:25:18,930 --> 00:25:21,549 on a cruise ship, your picture is 794 00:25:21,550 --> 00:25:23,329 taken, okay? 795 00:25:23,330 --> 00:25:25,209 And that could be used in other 796 00:25:25,210 --> 00:25:25,991 ways. Government could use it. 797 00:25:25,992 --> 00:25:26,969 And do you think most people... 798 00:25:26,970 --> 00:25:28,029 Soon and understand. 799 00:25:28,030 --> 00:25:29,409 And that's happening wherever they 800 00:25:29,410 --> 00:25:30,669 go now? No, they don't. 801 00:25:30,670 --> 00:25:32,529 They don't, I 802 00:25:32,530 --> 00:25:34,229 don't think they understand that the 803 00:25:34,230 --> 00:25:37,069 government can, at times, 804 00:25:37,070 --> 00:25:39,849 they can decide to subpoena that, 805 00:25:39,850 --> 00:25:41,729 that private entity could 806 00:25:41,730 --> 00:25:43,249 decide to give it to them. 807 00:25:43,250 --> 00:25:44,469 They don't know that. 808 00:25:44,470 --> 00:25:47,509 But that, to me, 809 00:25:47,510 --> 00:25:49,849 can be more problematic. 810 00:25:49,850 --> 00:25:51,629 However, in answering to your 811 00:25:51,630 --> 00:25:53,669 question, sometimes it's 812 00:25:53,670 --> 00:25:54,729 situational. 813 00:25:54,730 --> 00:25:56,569 They do the same thing in many 814 00:25:56,570 --> 00:25:57,809 instances if you get on a flight. 815 00:25:58,830 --> 00:26:01,109 But because the risk of 816 00:26:01,110 --> 00:26:02,629 a person getting on that flight and 817 00:26:02,630 --> 00:26:04,029 that plane coming down, if that 818 00:26:04,030 --> 00:26:06,389 person takes that plane down, 819 00:26:06,390 --> 00:26:08,389 you're willing to take more of a 820 00:26:08,390 --> 00:26:09,269 risk. 821 00:26:09,270 --> 00:26:11,229 You're willing give up more of your 822 00:26:11,230 --> 00:26:13,069 privacy if the 823 00:26:13,070 --> 00:26:15,709 risk is higher or if it's 824 00:26:15,710 --> 00:26:17,989 effective and it's important to 825 00:26:17,990 --> 00:26:18,949 save lives. 826 00:26:18,950 --> 00:26:21,029 If it's not doing those things, 827 00:26:21,030 --> 00:26:22,909 you're going, well, why am I giving 828 00:26:22,910 --> 00:26:24,899 up my privacy just for this? 829 00:26:24,900 --> 00:26:26,799 So those are 830 00:26:26,800 --> 00:26:28,479 some of the things that we have to 831 00:26:28,480 --> 00:26:29,379 balance. 832 00:26:29,380 --> 00:26:30,599 You know, are we just doing it 833 00:26:30,600 --> 00:26:32,659 because it's convenient for a 834 00:26:32,660 --> 00:26:34,579 particular industry or convenient 835 00:26:34,580 --> 00:26:35,580 for police? 836 00:26:37,060 --> 00:26:38,299 So that's one. 837 00:26:38,300 --> 00:26:39,879 One of the thing I do want to 838 00:26:39,880 --> 00:26:41,779 mention that I 839 00:26:41,780 --> 00:26:43,599 think really quickly is 840 00:26:43,600 --> 00:26:45,439 there is an economics to 841 00:26:45,440 --> 00:26:47,339 this that is important 842 00:26:47,340 --> 00:26:48,480 for people to understand. 843 00:26:50,020 --> 00:26:51,999 There are agencies now 844 00:26:52,000 --> 00:26:53,869 that are sending calls 845 00:26:53,870 --> 00:26:56,029 sending drones to calls to 846 00:26:56,030 --> 00:26:58,029 assess the situation. 847 00:26:58,030 --> 00:26:59,889 Okay? And then once they 848 00:26:59,890 --> 00:27:02,389 assess it, they may decide to 849 00:27:02,390 --> 00:27:04,249 deploy police or- Isn't 850 00:27:04,250 --> 00:27:05,449 that safer? 851 00:27:05,450 --> 00:27:07,509 It can be. 852 00:27:07,510 --> 00:27:09,529 And all of these have very 853 00:27:09,530 --> 00:27:10,869 positive impacts. 854 00:27:10,870 --> 00:27:12,729 That's why it needs that 855 00:27:12,730 --> 00:27:14,229 scrutiny. 856 00:27:14,230 --> 00:27:16,069 However, you flip that 857 00:27:16,070 --> 00:27:18,089 over and do 858 00:27:18,090 --> 00:27:20,629 you start to say, 859 00:27:20,630 --> 00:27:21,890 well, it's cheaper. 860 00:27:22,950 --> 00:27:24,869 To have the drone do it, 861 00:27:24,870 --> 00:27:26,909 than to have police officers 862 00:27:26,910 --> 00:27:30,829 who have to pay insurance, 863 00:27:30,830 --> 00:27:32,729 salary, benefits, and all those 864 00:27:32,730 --> 00:27:33,669 other things. 865 00:27:33,670 --> 00:27:35,529 Now, those are major questions 866 00:27:35,530 --> 00:27:37,369 because we have grown accustomed 867 00:27:37,370 --> 00:27:39,329 to having human beings, and 868 00:27:39,330 --> 00:27:41,809 it should always be making decisions 869 00:27:41,810 --> 00:27:43,749 about arrest, who gets 870 00:27:43,750 --> 00:27:44,750 the citation, 871 00:27:46,150 --> 00:27:47,909 what are the mitigating 872 00:27:47,910 --> 00:27:48,899 circumstances? 873 00:27:48,900 --> 00:27:50,359 I want to know which one's going to 874 00:27:50,360 --> 00:27:52,099 give me the best intelligence. 875 00:27:53,160 --> 00:27:55,899 You may want to know 876 00:27:55,900 --> 00:27:57,059 who's going to give you the best 877 00:27:57,060 --> 00:27:58,959 intelligence, and I believe it's a 878 00:27:58,960 --> 00:27:59,960 police officer. 879 00:28:00,920 --> 00:28:02,879 The technology will give you that 880 00:28:02,880 --> 00:28:04,859 information, but the 881 00:28:04,860 --> 00:28:06,939 police officer will add those 882 00:28:06,940 --> 00:28:09,399 things that you can't 883 00:28:09,400 --> 00:28:11,309 ever add with that, you know. 884 00:28:11,310 --> 00:28:13,229 Yeah, but can a drone talk 885 00:28:13,230 --> 00:28:15,429 a person down from 886 00:28:15,430 --> 00:28:17,629 a hostage situation or 887 00:28:17,630 --> 00:28:19,889 whatever that circumstance 888 00:28:19,890 --> 00:28:21,309 is? I mean, there just has to be a 889 00:28:21,310 --> 00:28:21,710 human implement, right? 890 00:28:21,711 --> 00:28:23,639 There has to be a human element 891 00:28:23,640 --> 00:28:25,679 to be able to do those 892 00:28:25,680 --> 00:28:27,079 things. There has been a human 893 00:28:27,080 --> 00:28:29,559 elements to understand 894 00:28:29,560 --> 00:28:32,039 the context, to understand 895 00:28:32,040 --> 00:28:33,619 that human being, where they're 896 00:28:33,620 --> 00:28:35,419 coming from, to understanding a 897 00:28:35,420 --> 00:28:36,559 particular area. 898 00:28:36,560 --> 00:28:38,399 You can have someone, 899 00:28:38,400 --> 00:28:40,139 you can have people violating park 900 00:28:40,140 --> 00:28:42,379 laws every night and that drone 901 00:28:42,380 --> 00:28:43,979 will pick up on it and they'll say, 902 00:28:43,980 --> 00:28:45,119 this is a problem, you're violating 903 00:28:45,120 --> 00:28:47,179 that. What they may not know 904 00:28:47,180 --> 00:28:49,079 is that a 905 00:28:49,080 --> 00:28:50,539 store may have closed and this may 906 00:28:50,540 --> 00:28:52,639 be the only drug store 907 00:28:52,640 --> 00:28:54,359 open at night and people are 908 00:28:54,360 --> 00:28:55,779 violating that just to get to that 909 00:28:55,780 --> 00:28:56,779 drug store. 910 00:28:56,780 --> 00:28:58,639 So you do need 911 00:28:58,640 --> 00:29:00,539 human beings to assess 912 00:29:00,540 --> 00:29:02,919 these things because just 913 00:29:02,920 --> 00:29:05,079 because something is 914 00:29:05,080 --> 00:29:07,299 wrong, the criminal justice system 915 00:29:07,300 --> 00:29:09,439 may not always be the 916 00:29:09,440 --> 00:29:11,619 correct way to deal with it. 917 00:29:11,620 --> 00:29:13,359 And it takes judgment. 918 00:29:13,360 --> 00:29:14,959 That's why. 919 00:29:14,960 --> 00:29:17,299 That's why justice is 920 00:29:17,300 --> 00:29:19,519 not blind. Justice is blindfolded. 921 00:29:19,520 --> 00:29:21,419 That means that human beings 922 00:29:21,420 --> 00:29:23,379 have to do things to be 923 00:29:23,380 --> 00:29:25,719 able to make sure that justice is 924 00:29:25,720 --> 00:29:27,759 meted out in an equal and 925 00:29:27,760 --> 00:29:28,760 fair way. 926 00:29:29,660 --> 00:29:31,559 So that's why Lady Justice has 927 00:29:31,560 --> 00:29:33,439 that. That's the balance is there. 928 00:29:33,440 --> 00:29:35,299 You have to balance the scale with 929 00:29:35,300 --> 00:29:36,099 empathy. 930 00:29:36,100 --> 00:29:37,439 You have the balance of scale with a 931 00:29:37,440 --> 00:29:39,359 whole host of issues that 932 00:29:39,360 --> 00:29:40,959 someone is surrounded with. 933 00:29:40,960 --> 00:29:43,939 These are things technology can't 934 00:29:43,940 --> 00:29:46,129 do. And I don't think 935 00:29:46,130 --> 00:29:48,029 that we want a 936 00:29:48,030 --> 00:29:50,369 world right now where technology 937 00:29:50,370 --> 00:29:52,049 is making those decisions, just like 938 00:29:52,050 --> 00:29:54,009 no one wants a world that we're 939 00:29:54,010 --> 00:29:55,819 constantly being surveilled. 940 00:29:55,820 --> 00:29:57,699 Yeah, and speaking of the human 941 00:29:57,700 --> 00:29:59,519 influence on things, 942 00:30:01,260 --> 00:30:03,419 whose job is it to determine, 943 00:30:03,420 --> 00:30:05,599 you know, how these tools 944 00:30:05,600 --> 00:30:07,439 are implemented? 945 00:30:07,440 --> 00:30:09,319 Is it the law 946 00:30:09,320 --> 00:30:10,359 enforcement agency? 947 00:30:10,360 --> 00:30:11,719 Is it a community? 948 00:30:11,720 --> 00:30:13,499 Is it state officials? 949 00:30:13,500 --> 00:30:15,719 Whose job is to say, 950 00:30:15,720 --> 00:30:16,699 you, know, this is a good idea. 951 00:30:16,700 --> 00:30:19,059 We should have a robot that 952 00:30:19,060 --> 00:30:20,959 decides that, hey, camera one, 953 00:30:20,960 --> 00:30:22,459 camera two, those guys might do 954 00:30:22,460 --> 00:30:24,419 something suspicious in a month, 955 00:30:24,420 --> 00:30:26,059 and we need to be ready for it. 956 00:30:26,060 --> 00:30:28,379 Like whose job is it to choose 957 00:30:28,380 --> 00:30:30,379 where that kind 958 00:30:30,380 --> 00:30:32,259 of 959 00:30:32,260 --> 00:30:33,699 superficial technology is being 960 00:30:33,700 --> 00:30:34,700 used, I guess. 961 00:30:35,220 --> 00:30:37,259 I think it is the 962 00:30:37,260 --> 00:30:39,199 stakeholders of 963 00:30:39,200 --> 00:30:40,020 the community. 964 00:30:40,021 --> 00:30:41,059 Is that the people? 965 00:30:41,060 --> 00:30:43,039 That is the people, 966 00:30:43,040 --> 00:30:44,879 that is the ones that 967 00:30:44,880 --> 00:30:46,619 are the manufacturers, there's the 968 00:30:46,620 --> 00:30:48,919 civil rights leaders, 969 00:30:48,920 --> 00:30:50,999 there is government. 970 00:30:51,000 --> 00:30:52,979 But the distinction here is 971 00:30:52,980 --> 00:30:54,859 that government has to lead on this 972 00:30:54,860 --> 00:30:57,419 one, because we're talking about 973 00:30:57,420 --> 00:30:58,459 government issues. 974 00:30:58,460 --> 00:30:59,479 Well, some people are concerned 975 00:30:59,480 --> 00:31:01,359 about the government because they 976 00:31:01,360 --> 00:31:04,099 take the data and 977 00:31:04,100 --> 00:31:05,939 use it in ways that some of 978 00:31:05,940 --> 00:31:07,619 them don't even know about. 979 00:31:09,450 --> 00:31:11,409 And when government 980 00:31:11,410 --> 00:31:13,190 undermines trust, 981 00:31:14,390 --> 00:31:16,369 when they're not using it in a way 982 00:31:16,370 --> 00:31:19,209 of honesty, character, 983 00:31:19,210 --> 00:31:20,949 confidence, when you don't have the 984 00:31:20,950 --> 00:31:21,949 confidence and they're using it the 985 00:31:21,950 --> 00:31:23,869 right way, they've undermined trust. 986 00:31:23,870 --> 00:31:25,089 So Thank you. 987 00:31:25,090 --> 00:31:26,139 Bye. 988 00:31:26,140 --> 00:31:28,199 I'm not speaking to a government 989 00:31:28,200 --> 00:31:29,319 that is not working. 990 00:31:29,320 --> 00:31:31,039 I am being aspirational, talking 991 00:31:31,040 --> 00:31:33,599 about if a government is working, 992 00:31:33,600 --> 00:31:35,019 they should take the lead. 993 00:31:35,020 --> 00:31:37,139 They should bring people together. 994 00:31:37,140 --> 00:31:38,979 They should talk, they bring all of 995 00:31:38,980 --> 00:31:40,759 the key stakeholders together and 996 00:31:40,760 --> 00:31:43,219 decide these key points of 997 00:31:43,220 --> 00:31:45,099 privacy, of 998 00:31:45,100 --> 00:31:47,679 things like, you know, 999 00:31:47,680 --> 00:31:50,319 public safety, of trust, 1000 00:31:50,320 --> 00:31:51,719 of all of this. Cause all of those 1001 00:31:51,720 --> 00:31:53,349 things are right there. 1002 00:31:53,350 --> 00:31:55,149 You know, the cost-benefit analysis 1003 00:31:55,150 --> 00:31:56,989 of having a drone do it or 1004 00:31:56,990 --> 00:31:58,249 a person do it. 1005 00:31:58,250 --> 00:32:00,289 All of those things are key 1006 00:32:00,290 --> 00:32:02,389 to providing public safety 1007 00:32:02,390 --> 00:32:03,379 in this country. 1008 00:32:03,380 --> 00:32:04,559 I want to get this question here 1009 00:32:04,560 --> 00:32:05,720 before we wrap up. 1010 00:32:06,760 --> 00:32:08,119 I mentioned Big Brother earlier. 1011 00:32:09,220 --> 00:32:10,959 You know, I think people understand 1012 00:32:10,960 --> 00:32:13,179 that. 1013 00:32:13,180 --> 00:32:15,559 Yeah, we're always there's 1014 00:32:15,560 --> 00:32:17,239 a camera on us. 1015 00:32:17,240 --> 00:32:19,319 And it corners and grocery stores, 1016 00:32:19,320 --> 00:32:21,239 elevators, you name 1017 00:32:21,240 --> 00:32:22,219 it. 1018 00:32:22,220 --> 00:32:23,829 Is that a good thing? 1019 00:32:23,830 --> 00:32:25,869 I don't think so, 1020 00:32:25,870 --> 00:32:27,769 because for two reasons. 1021 00:32:27,770 --> 00:32:29,629 One, and I 1022 00:32:29,630 --> 00:32:31,689 know everyone has cameras, 1023 00:32:31,690 --> 00:32:33,509 it's not just government, but 1024 00:32:33,510 --> 00:32:34,649 I don't think it's a good thing, 1025 00:32:34,650 --> 00:32:36,869 because it creates an environment 1026 00:32:36,870 --> 00:32:38,709 where we assume 1027 00:32:38,710 --> 00:32:40,929 that people are wrong. 1028 00:32:40,930 --> 00:32:43,529 It creates a surveillance mentality 1029 00:32:43,530 --> 00:32:45,169 that people have to prove themself 1030 00:32:45,170 --> 00:32:46,309 right. 1031 00:32:46,310 --> 00:32:48,529 One of the major 1032 00:32:48,530 --> 00:32:51,089 principles of this country is 1033 00:32:51,090 --> 00:32:53,239 that you are right until 1034 00:32:53,240 --> 00:32:54,799 you are innocent until proven 1035 00:32:54,800 --> 00:32:55,839 guilty. 1036 00:32:55,840 --> 00:32:57,519 Under these circumstances, if you're 1037 00:32:57,520 --> 00:32:58,739 constantly under surveillance and 1038 00:32:58,740 --> 00:33:00,779 something comes up, you have 1039 00:33:00,780 --> 00:33:02,979 to prove yourself innocent. 1040 00:33:02,980 --> 00:33:04,819 If you show up 1041 00:33:04,820 --> 00:33:07,579 as a false positive on a camera, 1042 00:33:07,580 --> 00:33:09,299 and you were there, and you're a 1043 00:33:09,300 --> 00:33:10,999 false-positive, you're going to have 1044 00:33:11,000 --> 00:33:12,879 to proof that you didn't do 1045 00:33:12,880 --> 00:33:13,879 it. 1046 00:33:13,880 --> 00:33:15,779 And that turns 1047 00:33:15,780 --> 00:33:17,999 the whole dynamic of some things 1048 00:33:18,000 --> 00:33:21,339 that for 250 1049 00:33:21,340 --> 00:33:23,389 years, was important to 1050 00:33:23,390 --> 00:33:25,729 this country, and that's 1051 00:33:25,730 --> 00:33:27,669 shifting, that constant 1052 00:33:27,670 --> 00:33:28,670 surveillance. 1053 00:33:31,260 --> 00:33:34,339 And I also want to ask you, 1054 00:33:34,340 --> 00:33:35,359 what do you see as the biggest 1055 00:33:35,360 --> 00:33:36,360 threat to policing, 1056 00:33:37,860 --> 00:33:38,719 and what do you use to see as a 1057 00:33:38,720 --> 00:33:40,559 threat to the 1058 00:33:40,560 --> 00:33:41,820 community and how it's policed? 1059 00:33:43,730 --> 00:33:46,029 Biggest threat to policing is 1060 00:33:46,030 --> 00:33:48,429 if somehow we 1061 00:33:48,430 --> 00:33:49,710 cannot get. 1062 00:33:51,920 --> 00:33:53,799 The entire apparatus 1063 00:33:53,800 --> 00:33:55,759 of government to start working on 1064 00:33:55,760 --> 00:33:57,399 these issues. 1065 00:33:57,400 --> 00:33:59,299 Because the police will be left out 1066 00:33:59,300 --> 00:34:00,300 there hanging. 1067 00:34:01,460 --> 00:34:03,449 Because... The community will ask, 1068 00:34:03,450 --> 00:34:05,349 I need for you to keep my community 1069 00:34:05,350 --> 00:34:07,229 safe, but then when they keep 1070 00:34:07,230 --> 00:34:09,049 the community safe and they make a 1071 00:34:09,050 --> 00:34:10,948 mistake, then they're going to 1072 00:34:10,949 --> 00:34:12,509 say, well, you're using technology 1073 00:34:12,510 --> 00:34:14,329 too much. 1074 00:34:14,330 --> 00:34:16,189 So the police, as 1075 00:34:16,190 --> 00:34:17,649 the ones that are delivering the 1076 00:34:17,650 --> 00:34:19,888 service, that will be 1077 00:34:19,889 --> 00:34:21,789 on their, that will, they 1078 00:34:21,790 --> 00:34:23,649 will carry the burden of 1079 00:34:23,650 --> 00:34:25,549 having to deal with all of 1080 00:34:25,550 --> 00:34:27,509 these issues. So it's important 1081 00:34:27,510 --> 00:34:29,428 that if you have a 1082 00:34:29,429 --> 00:34:30,888 law enforcement agency in your 1083 00:34:30,889 --> 00:34:32,899 jurisdiction that you help them 1084 00:34:32,900 --> 00:34:35,238 and you pull together 1085 00:34:35,239 --> 00:34:36,988 these resources to do that. 1086 00:34:36,989 --> 00:34:39,029 What was the second question again? 1087 00:34:39,030 --> 00:34:40,468 What's the biggest threat to the 1088 00:34:40,469 --> 00:34:42,089 community that's being policed? 1089 00:34:42,090 --> 00:34:43,988 The biggest threat to 1090 00:34:43,989 --> 00:34:45,908 the community as being police 1091 00:34:45,909 --> 00:34:48,388 is that we 1092 00:34:48,389 --> 00:34:50,388 lose our faith 1093 00:34:50,389 --> 00:34:52,229 in humanity. 1094 00:34:52,230 --> 00:34:54,388 That we start to believe 1095 00:34:54,389 --> 00:34:56,209 that we live in a 1096 00:34:56,210 --> 00:34:58,329 society that everyone 1097 00:34:58,330 --> 00:35:00,029 is a criminal. 1098 00:35:00,030 --> 00:35:02,069 People commit crimes at a 1099 00:35:02,070 --> 00:35:03,989 very low rate when it's all 1100 00:35:03,990 --> 00:35:04,789 said and done. 1101 00:35:04,790 --> 00:35:06,909 We should not design 1102 00:35:06,910 --> 00:35:09,069 systems solely for the purpose 1103 00:35:09,070 --> 00:35:11,669 of catching people. 1104 00:35:11,670 --> 00:35:13,729 We should design systems for 1105 00:35:13,730 --> 00:35:15,969 keeping the community safe, albeit, 1106 00:35:15,970 --> 00:35:17,909 which is very important, but 1107 00:35:17,910 --> 00:35:20,089 we should also design systems 1108 00:35:20,090 --> 00:35:21,909 that do the right thing 1109 00:35:21,910 --> 00:35:23,909 and help people and 1110 00:35:23,910 --> 00:35:26,269 help communities stay safe while 1111 00:35:26,270 --> 00:35:28,298 maintaining the public trust. 1112 00:35:28,299 --> 00:35:29,559 Yeah, and I'm going to get you to 1113 00:35:29,560 --> 00:35:30,799 look into your crystal ball on this 1114 00:35:30,800 --> 00:35:31,859 one. 1115 00:35:31,860 --> 00:35:32,860 What is the future, 1116 00:35:34,020 --> 00:35:35,539 considering we're here now, but what 1117 00:35:35,540 --> 00:35:37,299 does the future of law enforcement 1118 00:35:37,300 --> 00:35:38,979 look like in terms of technology and 1119 00:35:38,980 --> 00:35:39,879 how it's being used? What do you see? 1120 00:35:39,880 --> 00:35:41,139 What's going to be the next big to 1121 00:35:41,140 --> 00:35:42,140 do? 1122 00:35:42,500 --> 00:35:45,199 That's a tough one because 1123 00:35:45,200 --> 00:35:47,079 just as I sit here, if I go 1124 00:35:47,080 --> 00:35:49,239 back three years, everything 1125 00:35:49,240 --> 00:35:51,799 that was related to technology has 1126 00:35:51,800 --> 00:35:53,419 just expanded like you would not 1127 00:35:53,420 --> 00:35:54,279 believe. 1128 00:35:54,280 --> 00:35:56,339 It is growing so rapidly. 1129 00:35:56,340 --> 00:35:58,219 We've got data centers 1130 00:35:58,220 --> 00:36:00,499 that are powering algorithms 1131 00:36:00,500 --> 00:36:02,439 that we could never imagine 1132 00:36:02,440 --> 00:36:03,440 before. 1133 00:36:04,340 --> 00:36:06,279 So it is hard to 1134 00:36:06,280 --> 00:36:08,659 predict what's going to happen, But 1135 00:36:08,660 --> 00:36:10,919 we must try 1136 00:36:10,920 --> 00:36:13,109 if we can. 1137 00:36:13,110 --> 00:36:15,629 Keep this human-centered. 1138 00:36:15,630 --> 00:36:17,149 Justice must be human-centered. 1139 00:36:18,540 --> 00:36:19,979 From one human to another. 1140 00:36:19,980 --> 00:36:21,379 No worry, thanks for stopping by. 1141 00:36:21,380 --> 00:36:23,049 Thank you very much. 1142 00:36:23,050 --> 00:36:24,050 I appreciate you.