**20221104\_WEC.mp3**

[00:02:10] **Speaker 1** Recording in progress.

[00:02:30] **Speaker 2** Okay. We can go ahead and get started here. Thank you, everyone, for joining us today. My name is Riley Vetter and I'm the public information officer of the Wisconsin Elections Commission. Again, thanks for joining our media availability ahead of Tuesday's general election. During the availability today, Administrator Megan Wolfe will be outlining some of our preparations for Election Day. And then after that, we will take questions from the media. I'll have more details then. But what we'll ask after Megan's remarks are finished to raise your hand, and then we will call on you in the order that we receive questions. Without further ado, I hand it over to Megan. Thanks, everyone.

[00:03:06] **Speaker 1** Well, thank you. And good afternoon, everybody. I'm Megan Wolfe, the administrator of the Wisconsin Elections Commission and the state of Wisconsin's chief election official. Thanks so much for joining us today. We're just days away from the November 8th election. So I want to walk you through how we're prepared and what voters can expect as we head into Tuesday. Before I get into how we're prepared for Election Day, I'd like to briefly discuss Thursday's reports of a milwaukee election official allegedly unlawfully requesting three absentee military ballots. This came as a surprise to everyone in the Wisconsin elections community, and I am deeply disappointed in this individual's actions. This election official violated election law, undermined the trust of the public and of her fellow election workers. The actions of this single individual were swiftly detected and will have no impact on the November 8th election. We, however, recognize that the damage caused by this action is damage to public confidence, the violation of trust, cuts to the hearts of election integrity, something that the Wisconsin Election Commission and local election officials hold in the most serious regard. While the actions of this individual set us all back in our efforts to show Wisconsinites their elections are run with integrity, I have every confidence that the upcoming election will be fair and accurate. This lone individual's actions do not in any way reflect the high level of integrity that the rest of our local election officials who are your friends, neighbors and relatives bring to their job every single day. While this incident is deeply unfortunate and a violation of trust, it shows that our strong legal and election systems worked as intended to root out this alleged crime. Our understanding is that no other ballots beyond those previously reported have been affected by this individual's actions. As it relates to military ballots more generally, it's important to emphasize that military ballots themselves make up an average of 0.0% of total ballots cast in any general election. For context, in the 2018 general election, 2700 military ballots were requested and about 1500 were returned to be counted for the 2022 general election next Tuesday. So far, 2747 military ballots have been requested and about 1400 have been returned to be counted so far, meaning that the percentage of ballots is completely in line with the numbers that we've seen in the past. Now, that said, WAC and local election officials are still closely monitoring these request and any instances of fraudulent requests will be caught and will have consequences. The system is designed with many checks both by voters, clerks and state officials to identify fraudulent activity. These stunts waste clerks, valuable time clerks in each of Wisconsin's 850 cities, towns and villages are very busy making important preparations for next week. These attempts take away from the time and attention of your local officials who should be focusing on election preparations. These stunts do not impact the integrity of the election. They do not exploit vulnerabilities. They are caught, but they do cost local election officials valuable time. Time, we should all agree, is better spent preparing for the election and answering questions and concerns from the public. To put it bluntly, these attempts are illegal and irresponsible, but they will not impact the fairness or the accuracy of the November 8th election. I'd like to know shift towards talking about the approaching election on Tuesday. There are a few items to highlight in terms of how we're prepared to deliver a fair, secure and accurate election. The first is our contingency planning. Throughout the past year, the Commission and local election officials have worked with states and federal security partners to ensure we're prepared for anything that may happen on Election Day, including the remote possibility of cyber or physical threats. We have practiced our contingency plans and can say with confidence that we are prepared to work with law enforcement or other security partners to ensure that every qualified voter who wants to can exercise their right to vote on Tuesday, and that a dedicated poll workers and observers can perform their duties safely. The second item I want to mention is our post-election voting equipment audits. Not only will the unofficial election night results on Tuesday be publicly verified in the days following the election at the local, county and state levels. 10% of the reporting units across the state will be subject to post-election voting equipment audits, in which election workers will publicly hand count their ballots to compare the totals to the results from the voting equipment to ensure accuracy. A random sampling of reporting units is chosen to ensure representation from across the state and from every county in Wisconsin. This is 10% of reporting units will be the highest amount in state history. Next, I wanted to mention the transparency of our process, as you've heard me say before. Elections don't happen behind closed doors. Every aspect of the election process will be open to the public on Tuesday. From the moment the doors open at each polling place at 7 a.m. to the moment that the last absentee ballot is counted. And even as the unofficial results are transmitted from the polling place to the county. Finally, there are two concepts that members of the public and the media should keep in mind with regard to election nights. The first is that election night results are unofficial. In recent elections in Wisconsin, public misunderstanding of how election officials tabulate votes and produce unofficial results has fueled misinformation and conspiracy theories about Wisconsin's strong, decentralized system of election administration. The election results reported on election night are never the final certified results. These results have not been reviewed by County Board of Canvassers or certified by the WAC chairman. In the days between election night and certification, the unofficial results are publicly canvased and verified at the municipal, county and state level to ensure an accurate vote total prior to certification. Election night declarations of victory are based on predictions and incomplete results reported by the media, so the public should not draw hard conclusions about the results until they've gone through the statutorily required quality checks and are certified in a statutory deadline to certify is December 1st. The second important concept to keep in mind about election night is that unofficial election results may not be complete until the early morning on November 9th or later. The law does not direct WBC to centrally reports unofficial results. Instead, the law says that unofficial results are uploaded to each of the 70 to 72 counties websites on election night. The bottom line is election officials prioritize accuracy over speed always on election night when tallying the unofficial results. Results reporting in central count jurisdictions. So this is where a municipality has an ordinance in place to count all of their absentees in one location instead of at each polling place is a common source of online misinformation on election night. That and with misguided rumors about late night ballot dumps, which so doubt about the integrity of the election. So I think it's really important that we make it very clear that there are 38 municipalities and the list is posted publicly on our website that produce absentee ballots, that process absentee ballots at central count facilities and report their results a bit differently than cities that process absentee ballots at polling places. These cities report aggregated absentee results all at once. Unlike other places, that report results are produced by each individual polling place. Due to these factors, media compiling unofficial election night results may show a jump in the number of votes cast when the absentee results are added in from central count statistics. And again, there are 38 of them. And they vary in the type of jurisdictions from the village of Menomonee Falls in Waukesha County to the city of Hudson and Saint Croix. And larger jurisdictions like Milwaukee and Green Bay. Please note that this counting is happening in public with observers from the major parties present at the central count facilities. In Wisconsin, local election officials have to keep counting until they're finished. They are not able to adjourn and re adjourned the next day. And so you can observe the count even in the wee mornings of the hour as the final ballots are being counted at central count or at your polling place, depending on your jurisdiction. So those are, I think, the really key things to keep in mind when you're reporting about election night. And we really do ask for your partnership in helping us to make sure that that message is shared with voters across the state so that they understand what it is that they're looking at on election night and they understand the process and all of the important checks that are in place to make sure that the vote totals are accurate. And so with that, I think I will turn it over to Riley to see if we have any questions.

[00:14:31] **Speaker 2** Thanks, Megan. And as I said at the beginning, we will take questions from the media. At this point. I'm just raise your hand if you would like to ask a question. We'll be prioritizing the questions that that were the hand raised as opposed to those in the chat. But we will try to get to the chat if possible. And so the first question comes from Savannah. Tell me, Savannah, if Jacob, if you could meet her and then we can get to that question. Thanks.

[00:14:59] **Speaker 3** Hi. Thanks for doing this on the Friday before here. Would you be able to give me kind of an overview of what absentee and early voting has looked like so far?

[00:15:10] **Speaker 1** Yeah, that's a great question. So actually, every day we do post our statistics on our website about how many people have voted. So give me just a second here. Let me pull up our our spreadsheet. So we might have to look back on that question. I do have the data, but I don't have it in front of me. So if one of my team could send that over, that would be great.

[00:15:35] **Speaker 2** If the data today shows that there have been 754,763 ballots requested as of today, and then 642,565 ballots returned. That does include 258,713 ballots that are in-person absentee, and that's about 85% returns.

[00:15:58] **Speaker 1** Awesome. Thank you.

[00:16:04] **Speaker 2** And then we can now move to harm Van from the Abbey. Hey. Yeah, I was wondering about the that Kimberly is about a thing. Was this instance flagged in the my vote system as irregular activity since these three ballots were requested from the same IP address? And if not, do you believe this incidents would have incident would have been caught at some point had Kimberly Zapata not come forward?

[00:16:27] **Speaker 1** Yeah, this incident was caught. And I think that's really important. As were the previous instances, they were caught. There are many different checks on the process, both on the voter side. And I think it's wonderful that in these instances that we had information right away where the people that received the ballots alerted authorities, alerted us, and that we were able to look into that. That's great. That shows the system is working. But if it hadn't been caught at that very first step, there are also many other checks where, first of all, your local election official, they're going to have at least three interactions with a request for an absentee ballot. So they're going to get that request when it comes through. They're going to send out the ballot and then they're also going to receive the ballot back. And then, of course, it's sent to the polls or central count on Election Day to again be verified as part of that public process and potentially challenged. But in addition to that, the local officials are able to at any point, if they see something that's unusual, they're able to follow up on that information. And the same at the state level, if we see something that's unusual in the data, because, again, the the pool of people that we're looking at for these particular ballots, it's relatively a small pool of people. And so we're able to see every single request as it comes through. And if we see something unusual, we can work with local election officials as well as law enforcement to make sure that that that is followed up on. So I absolutely think that these would be caught, but I'm very grateful that people caught this at the very earliest stages. And so we didn't we didn't need to utilize all those additional checks.

[00:18:11] **Speaker 2** So just to clarify, was it or was it not flagged by the my vote system or was it just reported by by Juneau Branch and.

[00:18:20] **Speaker 1** So I guess I'm not sure what your your question is. I mean, I think local election officials certainly identified it, and it certainly was a part of the data that we reviewed, and it was also flagged publicly for us. So I think that, you know, all of those methods show that the process is working. And so I think they all worked in coordination to lead to the outcome that we saw.

[00:18:46] **Speaker 2** Thanks, Tom. We can now move to Kent Wainscott. Then you can go ahead and if you're unmuted. I'm sorry. Can you hear me again? Okay, great. Yeah. Thank you for taking my question. I'm sorry about that confusion. And this is just to follow up, actually, on the last question, I was going to ask something very similar, but just to clarify, on the back end of an incident like this, you did rely on the voter, the recipient of those ballots to come forward and turn those over to authorities. The checks and balances on the checks in place, rather, on the back end, if a ballot is is cast, what steps are in place to guarantee that fraudulently obtained ballot, if there is one, isn't counted?

[00:19:47] **Speaker 1** Yeah, I think those are, you know, great question. So in this instance, there was not a ballot that was returned. But when a ballot is returned, you know, that's another place where the local election official is again looking at that. But I do feel confident in this particular instance that local election officials would have identified it prior to that point or that opportunity for a ballot to be returned. But if a ballot was returned, that's another opportunity for the local election official to follow up on that information, to make any verifications that they think are appropriate. And then, of course, there's a challenge process. So those ballots have to be sent to the polling place or central count facility where a a poll worker or an observer does have the ability to also challenge the eligibility of an elector if if there's information to believe that a ballot is not lawfully cast. And so those are those are some of the ways. But again, we also have these checks in place. We're reviewing that data. And another place that this would have been cut is the commission is sending two postcards to, I should say, batches of mailings to voters who requested absentee ballots with a separate mailing address. So in these instances, the addresses because a military voter, anybody has to put in an actual address that can be geo located. So those actual addresses that were listed as the residential addresses would receive a will receive a postcard that says an absentee ballot was requested from this location. If that was it, you contact us and we'll work with law enforcement to pursue that. So there there are many different places where this could have been caught. But again, all of these were courts in the earliest stages of the process.

[00:21:46] **Speaker 2** Thank you. Thanks. And now we'll go to Patrick, Mali. If we're doing this on my questions about Twitter, Twitter's a place where a lot of misinformation can travel quickly right before an election, and the company is in the midst of a lot of layoffs. Do you have contacts directly with Twitter and are you confident that, you know, those people are still employed, that you can reach them if misinformation spreads that you feel needs to be taken down?

[00:22:17] **Speaker 1** Thank you for the question. Our office does not have direct contacts at Twitter, nor have we typically done any sort of monitoring or outreach if we identify misinformation and disinformation. So that has not been a normal part of our office's workflow. So I don't expect anything to change.

[00:22:37] **Speaker 2** And do you do anything through national organizations like Marzieh or the Secretary of State's Association, or what do you do when you see some crazy claim spreading through the Internet that can affect our people's ability to vote?

[00:22:56] **Speaker 1** Yeah, I can only really speak to Wisconsin's approach, and our approach is when we see mis or disinformation. So when we identify it through social media or through other channels is we will dig into the claim and we'll post information on our website through our fake news, and then typically we will share that information or that fake you through our social media. But our practice has generally been not to engage with the misinformation itself. And I do know that some of the other organizations like the National Association of Secretaries of State and the National Association of State Election Directors, they do have some ability to be able to report some of that misinformation. I don't know how successful those efforts have been in other states, but that's that's what we do in Wisconsin, is typically we'll handle it by producing our own fake news to address the claim.

[00:23:50] **Speaker 2** Thanks. Thanks, Patrick. We'll go to A.J by next. Thanks for doing this, guys. Megan, I've got a quick two parter here. One on the back end of the situation with the military absentee ballots being used and potentially flagged by this Milwaukee worker as what she believed was a vulnerability. Are you concerned that even though the numbers track now with the 2018 numbers so you don't think there's concern? Are you worried that public knowledge of this incident will lead to some sort of copycat effect where people will start looking for ways to potentially exploit the military ballot provisions that are less restrictive? And regarding the central count point you made. I know that each location in each community has its own constraints, but generally speaking, would you prefer communities did not do Central Council this? Would it be a concern in the first place?

[00:24:43] **Speaker 1** Thanks for the question. So in terms of other opportunities for people to exploit this same this same, you know, fraudulent activity. You know, there's a couple of things. First of all, even though the numbers do line up with the numbers from previous years, we don't see any increases or flags with the data that show us that there's anything different in terms of behavior than previous years. That doesn't mean we're not still looking at every single request that comes through the system and the ballots that are actually sent out, especially with military voters. That's part of some federal reporting requirements where we actually have to report all of the requests that are received, that are sent and that are counted. And we have to report that to the federal government as well. So those are requests that we monitor very, very, very closely and that we have to produce reports on each one of those ballots and that they were sent in a timely manner. And another thing that, you know, to keep in mind is timing. So, you know, today is the deadline for a lot of most voters, including most military voters, to make any type of absentee ballot request. And so that opportunity will no longer be available after after the deadline today at 5:00. So we will continue to monitor those very closely. We're not just relying on the trends, looking the same as previous years. We're going to work very closely with our local election officials to ensure that they are, you know, if anything looks unusual, that they are indeed following up on those. In your question about center counts, do I wish that places would would use polling place procedures rather than central counts? I don't have a opinion on that. I think that both processes have pros and cons. I think with central counts, they're able to process all their absentees in one central facility. That does offer a lot of opportunities for things like observers. So think about a central count location compared to a polling place. Polling places are usually smaller. Fewer people can fit in a polling place, typically with a central count facility. These are usually really large facilities. So you can have a lot more observers present as part of that process. And I think that observers are such an important part of the process, because if people have questions, concerns, if they think something didn't go right at the the central count location, they're going to turn to observers or maybe representatives of their party that were actually there and be able to talk to them about what really happened on the ground. And so I think that is really important. There are also efficiencies with central count, like they're able to use some of the tabulating equipment that allows them to process larger volumes of ballots more efficiently, whereas at the polls on Election Day, you have the tabulators that are designed for, you know, one ballot at a time by each individual voter. And so I think, you know, it's it's sort of a question of scale. And for some of our larger communities and the increased volume of absentees, I can see a central count really providing some additional efficiencies for some of them. But we do have some larger jurisdictions in probably the city of Madison is the most notable one as our second largest city. They don't have central count. They do polling place counting of absentees at each individual polling place. And they do a really good job and they're able to accomplish that in a really timely manner. And so I think there's going to be pros and cons of both systems. And I think that's why the law here was structured in a pretty thoughtful way, because it does require each of the jurisdictions to have an ordinance in place showing that how they're going to accomplish meeting all the central count requirements. One thing I do wish could be different is just more education around Central County. And, you know, I'll take responsibility for that, too. I think we can all take responsibility for that. It's confusing. People don't understand exactly how it works. And so I think that can be a challenge, but it's more of a communications challenge than it is actually a election administration problem.

[00:29:10] **Speaker 2** Great. Thanks for that, my friend. I'm sorry. Thanks for that question. And we'll go to Lexi Schrader next.

[00:29:20] **Speaker 3** Hi. Megan, can you hear me?

[00:29:22] **Speaker 1** I can. All right.

[00:29:23] **Speaker 3** Perfect. So, according to the Brennan Center for Justice, one in six election officials have experienced threats. 77% say they feel that threat, that's threats have increased in recent years. What do you really have to say about that? I mean, have you heard of any threats towards voters or workers in the state of Wisconsin so far this year?

[00:29:41] **Speaker 1** Well, thank you for your question. You know, and that's obviously a very serious concern for everyone. And I think some of our local election officials have, you know, talked about this publicly in some of their experiences, speaking from, you know, a state vantage point. We prepare for all sorts of things as we head into an election. So we're always preparing for what would we do or how would we respond or how would we work with law enforcement if we had a cybersecurity incident. And that's something we've been working with them on since 2016 is, you know, how do we prevent and respond if there were some kind of cyber incident when we've done that same kind of planning now looking, you know, preparing for the possibility of any kind of physical threats. I do feel very good about the fact that our law enforcement partners and our intelligence partners, both at the state, local and federal level, that they're constantly monitoring the threat environments and they have not identified any specific or credible threats to election infrastructure, including polling places on Election Day. That being said, I think they're all very cognizant, aware of the increased potential of something like that happening. And so we've all worked really closely together to make sure that we have contingency plans that we know well, law enforcement entities to engage if there were some kind of threats or incidents, and that we've not only prepared those contingency plans, but we've practiced them. And, you know, that can be that can be difficult. But we've practiced those contingencies with our local election officials. And I think that they are very well prepared to be able to respond if there were any kind of incident at the polls.

[00:31:30] **Speaker 3** Yeah. And kind of going into that, I mean, after all the hearings that the WC has kind of gone through, I mean, what do you anticipate or do you anticipate more challenges or kind of.

[00:31:41] **Speaker 1** Um, you know, I will I will continue to rely on the informed expert opinion of our law enforcement partners in terms of how we, you know, respond and how we continue to prepare. You know, that being said, I think that we'll all be on high alert after an election. Emotions are always high, especially in a state where we historically have seen such tight margins in some races. We can really see, you know, heightened emotions in the days around an election or certainly if there is a recount. So we're going to continue to monitor that. But again, I'm going to rely on the informed and expert opinion of our law enforcement and intelligence partners and that, you know, they will inform us and help us to respond appropriately if if there should be some type of threat that arises. Thank you.

[00:32:37] **Speaker 2** Thanks for that question. And we will now go to Mitchell Schmidt. Yeah. Thank you very much for the time today. So we've seen a handful of different lawsuits and court decisions relating to different aspects of elections over the last several months, whether it's absentee witness address information or the drop boxes case even earlier this year. I was just wondering if you had any sort of communication with clerks around the state and just how they're feeling going into this election, if there's any sort of levels of confusion or if it get if you get the sense that everybody is pretty much on the same page and we're all going to go for for Tuesday.

[00:33:20] **Speaker 1** Certainly any time that we see changes that are right before an election, there's absolutely an opportunity for there to be confusion both from voters and from local election officials. But that being said, I think that local election officials, they have the authority to make those decisions in terms of how to implement court decisions, how to implement state statutes. And a lot of cases, you know, they might be working with their absentee canvassers to be able to adjudicate those decisions, and they know how to do that. They've practiced that. They they do that all the time. And that really is how our law is structured, is to give those local officials and poll workers the ability to make those decisions based on the facts in front of them at the polls on Election Day. And so in that sense, I think that they are well postured and prepared to make those determinations and to act in accordance with law. But change is always hard, especially when we're already so busy just preparing for the election. And I think this year, you know, it's no secret that we've just seen such an increase in the number of open records request with things like, you know, questions, concerns, misinformation that we're all working on researching and providing information to be able to inform the public on that. You know, there's just an ever mounting set of things that our local election officials are asked to do. And it can be a real struggle, especially in some small jurisdictions, where they might only be paid by their township to be the clerk for 5 hours a week. But their jobs continue to grow and continue to have all these additional facets to it. So I think any additional changes can be a challenge, but I also feel confidence in our local election officials ability to be able to navigate those appropriately.

[00:35:20] **Speaker 2** Thank you. Thanks for that question. And now we will go to Adam, right? Hi there, Megan. Thanks for doing this. I think we all appreciate it. One of the conversations we're having internal here is about being proactive about good information, not just waiting for bad information to disprove on election night. Do you have any plans to proactively get things out periodically throughout the night, whether it's on camera like this or releases, just to reassure voters that things are going well or these are the small issues that we're having, or these are the concerns and this is exactly what it is. We often sometimes only go on when we have challenges, but we're talking about being proactive in saying so far the weak says one minor issue here, a delay in reporting, but everything's fine, that kind of thing. Any any ideas on that?

[00:36:10] **Speaker 1** Yeah, I think that's a great idea. And, you know, sometimes I wish we had more capacity to be able to do that. You know, where we're really small agency and I end up being on the phone, answering voter questions, answering clerk questions all day. But you're absolutely right. Like putting out proactive information I think has been really effective to be able to tell people this is what the law says, this is where you can expect to see is really helpful. And so we we are planning on doing some availabilities like this on Election Day. And I think Riley is going to be sending out information about that shortly. But I think that's a great idea, and I really hope that we can continue to build on that. But we will be doing some at least on Election Day, because I think you raise a great point.

[00:37:00] **Speaker 2** Appreciate it. Best of luck. Thanks.

[00:37:01] **Speaker 1** Thanks. And I will say to that, you know, please reach out with questions that you have. I mean, you know, we're going to be really busy and we're stretched. Like I said, we're a small agency. But that being said, we take your questions very seriously. We know it's important that you get out good information to the public, and we genuinely appreciate your partnership and wanting to make sure people have good information. So if you have questions or if you want to hear from us, feel free to shoot us a message and we will do our very best to get you back the answers in a timely manner.

[00:37:33] **Speaker 2** Thanks. Thanks for that question. And then finally, finally, we'll go to Jason. Thanks for taking my question. This is Jason Carroll with Fox six in Milwaukee. What is the guidelines for? Poll observers, people that are watching the election, what what guidance you have for voters about that, if maybe somebody that's not an election worker questions them to see a driver's license or something like that, what guidance you have to voters and then what are you hearing from quirks about potential worries about observers this election?

[00:38:10] **Speaker 1** Yeah. Thanks for that question. So in terms of guidelines for voters, so voters, when they're at their polling place, they should only, you know, expect to or they should only be approached by their election officials. So if they have a question that should be directed to their election officials. Every polling place has a chief inspector, and this is the person that's in charge of the polling place. And so if, you know, a voter is being approached by somebody that's not an election official within the polling place, that's not appropriate. And that's something that they should bring to the attention of the election workers, of the poll workers. Now, that being said, observers, they can certainly ask questions of the clerks, of the poll workers as part of the process. You know, they're going to be able to see some of the things like the poll book on Election Day. And those are a normal part of the process of them observing the process. But they can't be disruptive to the process and the and they can't intimidate voters. And the chief inspector is the one that has that statutory discretion to determine whether or not any activity rises to the level of a disturbance. And so, you know, that's the kind of monitoring that's going on and regular basis at each of our polling places is to make sure no activity rises to the level of a disturbance. That being said, I, I think that observer is, again, a really important part of the election process. I think it is actually a really it's really encouraging that so many people want to be engaged with the election process, want to observe it firsthand. And I think that the parties that train observers, that they take that really seriously and that, you know, I don't expect that any of the observers won't act in a professional manner. And if there are instances, individual, isolated incidences in polling places, I think that our chief election inspectors are trained and are aware of their statutory ability to be able to control that disturbance or to ask somebody to leave if it does rise to that level.

[00:40:28] **Speaker 2** Thanks for that question. Is there anyone else that has a question? I'm not seeing any hands raised in the chat, but if you do have any follow up questions, I'm I can call on you. It looks like harm from the AP has one last question. Yeah. So if an unregistered military voter uses my vote to apply for an absentee ballot for the first time, given that they only need to provide those three things name, address, date of birth, how do you verify that they're a qualified elector or even a real person?

[00:41:00] **Speaker 1** So the system and the absentee ballot request process through my vote, through email, through any sort of written application with your local election official, is implemented exactly as Wisconsin state law is designed. So Wisconsin state law says that military voters do not have to register to vote, but they do have to provide a Wisconsin residential address because that determines what ballot they're going to receive and every single request. And I think this really gets to the answer to your question. Every single request has to go through your local election officials, so they have to review that vote when they send it out, both when you apply and when that ballot if a ballot is received and returned to their office. And so your local election official is the one that has the tools and ability to be able to follow up with somebody if they think that something works unusual. So, for instance, if they saw, you know, contact or requests coming in from an unusual number of voters that were declaring themselves as military that they had not seen before in their community that are not previously in the system, that's going to probably lead to them following up with those individuals to verify that they do indeed qualify for that statutory exemption. So the system and the absentee ballot process is designed exactly as required by Wisconsin state law and by federal law, which also has additional protections for military voters to ensure that they're able to easily access their ballot.

[00:42:45] **Speaker 2** Thank you, Juan, and thank you, everyone, for joining us today. This will wrap up our media availability. I wish you all luck in covering the election. I think that's all we've got for you today. As always, if you have any questions, feel free to reach out to me. Thanks.

[00:43:02] **Speaker 1** Thank you.

[00:43:12] **Speaker 2** Who? Who?